The Real Cause of Navy Collisions? Part 2

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes its examination of the real causes behind the recent deadly collisions of U.S. Navy ships.

A Heritage Foundation report notes: “A longstanding fear has been that cyber attacks against the U.S. might result in disruptions to power, banking, and communications systems at a critical moment. The cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia, which disrupted commerce and communications, raise the specter that the U.S. might undergo the equivalent of a cyber Pearl Harbor. Efforts by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to improve verification capabilities highlight the limitations of current computer engineering skills in, for example, diagnosing cyber intrusions. Initial studies on the Trusted Integrated Circuit program, seeking to create a secure supply chain, were requested in 2007. As of late 2010, DARPA was still seeking new research proposals for determining whether a given chip was reliable, and whether it had been maliciously modified, as part of the Integrity and Reliability of Integrated Circuits (IRIS) program.

“A more recent worry is vulnerabilities “hardwired” into the physical infrastructure of the Internet. In the last several years, the FBI has warned that counterfeit computer parts and systems may be widespread. This can manifest itself in two ways: fake parts and systems, which may fail at dangerously higher rates, or contaminated systems that might incorporate hardwired backdoors and other security problems, allowing a foreign power to subvert a system. Similar problems have been identified by American allies; the U.K. has identified counterfeit parts entering into its military supply chain. Much cyber-related attention has been focused on the PRC. China is reportedly the source of many of the hacking efforts directed at U.S. military and security computer networks. Chinese computer infiltration has reputedly obtained access to such sensitive programs as F-35 design information.”

With the summer Olympics due to kick off in Beijing this August, all eyes will be turned to China and to on line levitra the sporting world. The rate shop viagra of incidence is higher in the quality. Anyhow more sildenafil pills has placed very well impact in positive to the curing of this disorder. levitra works in an excellent manner by curing it completely ensuring a 100% result to the consumer. Other than curing erectile dysfunction Vardenafil also helps in treating premature ejaculation, as it considerably increases the time-period cialis canadian prices between vaginal penetration and ejaculation, thus making your every sex session much better and last longer. In 2012, John Reed, in a Defense Tech article, noted: “For years, everyone has warned that counterfeit microchips made in China and installed on American military hardware could contain viruses or secret backdoors granting the Chinese military cyber access to U.S. weapons systems. These warnings/predictions recently expanded beyond counterfeit parts, now we’re worried that any Chinese-made components could be infected…a scientist at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom claims to have developed a software program proving that China — and anyone else — can, and is, installing cyber backdoors on some of the world’s most secure, ‘military grade’microchips…Basically, Chinese cyber spies can gain use the chip’s built-in malware to decipher military passcodes and gain remote access to the chip and reprogram it to do their bidding; ‘permitting a new and disturbing possibility of a large-scale Stuxnet-type attack via a network or the Internet on the silicon itself,’ reads his report. The worst part, this backdoor, installed on chips used on critical weapons systems and public infrastructure around the word, is almost impossible to remove from the chip since, well, it was built into the device during manufacturing. That mean’s you can’t just issue a software patch to repair the vulnerability. The backdoor is close to impossible to fix on chips already deployed because, unlike software bugs in a PC Operating System, you cannot issue a patch to fix this. Instead one has to replace all the hardware which could be extremely expensive. It may simply be a matter of time before this backdoor opportunity, which has the potential to impact on many critical systems, isexploited.Having a security related backdoor on a silicon chip jeopardises any efforts of adding software level protection. This is because an attacker can use the underlying hardware to circumvent the software countermeasures.

USATODAY reports that In 2013 a group of graduate students were able to successfully spoof an $80 million yacht’s GPS system, sending it hundreds of yards off course without the ship’s navigation system showing the change to the crew.

This may be precisely what China, using its Trojan Horse chips foolishly or unknowingly purchased by the Pentagon, may be doing to the U.S. Navy, intentionally causing collisions, perhaps as a warning to Washington to refrain from taking military action against Beijing’s client state, North Korea.

Quick Analysis

What Would War with Taiwan be Like

There is a coming conflict with Taiwan. What remains uncertain is the nature of that conflict. A newly released report this week by the Global Taiwan Institute’s (GTI) John Dotson argues that political warfare is a key component of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) attempt to undermine and achieve annexation of Taiwan. The CCP’s goal, he says, is to force the subjugation of the island’s citizens and democratic society and place it under “full CCP political Control.” Chinese directed propaganda and disinformation, elite cooption, political subversion, and coercive military and economic actions all are connected by a prominent link – they are actions intended for psychological effect. They are also methods of political warfare in an ongoing, persistent, and multi-faceted campaign against Taiwan. Information warfare used by Beijing against Taipei manipulates the news to change the attitudes of the population. Is it working? Dotson says that China is successfully exercising influence of “content and editorial coverage in traditional media outlets such as newspapers and television news channels, largely by leveraging influence through local proxy figures—in particular, wealthy businesspersons who have extensive financial equities in China.” He suggests that Beijing employs a “pink model” to push pro-CCP content into social media news feeds, not unlike what China does inside the United States. Using algorithmic targeting, Beijing is able to attack selected demographic targets who are more vulnerable to disinformation. Its goal is to further sow confusion and reduce cognitive resistance to pro-CCP’s narratives. Encouraging a population to believe false information by reducing a group’s opposition to it is a common practice among intelligence agencies and politicians alike. First, a population is provided with several scenarios that are easily accepted as true. In a simple example, one might read that at noon the sun is high in the sky, the clock says 12:00 pm, and many people are eating lunch. These points are easily accepted as true. The human brain at this point becomes more susceptible to accepting new information that may be false as it is programmed to let its guard done. The CCP follows by planting real information among false facts to make it easier to accept and digest. It doesn’t stop at disinformation, Beijing is also leveraging its toolkit in a related field, “legal warfare (法律戰), to promote its interpretation of international law and diplomatic practice. Yet another major category of concern in the CCP’s political warfare against Taiwan is known as “gray zone operations.” These are more closely related to military actions and include activities such as the aerial and maritime encroachment of Taiwan’s territory. The goal is to erode the concept of sovereignty and security. The United States is experiencing “gray zone” operations on our own southern border. In Taiwan, these include China’s overflight of Taiwan’s airspace by military aircraft. These events are increasing in both number and intensity as they grow close to the island itself. Simultaneously, China’s PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), through its coast guard “law enforcement” operations are challenging Taipei’s outer islands. Dotson points out that the “paramount objective in such operations is the intended psychological effect on Taiwan’s population.” Another related area according to the GTI report is increasing economic coercion. China is attempting to deny Taiwan market access, ban its imports, and limit politically-oriented trade and investment opportunities. The intent is to “punish groups within Taiwan for developments to which Beijing objects, to isolate Taiwan internationally, and to pressure other countries and international companies to conform to Beijing’s preferred policies on Taiwan,” says Dotson. To date, Taiwan has suffered from attempts to ban Taiwan’s export of agricultural products. Beijing has also punished countries who willingly import from Taiwan and have close relations with Taipei. Perhaps one of the most misunderstood areas of China’s political warfare campaign against Taiwan revolves around its “united front work.” This embraces a range of measures that Dotson says include both financial and psychological cooption and include the use of front organizations and political subversion. In Taiwan, China is coopting business and political elites, funding and manipulating local organizations (temple societies) and offering support to fringe political parties that can be used to destabilize Taiwan and spread the CCP’s propaganda. Western militaries analyze the likelihood of kinetic warfare but spend less time on the impacts of political warfare. The free world cannot overlook what is happening in Taiwan and needs to recognize that Chinese political warfare extends across the globe. Beijing may not need to physically capture the island by force if it wins using a clandestine political warfare model of conflict. Then the question becomes, “Who is next?” Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept. Illustration: Pixabay