Russia Moves to Dominate Arctic, Part 2

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes its report on Russian domination of the Arctic.

According to Pavel Devyatkin, writing for The Arctic Institute “Russia has increased Arctic military drills, opened or reopened military bases, constructed icebreakers, and established advanced radar stations to enhance its control of the region…US Secretary of Defense James Mattis declared that Russia is taking ‘aggressive steps’ to increase its presence in the Arctic…the Basics of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Region declared that all activities in the Arctic should be tied to the interests of ‘defense and security to the maximum degree.’ “In February 2013, Russia’s official Arctic strategy was expanded when President Putin approved the Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and the Provision of National Security for the Period Until 2020… [it notes that] National security in the Arctic requires an advanced naval, air force and army presence in the Arctic. Further aims include developing the Russian icebreaker fleet, modernizing the air service and airport network, and establishing modern information and telecommunication infrastructure. In August 2007, Russia resumed strategic bomber and Northern Fleet patrols in its Arctic waters for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Russia has also invested significantly in its naval capacity in the Arctic. The Northern Fleet is…the most powerful of the four Russian fleets with the greatest number of icebreakers and submarines. The Northern Fleet’s sea-based nuclear deterrence capability makes it a fundamental part of Russia’s military. Russia has expanded naval patrols near Norwegian and Danish territories, increased the operational radius of the Fleet’s submarines, and commenced below-ice training for submarines.

“The Ministry of Defense has announced that they aim to put more than 100 military facilities into operation in 2017. Since 2015, Russia has constructed six new bases that have included new airfields, ports and army bases.¹⁶⁾ These actions show that Russian security policy in the Arctic is more than simply upgrading existing military infrastructure…In addition, traditional armed forces are becoming involved in the Arctic to learn military tactics for Arctic warfare. Although Russia’s military activities in the Arctic are mostly aerial and naval, there are garrisons of Russian ground troops and security services throughout the Russian Arctic.”

Beyond icebreakers and bases, 2018 has been an active year for Russia’s militarization of the Arctic. A Telegraph report filed by Alec Luhn in Moscow noted that the nation’s annual Victory Day Parade featured a new “fighting snowmobile” equipped with a machine gun. “With a speed of 40 miles per hour and a range of 300 miles, the snowmobile keeps its two-man crew warm in an enclosed cabin and… [has] a 7.62mm PKP machine gun mounted on the back.

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Deemer notes that “At present, NATO and the United States lack a well-developed strategy to address and counter Russian aggression in the Arctic. … NATO and the United States should instead pursue a renewed strategy of containment, constructing military installations in two specific regions: northern Norway and northwestern Alaska. Expanding on a January 2017 reshuffling of troops that led to 300 U.S. Marines being stationed at Vaernes Air Base, NATO should construct bases in the Norwegian states of Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark. At the same time, military installations in the Northwest Arctic, North Slope, and Kotzebue Sound would provide a NATO presence at the mouth of the Northern Sea Route. An already-established Canadian and Danish military presence on the opposite side of the Arctic and in Greenland would complete this strategy of containment. Russia would find itself with NATO forces to the west in Norway, the east in Alaska, and to the north across the Arctic. Any Russian territorial claims could be legitimately disputed and Russia would largely be limited to resources found on the Russian mainland, maintaining the global power equilibrium and advancing U.S. interests abroad…[However] any diversion of NATO troops to pursue such a strategy would inevitably leave NATO less formidable elsewhere, namely in Western Europe.”

Photo: U.S. Navy

The submarine USS Connecticut and fast-attack submarine USS Hartford breakthrough the ice in support of Ice Exercise 2018 near Ice Camp Skate in the Arctic Circle

Quick Analysis

Part 3: AMERICA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE

We conclude our summary of the urgent recommendation of the Congressional Committee on the nation’s Strategic Posture NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES The Commission recommends: The United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space. The United States and its Allies take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture. The United States prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned. x America’s Strategic Posture The United States develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.4 The Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced IAMD capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses. The DOD should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible. The Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 October 2024. This will allow the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to focus on research, development, prototyping and testing. ALLIES AND PARTNERS The Commission believes it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain, strengthen, and when appropriate, expand its network of alliances and partnerships. These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets. Withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly benefit adversaries, invite aggression that the United States might later have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American, allied, and partner security and economic prosperity. Further, the Commission believes that our defense and the defense of the current international order is strengthened when Allies can directly contribute to the broader strategic posture, and the United States should seek to incorporate those contributions as much as possible. The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations. RISK REDUCTION The Commission believes it is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces. The Commission recommends that a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission recommends that once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security. The Commission recommends that the United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities and conduct research into potential verification technologies in order to support or enable future negotiations in the U.S. national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types, should the geopolitical environment change. Where formal nuclear arms control agreements are not possible, the Commission recommends pursuing nuclear risk reduction measures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty and the chances for misperception and miscalculation. The 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that the United States was at “a moment of opportunity, . . .but also a moment of urgency” – because the security environment had improved and the threat of nuclear proliferation was the principal concern. Since 2009, the security environment has dramatically worsened and new existential threats have emerged. This Commission concludes that the United States now faces a highstakes challenge that requires urgent action. Nevertheless, the Commission has not seen the U.S. government demonstrate the urgency and creativity required to meet the challenge. Nothing other than synchronized steps taken by the Executive and Legislative Branches will craft the strategy and build the posture the nation requires. The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now. Photo: An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during a test at Vandenberg Space Force Base (DoD)