Who is Entering the Kremlin’s Military?

Russian war dead in Ukraine likely exceed 300,000 according to US officials, with another 180,000 wounded in the war. Those estimates dwarf Ukrainian losses, which are estimated to be 70,000 killed with slightly more than 100,000 wounded. Although Russia’s uniformed military including the Wagner group mercenary force is almost three times larger than Ukraine’s 1.3 million soldiers, Putin is being forced to recruit heavily in Central Asia to fill the ranks. It is becoming more challenging for Russia to recruit in Kyrgyzstan as it is illegal for their citizens to participate in the armed hostilities as a mercenary serving Russia. Although that does not bode well for the Kremlin, Putin is pushing back against the Central Asian elites balking about supplying men for his war.

Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court on August 30 held a criminal hearing in the case against one of its national’s, Askara Kubanychbek-uulu. He was detained by the country’s State Committee for National Security in January 2023 and in May sentenced to 10 years for participating in the Ukraine war, before the case was revisited and a new trial set. Nurbek Bekmurzaev, of the Jamestown Foundation, says that in June 2022 Kubanychbek-uulu signed a contract with the “armed forces” of the so-called Luhansk “people’s republic” to obtain Russian citizenship.

The Russian publication RT on July 19 reported that he requested the Kremlin grant him a Russian passport and extricate him from prison. This marks what appears to be the first case of a Central Asian citizen convicted for participating illegally in the war in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. Analysts expect there will be additional cases. Despite Central Asian states attempting to discourage participation as mercenaries, Russia is continuing to step up its efforts to recruit as its domestic efforts falter.

According to Kaktus Media, Kirill Kabanov, a member of the Russian Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, promised to speed the passport process for Kubanychbek-uulu, stating that Russia “is obliged to use all possible pressure mechanisms in response to clearly unfriendly actions on the part of the Kyrgyz authorities.” Putin needs to reinforce his armed forces and cannot afford the Central Asian courts to discourage recruits. After the initial ruling Moscow started exerting pressure on Bishkek to drop the charges. Both the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior were involved in the operation to free Kubanychbek-uulu.

Central Asian migrants, notes Bekmurzaev, “present a large pool of potential recruits and allow the Kremlin to avoid having to mobilize ethnic Russians in its city centers. If the Kremlin is to succeed with these recruitment efforts, it cannot ignore such cases as Kubanychbek-uulu’s and leave Central Asians who fought on the Russian side rotting in prison in their home countries.” C. Krishnasai, writing in WION on September 4, says that since late June “Russian miliary reportedly put up military advertisements targeting Armenian and Kazakhstani migrants, offering down payments of 45,000 rubles, equivalent to about US $5,140 and staring salaries of 190,000 rubles, or US $1,973 dollars.”

Krishnasai adds that the UK Ministry of Defense reports that there are upwards of 6 million Central Asian migrants inside the Russian Federation, all of whom are “potential recruits” in the Kremlin’s eyes. As of May 2022, there were 3.35 million labor migrants, according to a Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration analysis publish in June 2022, entitled, “Monitoring the Economic Situation in Russia: Tendencies and Challenges of Socio-economic Development.” Eighty-three percent of the migrants arrived from Central Asia and work in the service and construction industries on large infrastructure projects. It was a natural transition for them to enter the military sphere. The Jamestown Foundation reports that the first video evidence of Russian recruitment of Central Asians coincided with the first day of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. It depicts an Uzbek male in uniform driving a truck in the Luhansk region of Ukraine. The video reported that many Tajiks and Uzbeks already had signed contracts to join the Russian invasion.

The Russian government as early as spring 2022 attempted to threaten Central Asians possessing Russian passports, which are required for working in Russia, with losing their citizenship if they failed to appear when summoned to Russian enlistment centers. Although it was not legally required, the intimidation appears pervasive. Those without Russian passports were promised one immediately upon their contract completion of military service. In addition to Moscow recruiting Central Asians, the Wagner Group also sought prisoners from the region and brought them to its training center in Molkino, Russia. The Asiaplus publication in Tajikistan reported last June that at least 93 Central Asian prisoners from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan died while fighting in Ukraine.

As desperation seeps throughout the corridors of the Kremlin, it is likely Russian officials will increase their coercion of migrant workers to join the ranks of its military fighting in Ukraine. Earlier this month Uzbek nationals arriving in Mariupol as construction workers were tricked into fighting on the front lines in Ukraine after contract papers, they were required to sign, had a small section of the document designating them as military. With the 2024 Russian elections looming on the horizon, Putin cannot risk the widespread alienation of Russian voters. Bekmurzaev argues that a new verdict in Kubanychbek uulu’s case may expose just how desperate Putin is this fall and how weak the Central Asian elites are if they cave to Russia’s demands. The outcome of the war in Ukraine is far from decided.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Photo: Pixabay

Quick Analysis

Part 3: AMERICA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE

We conclude our summary of the urgent recommendation of the Congressional Committee on the nation’s Strategic Posture NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES The Commission recommends: The United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space. The United States and its Allies take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture. The United States prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned. x America’s Strategic Posture The United States develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.4 The Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced IAMD capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses. The DOD should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible. The Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 October 2024. This will allow the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to focus on research, development, prototyping and testing. ALLIES AND PARTNERS The Commission believes it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain, strengthen, and when appropriate, expand its network of alliances and partnerships. These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets. Withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly benefit adversaries, invite aggression that the United States might later have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American, allied, and partner security and economic prosperity. Further, the Commission believes that our defense and the defense of the current international order is strengthened when Allies can directly contribute to the broader strategic posture, and the United States should seek to incorporate those contributions as much as possible. The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations. RISK REDUCTION The Commission believes it is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces. The Commission recommends that a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission recommends that once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security. The Commission recommends that the United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities and conduct research into potential verification technologies in order to support or enable future negotiations in the U.S. national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types, should the geopolitical environment change. Where formal nuclear arms control agreements are not possible, the Commission recommends pursuing nuclear risk reduction measures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty and the chances for misperception and miscalculation. The 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that the United States was at “a moment of opportunity, . . .but also a moment of urgency” – because the security environment had improved and the threat of nuclear proliferation was the principal concern. Since 2009, the security environment has dramatically worsened and new existential threats have emerged. This Commission concludes that the United States now faces a highstakes challenge that requires urgent action. Nevertheless, the Commission has not seen the U.S. government demonstrate the urgency and creativity required to meet the challenge. Nothing other than synchronized steps taken by the Executive and Legislative Branches will craft the strategy and build the posture the nation requires. The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now. Photo: An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during a test at Vandenberg Space Force Base (DoD)