Chinese Military Power 2018

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its summary of the The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual examination of China’s military power. The second part of key sections of the Executive Summary is provided, below.

THE U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP IN CONTEXT

The 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recognize the growing trend of military competition in a dynamic security environment. The United States will continue to seek areas of cooperation with competitors, while preserving the ability to compete successfully from a position of strength. The United States seeks a constructive and results- oriented relationship with China. U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2017 were designed to support overall U.S. policy and strategy toward China. They are carefully tailored to clarify and develop areas of cooperation where it is in our mutual interest and to manage and reduce risk; contacts are also conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

While the Department of Defense engages substantively with the People’s Liberation Army, DoD will also continue to monitor and adapt to China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization. The United States will adapt its forces, posture, investments, and operational concepts to ensure it retains the ability to defend the homeland, deter aggression, protect our allies and partners, and preserve regional peace, prosperity, and freedom.

SPECIAL TOPIC: OVERWATER BOMBER OPERATIONS

The PLA has long been developing air strike capabilities to engage targets as far away from China as possible. Over the last three years, the PLA has rapidly expanded its overwater bomber operating areas, gaining experience in critical maritime regions and likely training for strikes against U.S. and allied targets. The PLA may continue to extend its operations beyond the first island chain, demonstrating the capability to strike U.S. and allied forces and military bases in the western Pacific Ocean, including Guam. Such flights could potentially be used as a strategic signal to regional states, although the PLA has thus far has not been clear what messages such flights communicate beyond a demonstration of improved capabilities.

Western Pacific. PLA aircraft first operated beyond the first island chain in 2013, when a PLAN ASCM- capable H-6G bomber transited through the Bashi Channel; however, the H-6G bomber lacks the range and endurance to patrol the western Pacific Ocean effectively and strike key U.S. and allied facilities. China began to field the longer-range H-6K bomber in 2013, incorporating cruise missile pylons to turn the bomber into a stand-off strike platform. The H-6K’s capabilities provided the PLAAF an offensive strike capability against Guam with LACMs.
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The PLAAF began flying the H-6K past the First Island Chain into the western Pacific Ocean in 2015, alternating transits through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel and flying within LACM range of Guam. In 2016, the PLAAF improved its capabilities by adding AWACS and fighter aircraft to its bomber flight packages to provide defensive counter-air protection of the bombers beyond the first island chain.

In 2016, the PLAAF also circumnavigated Taiwan for the first time by passing through both the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel in the same mission, and significantly increased the number of circumnavigation missions in 2017. In addition to long-range flight plans, future H-6 missions may also target Taiwan. Depending on the weapons load, potential future H-6 missions could include anti- ship or shorter-range strikes targeting eastern Taiwan from all directions or supporting a blockade. Currently, such missions are vulnerable without defense counter-air support provided by fighters traveling along the route with the bombers.

South China Sea. In 2016, China began flying H-6K missions in the South China Sea, probably as far as Scarborough Reef, conducting maritime patrols and ISR. H-6s could, if deployed to airfields in the Spratly Islands, extend their range through the Balabac Strait into the Celebes Sea or through the Sunda or Malacca Strait to fly into the Indian Ocean.

Sea of Japan. In August 2016, two PLAN H-6 bombers accompanied by a Y-8 AEW&C aircraft conducted the first PLA flights into the Sea of Japan. In January 2017, they flew the same route, this time with six bombers supported by two reconnaissance aircraft. In August 2017, the PLAAF further expanded the PLA’s operating area by sending six PLAAF H-6K bombers through the Miyako Strait, and for the first time, turned north to fly east of Okinawa and as far north as the Kii Peninsula. These flights demonstrated a maturing capability for H-6K bombers to conduct off-axis strikes against U.S. and allied facilities. Previously demonstrated flight endurance of the PLAAF H-6K suggest future missions could fly around Japan, along the Philippines’ coast, and use a wider area of operations throughout the Philippine Sea than current operations by Chinese aircraft.

Photo: Chinese forces train for amphibious attacks. (Chinese Ministry of Defense)

The U.S. Department of Defense has provided its annual examination of China’s military power to Congress. The Executive Summary is provided, below. A discussion on Chinese pilots training to target the U.S. will be provided tomorrow

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018

Executive Summary

WHAT IS CHINA’S STRATEGY?

Since 2002, Chinese leaders – including President Xi Jinping – have characterized the 21st century’s initial two decades as a “period of strategic opportunity.” They assess that international conditions during this time will facilitate domestic development and the expansion of China’s “comprehensive national power.” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has distilled these objectives into President Xi’s “China Dream of national rejuvenation” to establish a powerful and prosperous China.

GROWING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PRESENCE

China’s leaders increasingly seek to leverage China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand the country’s international influence. “One Belt, One Road,” now renamed the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues. Countries participating in BRI could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could leverage to achieve its interests. For example, in July 2017, Sri Lanka and a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) signed a 99-year lease for Hambantota Port, following similar deals in Piraeus, Greece, and Darwin, Australia.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO MANAGING REGIONAL DISPUTES

China seeks to secure its objectives without jeopardizing the regional stability that remains critical to the economic development that has helped the CCP maintain its monopoly on power. However, China is also willing to employ coercive measures – both military and non-military – to advance its interests and mitigate opposition from other countries. For example, in 2017, China used economic and diplomatic pressure, unsuccessfully, in an attempt to urge South Korea to reconsider the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

In its regional territorial and maritime disputes, China continued construction of outposts in the Spratly Islands, but also continued outreach to South China Sea claimants to further its goal of effectively controlling disputed areas. China also maintained a consistent coast guard presence in the Senkakus. In June 2017, India halted China’s efforts to extend a road in territory disputed with Bhutan near the India border, resulting in a protracted standoff lasting more than 70 days. In August, India and China agreed to withdraw their military forces from the vicinity of the standoff; however, both countries maintain a heightened military presence in the surrounding region.

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In support of the goal to establish a powerful and prosperous China, the “China Dream” includes a commitment to developing military power commensurate with that of a great power. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the requirement for a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) able to secure Chinese national interests overseas, including a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime and information domains, offensive air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations.

The PLA is undergoing the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars” – regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control, and precision strike. Reforms seek to streamline command and control structures and improve jointness at all levels. Personnel cuts likely targeted non-combat personnel and rebalanced the preponderance of forces away from the PLA Army (PLAA).

Training continued to focus on executing large-scale, complex joint operations. This included increasing exercise realism by evaluating unit performance during force-on- force confrontations against dedicated opposing-force units, strengthening strategic campaign training, and executing long-distance maneuvers and mobility operations. The CCP also continued vigorous efforts to root out corruption in the armed forces.

China’s leaders continued to advance an ambitious military modernization and organizational reform agenda to achieve those requirements. China’s military modernization targets capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. operational and technological advantages. To support this modernization, China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual- use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to these technologies. Several recent cases and indictments illustrate China’s use of intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches to obtain national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials.

Additionally, as China’s global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization program has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and noncombatant evacuation operations. In August 2017, China officially opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, deploying a company of marines and equipment to the base. China likely will seek to establish additional military logistics facilities in countries with which it has longstanding, friendly relationships.

CONTINUED POLITICAL AND SECURITY PREPARATIONS VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN

China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. Taiwan lost an additional diplomatic partner in 2017, and international fora denied participation or observership to representatives from Taiwan. While China advocates for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, China has never repudiated the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. Taiwan’s 2017 National Defense Report cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan pose an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait.”

The Report Concludes Tomorrow, with a Special Section in which the Department of Defense discusses the training of Chinese pilots to strike the U.S.

Photo: Chinese Air Force aerobatics team departs for performance in Russia (Chinese Ministry of Defense photo)

Quick Analysis

Russia Expanding Aggression

President Putin is using more than one pathway to enter Europe and undermine the West. While most of the world watches the conflict he initiated in Ukraine, the Russian government is actively pursuing a second front in a little noticed campaign in Cyprus. Although the corrupt Cypriot government ended its issuance of “golden passports” in 2020, Russian intelligence is functioning quietly there to transform this EU country into a Russian beachhead of illicit economic activity aimed at penetrating the capitalist West, according to Paul Goble of the Jamestown Foundation. Cyprus is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor does it receive as much attention as those countries who are member states. That adds to its allure as a prime location for Russia to attempt to gain a European foothold. Last week a NATO report, cited in the European Daily Monitor, noted that Russian intelligence agents have been plotting to destroy European infrastructure across the continent to disrupt states supporting Ukraine. It further suggests that Putin’s immediate goal is to lay the framework for a future move against the security organization’s members. Hungary, in particular, is another country garnering Moscow’s attention as it opposes the Western response to Russian aggression. Russia is focusing its intelligence efforts on other European, non-NATO member countries in addition to Cyprus, including Austria, Malta, and Ireland. The NATO report suggests that Moscow has had success in disseminating the Russian political narrative in these states to advance its campaign against the West. The island of Cyprus is proving to be a good target for Moscow as it is an ethnically divided island that is part of the EU since 2004. Northern Cyprus, officially called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), is a de facto state that is only recognized by Turkey. The division precludes it from joining NATO. As Goble suggests, “it offers Russia troubled waters in which to fish.” Over the last 20 years, he points out, Cyprus’ challenges have opened it to a massive influx of Russian citizens, who now comprise approximately 10 percent of the island state’s population. Over 2,900 residents are Russians who entered until the “golden passport” program that allowed wealthy or well-connected Russians to move to Cyprus. It also provided them with documentation to travel freely throughout Europe! Although less visible on the world’s radar than the war in Ukraine, Moscow is also being helped by Cyprus’ banks opposition to seizing Russian assets and its support in evading Western sanctions. Russia has placed tens of billions of US Dollars there for money laundering. It has been more than two years since a single Russian “diplomat” has been deported and, in fact, the Embassy has grown to over 300 staffers on this tiny island state of only 1.2 million people. The Russian embassy in Nicosia has advanced communications antennae on its roof and opened a consulate on the northern end of the island. Moscow’s Ambassador, Mura Zyazikov, is a lieutenant general in the FSB with no diplomatic experience. The FSB, SVR (Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service), and GRU are actively using the island as a base of operations against NATO Member states, Israel, and other Western allies. Moscow backs pro-Russian political parties who in turn influence Cypriot decisions on education, language, and other issues. “Dmitry Khmelnitsky of the Dossier Center says that its findings should be of concern not only to Cyprus but to the West as a whole. Those who ignore what Moscow is doing because Cyprus does not follow the EU sanctions regime are missing something critical,” says Goble. “Cyprus does not seek to get rid of Russian agents and does not interfere with their work,” Khmelnitsky concludes, “despite the fact that what the Kremlin is doing is so clearly visible.” This has an impact not only on the small island but on the EU, NATO, and the West in general. Earlier this year the Moscow Times reported that when the FBI became more interested in Russian business and oligarchs in Cyprus, at least 10 of the major Russian businesses operating there left. Despite the government of Cyprus’ vow to implement plans for new sanctions against Russia, it continues to ignore Putin’s atrocities in Ukraine and to shield the wealth of the 50,000 wealthy Russian citizens and oligarchs residing there. Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept. Illustration: Pixabay