The FBI has issued a warning to academia concerning the growing threat of foreign espionage. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government has reviewed the document, and presents key excerpts of it.
More than 1.4 million international students and professors were participating in America’s open and collaborative academic environment. This open environment puts academia at risk for exploitation by foreign actors who do not follow our rules or share our values.
Some Foreign actors, particularly foreign state adversaries, s to illicitly or illegitimately acquire U.S. academic research and information to advance their scientific, economic and military development goals. By doing so, they can save their countries significant time, money, and resources while achieving generational advances I technology. Through their exploitative efforts, they reduce U.S. competitiveness and deprive victimized parties of revenue and credit for their work. Foreign adversaries’ acquisition efforts can come in many forms, including overt theft, plagiarism, elicitation, and the commercialization of early-stage collaborative research.
As foreign adversaries use increasingly sophisticated and creative methodologies to exploit America’s free and open education environment, the United States faces an ever greater challenge to strike a sustainable balance between unrestricted sharing and sufficient security within this education ecosystem.
Foreign adversaries exploit America’s deeply held and vital culture of collaboration and openness on university campuses, with the Chinese government posing a particular threat to U.S. academia for a variety of reasons. First, it does not play by the same rules of academic integrity that U.S. educational institutions observe. Many recent high-profile examples show plagiarism is commonplace throughout Chinese academic and research institutions.
The Chinese government has historically sponsored economic espionage, and China is the world’s principal infringer of intellectual property. The annual cost to the U.S. economy of counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade secrets is between $225 billion and $600 billion.
The Chinese government uses some Chinese students, mostly post-graduate students and post doctorate researchers studying science, technology, engineering and mathematics, and professors to operate as non-traditional collectors, wittingly or unwittingly, of economic, scientific and technological intelligence from U.S. institutions to ultimately benefit Chinese academic institutions and businesses.
Regardless of the motive, this exploitation comes at great cost to U.S. interests. When these foreign academics unfairly take advantage of the U.S. academic environment, they do so at a cost to the institutions that host them, as well as to the greater U.S. innovation ecosystem in which they play a role. Directly or indirectly, their actions cost money, jobs, expertise, sensitive information, advanced technology, first-mover advantage, and domestic incentive to innovate.
Foreign adversaries leverage joint research opportunities, language and cultural training, unsolicited invitations, visiting students and professors, and state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage to support However, levitra samples amerikabulteni.com what if you learned that the paper that wraps these drive-through delicacies was worse for you than the food they hold? This would be important news. Make sure you take the medicine as per the doctor amerikabulteni.com sample viagra prescription s prescription. Generally doctors suggest people to have those medicines for the issue but we have to see and chose the ones that are worth taking for the issue. online pharmacy sildenafil is a generic drug which is comparatively cheaper to the other drugs but that does not really mean that it compromises over the quality. If you have vague goals, you will get vague results, if order levitra http://amerikabulteni.com/2012/10/31/abd-sandynin-karanliginda-cadilar-bayramini-halloween-kutluyor/ any at all. their military and commercial research, development, and acquisition.
[Foreign adversaries a variety of tactics, including:]
TALENT RECRUITMENT OR “BRAIN GAIN” PROGRAMS that encourage the transfer of original ideas ad intellectual property from U.S. universities.
FOREIGN STUDENTS OR VISITING PROFERSSORS [may be] coerced into reporting on the research they are doing in the United States, or [they are] offered scholarships or funding in exchange for the information.
LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL TRAINING opportunities can enable foreign adversaries to use universities not only to increase their understanding of the local language and culture, but also to make contacts.
FUNDING AND DONATIONS provided by foreign adversaries can enable universities to establish cultural centers, support academic programs, or facilitate joint research while also fostering goodwill and trust between the donor organization and the university. However, a foreign adversarial organization could place stipulations on how the programs or centers function or install its own recruits in positions with little or no university oversight.
ELICITATION of information about research can come in many forms. A foreign adversary might try to elicit information by using flattery, assuming knowledge, asking leading questions, claiming a mutyual interest, or feigning ignorance.
JOINT RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENT, such as incubators or joint research centers, can enable a foreign adversary to obtain research. They an also provide an opportunity to spot, assess, and befriend fellow STEM students or researchers who might assist, either wittingly or unwittingly, in passing research and development to a foreign adversary.
FOREIGN TRAVEL an leave American students, professors, and researchers vulnerable to targeting through searches of luggage and hotel rooms, extensive questioning, manufacture of compromising situations, and confiscation of electronics.
FOREIGN VISITORS entering sensitive research areas can pose a security risk to intellectual property or competitive edge. Some visitors might verbally elicit information, some might brazenly ignore security parameters of a tour, and others might use concealed electronic devices to obtain restricted information or access.
Illustration: Pixabay
