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DHS Attempted to Stonewall Ebola Investigation

According to a worrisome report by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of the Inspector General,  (OIG) DHS’s response to the Ebola epidemic in 2014 was flawed. It also appears that DHS attempted to stonewall the inquiry into its problematic response.

Following the outbreak of the largest Ebola outbreak on record, DHS was tasked with preventing the African outbreak from spreading to the United States, largely by screening passengers at American ports of entry. The OIG found that while the response was timely, DHS failed to provide proper training, appropriate procedures were not consistently followed, and DHS workers themselves did not receive necessary protection.

In September of 2014, the Centers for Disease Control, a division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), confirmed the first case of Ebola in the United States.  Approximately two weeks later, screening began at five major airports, including NYC’s JFK, Washington-Dulles in Virginia, Newark Liberty in New Jersey, O’Hare in Chicago, and Hartsfield-Jackson in Atlanta.  The screenings eventually spread to all U.S. Ports of Entry, resulting in over 20,000 screenings between October 2014 and June 2015.

The OIG audit revealed that DHS didn’t “ensure sufficient coordination, adequate training, and consistent screening of people arriving at U.S. ports of entry…Coordination between DHS, HHS, and other DHS components was not sufficient to ensure all passenger received full screening.”

Among the specific criticisms contained in the report:

CBP officers did not consistently refer passengers to Ebola screening, even when the travelers self-declared their travel to an Ebola-affected country;

Diplomats, United Nations workers, U.S. Government employees, and other dignitaries were not thoroughly scrutinized;

CBP officers did not consistently receive proper medical clearance, and DHS workers were not consistently protected.

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“During the course of this audit, we [OIG] encountered significant delays, cooperation issues and opposition from both components and Departmental offices.  Audited groups were unwilling to provide requested information in response to briefings and audit findings. The continued delays and resistance to providing responses during this engagement have violated the spirit of the Inspector General Act and have prevented our offices from delivering a timely report to Congress.”

The OIG has made ten recommendations for improvement. They urge stronger cooperation between agencies, better training, more thorough dissemination of information and guidance, more oversight of reporting procedures, and more careful purchasing of equipment.

The OIG’s report, which was brought to the public’s attention by the Washington Free Beacon,  did not cover broader policy issues concerning the federal government’s response to the Ebola outbreak.  Last October, the New York Analysis of Policy & Government noted that there was a lack of candid conversation about how Ebola is spread, and how it could evolve in dangerous ways, such as airborne transmission.  The American public was constantly told not to worry because the contagion is not airborne. Even without that mutation, however, the disease is so virulent that it can exist for hours on surfaces. So if an infected individual sweats, coughs, sneezes, or otherwise leaves any bodily fluid on a site others can touch, it can spread.

Nor has there been adequate discussion about the danger posed by direct flights to or from actively infected areas. Unlike several African nations and other countries including France and the United Kingdom which banned direct flights, the United States, inexplicably, continued them. The CDC’s director Thomas Freidan was asked about this on several occasions, and none of his explanations were even remotely credible. There is no reason that specially prepared charter flights could not have been substituted for any necessary transit to or from West Africa.

The five airports designated for receiving individuals from West Africa, including Kennedy International in New York, Newark Liberty International, Washington Dulles International, O’Hare International in Chicago, and Hartsfield-Jackson International in Atlanta, were both too numerous and located precisely in densely populated areas where the disease could most quickly spread. A more rational move would have been to limit travel, after a suitable quarantine period, to a single reception site in the United States where comprehensive health checks could have been performed.

In a 2010 decision the Obama Administration decided to scrap proposals  first set in place by the Bush Administration in 2005 in response to the potential spread of the Avian flu. It would have given the federal government wider authority to confront the spread of contagious diseases.

Health care workers have discussed fears about the adequacy of their facilities and procedures.  In a Washington Post interview, CDC spokeswoman Abbigail Tumpey admitted that “We as a health care system have to make sure not to let our guard down and be vigilant that patients with Ebola could show up at any U.S. health care facility…”