Russian-Belarus Preparations for an Attack on the West

While Russia is celebrating May Day at home this week, it is also growing closer to breaching the threshold triggering a nuclear event in Western Europe. Military analysts in Washington consider the recent deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus a political sign designed to unnerve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) easternmost flank. Alexander Taranov, of the Jamestown Foundation calls it “practical preparation for nuclear escalation.” Last week the Kremlin publicly repeated its threat of nuclear war against the West. It immediately followed the US Congress’ vote to provide $61 billion in military assistance to Ukraine.

Up for debate is whether Russia’s storage of nuclear warheads in Belarus is short-term preparation for their operational use. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov openly declared that increasing aid to Ukraine increases the threat of a direct military clash. From Moscow’s perspective, he points out, Ukraine is backed by three nuclear states, including the US, UK, and France. He uses it to justify the Kremlin’s moves in Belarus as Russia considers the situation a serious strategic risk. The nuclear environment in Europe is moving beyond simple rhetoric this spring.

Russian-Belarus preparations for an attack on the West include war gaming a simulated nuclear event in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The operating assumption for the games is that the West is “morally too weak to respond with retaliatory strikes,” according to Taranov. The representative for national defense of the Belarusian opposition-in-exile’s United Transitional Cabinet and former commander of the Belarusian 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (Brest), Valery Sahashchyk, says that the militaries are war-gaming and preparing for an attack on Lithuania. Last week the publication RIA Novosti suggested that the Kremlin may take matters into its own hands and that Russia is fighting a “long war” against the collective West and Ukraine.

Just over a month ago, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) confirmed the establishment of a nuclear warhead storage facility near Asipovichy, Belarus, where, according to Taranov, the 1405^th Artillery Ammunition Base is located. The 465^th Missile Brigade is almost co-located and supplied with Russian Iskander-M operational-tactical missile (RMB) systems that are also known as TNW carriers. Pre-deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) raises the potential that Russia could choose to use them should the war in Ukraine go badly this summer.

Western powers are divided on how to view the Russian nuclear moves. Some military planners are arguing that the West needs to be prepared, despite the possibility that Putin is simply posturing and not preparing for war. Other Western commentators suggest it is only posturing since prior to the recent nuclear deployment in Belarus, Russia already had the capability to launch a strike in Eastern Europe using its modernized nuclear weapons storage facilities in Kaliningrad.

Taranov points out that the Belarusian nuclear site is only modernized with added perimeter security and an access point and that “No underground bunker-type fortifications, designed for the long-term storage of TNWs… were built on the Belarusian base’s territory. Instead, the nuclear warheads were placed in one of the arsenals of the ammunition base, which also stores operational-tactical missiles for the Iskander-M system.” He says this co-location with their launch vehicles is an indication that a repair and maintenance base has been organized there to support and prepare the TNWs for operational use. Personnel on the site are likely tasked with fitting the nuclear warheads on the missiles.

What makes this more concerning is that during a peacetime environment, the standard Russian practice is to store TNWs in a special bunker-type fortified facility while RMBs typically are located off base. Military procedures in the past called for moving TNWs off base to the TNW carrier and delivery vehicle site only after receiving an order or special command from: 1) the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, 2) the Minister of Defense, and 3) the Chief of the Russian General staff. Co-positioning marks a change in standard operating procedures that indicates the weapons are, essentially, in field-ready conditions. This reduces the time to place the nuclear warheads on the missiles. This “indicates preparation for operational use,” according to Taranov.

There are additional signs that Putin is prepping for an escalation in the Ukrainian conflict. The Polish government says Russian Aerospace Forces are using Belarusian-based Kh-55 nuclear-capable cruise missiles with imitators of nuclear warheads against targets in Poland and Ukraine. This points to Russia’s practicing for at minimum of a tactical nuclear strike. The summer months may become very active in Europe if Putin sees it as an opportune time to act while the US is in the middle of a presidential election.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Photo: RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) ICBM. Photo: Wikimedia Commons / Vitaly V. Kuzmin

Quick Analysis

What Would War with Taiwan be Like

There is a coming conflict with Taiwan. What remains uncertain is the nature of that conflict. A newly released report this week by the Global Taiwan Institute’s (GTI) John Dotson argues that political warfare is a key component of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) attempt to undermine and achieve annexation of Taiwan. The CCP’s goal, he says, is to force the subjugation of the island’s citizens and democratic society and place it under “full CCP political Control.” Chinese directed propaganda and disinformation, elite cooption, political subversion, and coercive military and economic actions all are connected by a prominent link – they are actions intended for psychological effect. They are also methods of political warfare in an ongoing, persistent, and multi-faceted campaign against Taiwan. Information warfare used by Beijing against Taipei manipulates the news to change the attitudes of the population. Is it working? Dotson says that China is successfully exercising influence of “content and editorial coverage in traditional media outlets such as newspapers and television news channels, largely by leveraging influence through local proxy figures—in particular, wealthy businesspersons who have extensive financial equities in China.” He suggests that Beijing employs a “pink model” to push pro-CCP content into social media news feeds, not unlike what China does inside the United States. Using algorithmic targeting, Beijing is able to attack selected demographic targets who are more vulnerable to disinformation. Its goal is to further sow confusion and reduce cognitive resistance to pro-CCP’s narratives. Encouraging a population to believe false information by reducing a group’s opposition to it is a common practice among intelligence agencies and politicians alike. First, a population is provided with several scenarios that are easily accepted as true. In a simple example, one might read that at noon the sun is high in the sky, the clock says 12:00 pm, and many people are eating lunch. These points are easily accepted as true. The human brain at this point becomes more susceptible to accepting new information that may be false as it is programmed to let its guard done. The CCP follows by planting real information among false facts to make it easier to accept and digest. It doesn’t stop at disinformation, Beijing is also leveraging its toolkit in a related field, “legal warfare (法律戰), to promote its interpretation of international law and diplomatic practice. Yet another major category of concern in the CCP’s political warfare against Taiwan is known as “gray zone operations.” These are more closely related to military actions and include activities such as the aerial and maritime encroachment of Taiwan’s territory. The goal is to erode the concept of sovereignty and security. The United States is experiencing “gray zone” operations on our own southern border. In Taiwan, these include China’s overflight of Taiwan’s airspace by military aircraft. These events are increasing in both number and intensity as they grow close to the island itself. Simultaneously, China’s PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), through its coast guard “law enforcement” operations are challenging Taipei’s outer islands. Dotson points out that the “paramount objective in such operations is the intended psychological effect on Taiwan’s population.” Another related area according to the GTI report is increasing economic coercion. China is attempting to deny Taiwan market access, ban its imports, and limit politically-oriented trade and investment opportunities. The intent is to “punish groups within Taiwan for developments to which Beijing objects, to isolate Taiwan internationally, and to pressure other countries and international companies to conform to Beijing’s preferred policies on Taiwan,” says Dotson. To date, Taiwan has suffered from attempts to ban Taiwan’s export of agricultural products. Beijing has also punished countries who willingly import from Taiwan and have close relations with Taipei. Perhaps one of the most misunderstood areas of China’s political warfare campaign against Taiwan revolves around its “united front work.” This embraces a range of measures that Dotson says include both financial and psychological cooption and include the use of front organizations and political subversion. In Taiwan, China is coopting business and political elites, funding and manipulating local organizations (temple societies) and offering support to fringe political parties that can be used to destabilize Taiwan and spread the CCP’s propaganda. Western militaries analyze the likelihood of kinetic warfare but spend less time on the impacts of political warfare. The free world cannot overlook what is happening in Taiwan and needs to recognize that Chinese political warfare extends across the globe. Beijing may not need to physically capture the island by force if it wins using a clandestine political warfare model of conflict. Then the question becomes, “Who is next?” Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept. Illustration: Pixabay