Russia and Iran’s Deepening Relationship

Bilateral cooperation between Russia and Iran runs much deeper than a single shipment of Iranian-made drones for Moscow’s use in the war in Ukraine. Regular arms deliveries from Tehran to Moscow now also include large shipments of drones and surface-to-surface missiles. Russia, in turn, is sending advanced weapons stolen from the West and cash to Iran. In late November Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Iran is studying the weapons it receives and working to reverse engineer the systems. According to Stephen Blank of the Jamestown Foundation, it is possible that the “modifications Russian forces introduced to the Shaheed-136 drone to improve its accuracy may have been communicated to Iran ahead of time, as suggested by the drone strike on an Israeli-owned oil tanker on November 15.” It does not stop there. Asia Times notes that Russian re-engineered drones produced originally by Iran could pose a major existential threat to shipping routes from the Persian Gulf, Black, Baltic, and Mediterranean seas and as far away as the Indian Ocean. Naval experts in Washington are concerned that progress on these weapons could be the first part of an Iranian sea-denial strategy aimed at fulfilling Tehran’s desire to control vast swaths of the Middle East and beyond. Earlier this summer Tehran launched its Khayyam satellite on a Russian Soyuz rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. It was designed for use, according to Iranian sources, for “border surveillance of agriculture, monitoring land use changes such as unauthorized construction, deforestation and environmental hazards and scouting for mineral deposits, among others.

More concerning it that the satellite could be used to conduct reconnaissance of Ukrainian groupings and weapons systems, according to an August 11 Russian Space Web story. It reports that beginning in 2018 Russia and Iran have also been conducting negotiating to secure delivery of a Russian Kanopus-V satellite with “high-resolution cameras” for Tehran. Many in the US intelligence community also believe that Iran wants Russia’s help to expand and speed its nuclear program in the area of nuclear materials and fuel fabrication. Although Iran may not possess an assembled nuclear weapon, with Russia’s assistance it could achieve “nuclear latency,” or the ability to assemble one in a short period of time. As Russo-Irian political and economic ties strengthen, so does anti-American sentiment driving those policies.

In December the Tasnim News Agency (TNA) reported that Iran and Russia were working on new frameworks and mechanisms for deepening their relationship that “go beyond Syria and military transfers to include the Caucasus, where Iran is already expanding its influence to the point of dangerously mounting tensions with Azerbaijan and Turkey.” TNA says that Russia and Iran were growing closer before the war in Ukraine, but are even closer now. It points out that “a gas swap, which would allow Iran to import Russian gas and then export it to third countries, is in the works.” As Putin and the Iranian president continue building cooperative ties, Iran is working to circumvent Western sanctions through a joint working group. Lastly, Iran asked for Putin’s help in suppressing the long-running demonstrations across the country by transferring Russian anti-riot equipment and training to Tehran earlier this month. As the war progresses in Ukraine, the West must remember that Russia is engaged in other parts of the world, including the Middle East and the Caucasus. Israel has labeled the growing bilateral relationship “dangerous” and that this new entente will give Tehran cover in Syria to expand its activities up to the Israeli border. Russia, the Jerusalem Post says, “might step in to limit Israeli air strikes against Iranian facilities and installations there.” Taking advantage of the increasingly visible estrangement between Riyadh and Washington, the Post suggests that Moscow is trying to facilitate a means by which Iran and Saudi Arabia might mend their differences, a development that, if it occurs, would send shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Russia’s growing ties with Iran could represent a risk to Middle East stability and security and a major rupture in the non-proliferation order.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

Quick Analysis

Part 3: AMERICA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE

We conclude our summary of the urgent recommendation of the Congressional Committee on the nation’s Strategic Posture NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES The Commission recommends: The United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space. The United States and its Allies take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture. The United States prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned. x America’s Strategic Posture The United States develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.4 The Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced IAMD capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses. The DOD should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible. The Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 October 2024. This will allow the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to focus on research, development, prototyping and testing. ALLIES AND PARTNERS The Commission believes it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain, strengthen, and when appropriate, expand its network of alliances and partnerships. These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets. Withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly benefit adversaries, invite aggression that the United States might later have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American, allied, and partner security and economic prosperity. Further, the Commission believes that our defense and the defense of the current international order is strengthened when Allies can directly contribute to the broader strategic posture, and the United States should seek to incorporate those contributions as much as possible. The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations. RISK REDUCTION The Commission believes it is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces. The Commission recommends that a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission recommends that once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security. The Commission recommends that the United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities and conduct research into potential verification technologies in order to support or enable future negotiations in the U.S. national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types, should the geopolitical environment change. Where formal nuclear arms control agreements are not possible, the Commission recommends pursuing nuclear risk reduction measures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty and the chances for misperception and miscalculation. The 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that the United States was at “a moment of opportunity, . . .but also a moment of urgency” – because the security environment had improved and the threat of nuclear proliferation was the principal concern. Since 2009, the security environment has dramatically worsened and new existential threats have emerged. This Commission concludes that the United States now faces a highstakes challenge that requires urgent action. Nevertheless, the Commission has not seen the U.S. government demonstrate the urgency and creativity required to meet the challenge. Nothing other than synchronized steps taken by the Executive and Legislative Branches will craft the strategy and build the posture the nation requires. The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now. Photo: An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during a test at Vandenberg Space Force Base (DoD)