Competing In Space – USA Gov Policy

Just as the industrial revolution changed the world’ economy and the way wars were fought hundreds of years ago, space technology is altering the way humanity works, prospers, and, yes, fights wars.

If America is to survive and thrive, it must successfully utilize space. The National Space Intelligence Center and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center have produced a landmark report, “Competing in Space.” We reproduce key portions of that vital work.

Every day, billions of people rely on spacecraft orbiting hundreds and thousands of miles above Earth. Complex satellite constellations support the world’s finances, transportation, and agriculture, providing essential services that transcend international borders and touch the lives of virtually every person on Earth. Major disruptions to satellite services would cause significant, perhaps irreparable, damage to 21st century life. Space systems have transformed international competition and conflict. Over 80 countries own satellites and many of these countries consider access to space systems and services as important contributors to their national security and military power projection. The U.S.’s key competitors, China and Russia, both operate hundreds of space systems to strengthen warfighting capabilities, boost spheres of influence, and position themselves as leaders in the international space community. At the same time, both of these competitors are developing counterspace capabilities capable of degrading or destroying space systems critical to civilian infrastructure and military operations. Space promises humanity boundless capabilities, resources, and achievements. However, the world’s increasing space use has made the inherent risks and vulnerabilities apparent. This publication identifies those capabilities, trends, and dangers that constitute the present and future of our space-integrated lives.

Everyday Life

Space services are key enablers of industry, critical infrastructure, and international trade. Navigation satellites provide precise timing references for banks, stock markets, and national power grids, as well as positioning data for cell phones to operate and for trucks, airplanes, and cargo ships to find their way around the world. Remote sensing satellites enable timely warning and monitoring of weather events and natural disasters, and perform mapping and tracking functions for agriculture, environmental protection, resource management, and city planning. Communications satellites supplement terrestrial communications networks and offer people, particularly those in remote or conflict regions, access to telephone, television, and broadband internet.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Space services are also key enablers for national defense and military operations. Remote sensing satellites allow tracking and monitoring of adversary installations and movement of forces. Navigation satellite constellations, like the U.S.’s Global Positioning System (GPS), provide critical positioning, navigation, and timing data to improve the effectiveness of guided munitions and deploying forces worldwide. Communications and relay satellites securely transmit data to military forces, particularly in remote regions inaccessible by traditional terrestrial communications. Ballistic missile early warning satellites serve as the initial alarm for detecting ballistic missile launches and are a critical part of national missile defense architectures.

Space Operations

Several of the world’s advanced spacefaring nations operate launch vehicles, satellites, and ground-based support infrastructure. Our key competitors, China and Russia, have developed launch vehicles capable of reaching all orbits, substantial satellite constellations for remote sensing, navigation, and communications, and networks of ground sites to launch, control, and support their spacecraft.

COMPETITORS’ SPACE PARTNERSHIPS

China and Russia offer launch and satellite services to other countries. Partnerships like these offer non-spacefaring nations the benefits of space use without the expense of developing their own space support infrastructure. China particularly incentivizes its space partnerships by offering technical exchanges, satellite services, and even production of complete satellites at little initial cost. Beyond, or in lieu of, monetary payments, China and Russia can use these opportunities to garner geopolitical influence and bolster scientific prestige. As part of broader efforts to improve military force capabilities and technological innovation, China and Russia are increasingly integrating civilian, commercial, and academic space expertise into military programs. This was evident in early 2023 when the U.S. issued sanctions and export controls against Chinese and Russia companies for providing satellite imagery support to Russian military operations in Ukraine. Both countries also pursue collaboration with academic and civil organizations abroad to enhance scientific research and expand space surveillance capabilities outside their respective borders.

SPACE GROWTH

Since the first edition of “Competing in Space,” the number of active satellites in space has more than tripled, from 1,880 to 7,096 at the end of 2022. While plans for massive mega-constellations made up of hundreds or thousands of satellites cause projections to vary widely, some estimates indicate the number of satellites in orbit may exceed the tens or even hundreds of thousands by 2032. Increasing commercial availability of launch services and production of small satellites that are cheaper, less complex, and faster to develop are propelling this growth. These factors enable some launch providers to send over a hundred satellites into low Earth orbit on one launch vehicle; for instance, India launched a foreign record of 104 satellites at once in early 2017.

The Report Continues Tomorrow

Photo: NASA

Quick Analysis

Part 3: AMERICA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE

We conclude our summary of the urgent recommendation of the Congressional Committee on the nation’s Strategic Posture NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES The Commission recommends: The United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space. The United States and its Allies take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture. The United States prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned. x America’s Strategic Posture The United States develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.4 The Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced IAMD capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses. The DOD should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible. The Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 October 2024. This will allow the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to focus on research, development, prototyping and testing. ALLIES AND PARTNERS The Commission believes it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain, strengthen, and when appropriate, expand its network of alliances and partnerships. These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets. Withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly benefit adversaries, invite aggression that the United States might later have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American, allied, and partner security and economic prosperity. Further, the Commission believes that our defense and the defense of the current international order is strengthened when Allies can directly contribute to the broader strategic posture, and the United States should seek to incorporate those contributions as much as possible. The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations. RISK REDUCTION The Commission believes it is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces. The Commission recommends that a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission recommends that once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security. The Commission recommends that the United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities and conduct research into potential verification technologies in order to support or enable future negotiations in the U.S. national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types, should the geopolitical environment change. Where formal nuclear arms control agreements are not possible, the Commission recommends pursuing nuclear risk reduction measures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty and the chances for misperception and miscalculation. The 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that the United States was at “a moment of opportunity, . . .but also a moment of urgency” – because the security environment had improved and the threat of nuclear proliferation was the principal concern. Since 2009, the security environment has dramatically worsened and new existential threats have emerged. This Commission concludes that the United States now faces a highstakes challenge that requires urgent action. Nevertheless, the Commission has not seen the U.S. government demonstrate the urgency and creativity required to meet the challenge. Nothing other than synchronized steps taken by the Executive and Legislative Branches will craft the strategy and build the posture the nation requires. The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now. Photo: An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during a test at Vandenberg Space Force Base (DoD)