Month: December 2019

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Quick Analysis

Understanding Iran’s Military Power, Part 3

The Defense Intelligence Agency has just released a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s military power. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government concludes its provision of key excerpts.

Core Iranian Military Capabilities

Ballistic Missiles

Iran’s ballistic missiles constitute a primary component of its strategic deterrent. Lacking a modern air force, Iran has embraced ballistic missiles as a long-range strike capability to dissuade its adversaries in the region—particularly the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia—from attacking Iran. Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle East, with a substantial inventory of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and medium-range ballis- tic missiles (MRBMs) that can strike targets throughout the region as far as 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders. Iran is also develop- ing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which present a unique threat profile from ballistic missiles because they can fly at low altitude and attack a target from multiple directions.

Decades of international sanctions have hampered Iran’s ability to modernize its military forces through foreign procurement, but Tehran has invested heavily in its domestic infrastructure, equipment, and expertise to develop and produce increasingly capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Iran will continue to improve the accuracy and lethality of some of those systems and will pursue the development of new systems, despite continued international counterproliferation efforts and restrictions under UNSCR 2231.

 Iran is also extending the range of some of its SRBMs to be able to strike targets farther away, filling a capability gap between its MRBMs and older SRBMs.

Iran can launch salvos of missiles against large- area targets, such as military bases and population centers, throughout the region to inflict damage, complicate adversary military operations, and weaken enemy morale. Although it maintains many older, inaccurate missiles in its inventory, Iran is increasing the accuracy of many of its missile systems. The use of improved guidance technology and maneu- verability during the terminal phase of flight enables these missiles to be used more effectively against smaller targets, including specific military facilities and ships at sea. These enhancements could reduce the miss-distance of some Iranian missiles to as little as tens of meters, potentially requiring fewer missiles to damage or destroy an intended target and broadening Iran’s options for missile use. 

Iran’s more-accurate systems are primarily short range, such as the Fateh-110 SRBM and its derivatives. Iran’s longer-range systems, such as the Shahab 3 MRBM, are generally less accurate. However, Iran is developing MRBMs with greater precision, such as the Emad-1, that improve Iran’s ability to strike distant targets more effectively. Iran could also complicate regional missile defenses by launching large missile salvos. 

Iran lacks intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but Tehran’s desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to develop and eventually field an ICBM. Iran continues to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs) with increasing lift capacity—including boosters that could be capable of ICBM ranges and potentially reach the continental United States, if configured for that purpose.

Progress in Iran’s space program could shorten a path- way to an ICBM because SLVs use inherently similar technologies.

Other Long-Range Strike Options:  To supplement its long-range strike capabilities, Iran could also attempt to use its regional proxies and limited airstrike capability to attack an adversary’s critical infrastructure. Iran maintains an aging inventory of combat aircraft—such as decades-old U.S. F-4 Phantoms— which it could attempt to use to attack its regional adversaries. However, these older plat- forms would be more vulnerable to air defenses than modern combat aircraft. Iran could also use its armed UAVs for limited long-range airstrikes, potentially in combination with missiles, as it demonstrated during strikes against ISIS in Syria in 2018.

Antiaccess/Area Denial

Iran’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategy seeks to prevent an adversary from entering or operating in areas that it considers essential to its security and sovereignty. Iranian A2/AD relies primarily on Iran’s naval forces and geostrategic position along the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz—a critical chokepoint for the world’s oil supply. Iran’s layered maritime defenses consist of numerous platforms and weapons intended, when used in a combined fashion, to overwhelm an adversary’s naval forces. Iran emphasizes asymmetric tactics, such as small boat attacks, to saturate a ship’s defenses. The full range of Iran’s A2/AD capabilities include ship- and shore-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fast attack craft (FAC) and fast inshore attack craft (FIAC), naval mines, submarines, UAVs, antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and air defense systems.

Maritime Threat Capabilities

Capitalizing on the strategic nature of its littoral, Iran’s maritime A2/AD strategy employs a combination of surface combatants, undersea warfare, and antiship missiles to deter naval aggression and hold maritime traffic at risk. Particularly with its large fleet of small surface vessels—high-speed FAC and FIAC equipped with machine guns, unguided rockets, torpedoes, ASCMs, and mines—Iran has developed a maritime guerrilla-warfare strategy intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of traditional naval forces that rely on large vessels. Iran can also use its undersea warfare capabilities, which include Yono class midget submarines and Kilo class attack submarines, to attack surface ships in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. Iran operates coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) along its southern coast, which it can launch against military or civilian ships as far as 300 kilometers away. Iran also maintains an estimated inventory of more than 5,000 naval mines, including contact and influence mines, which it can rapidly deploy in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz using high-speed small boats equipped as minelayers.

                                    Long-Range Strike

During a conflict, Iran probably would attempt to attack regional military bases and possibly energy infrastructure and other critical economic targets using its missile arsenal. Even with many of its missile systems having poor accuracy, Iran could use large salvos of missiles to complicate an adversary’s military operations in theater, particularly if some of Iran’s newer, more-accurate systems are incorporated. Iran has also developed short-range ASBMs based on its Fateh-110 system. Iran could use these ASBMs, in concert with its other countermaritime capabilities, to attack adversary naval or commercial vessels operating in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman.

Air Defenses

Iran operates a diverse array of SAM and radar systems intended to defend critical sites from attack by a technologically superior air force. Operational since 2017, Iran’s Russian-provided SA-20c long-range SAM system is the most capable component of its integrated air defense system (IADS). Iran is also fielding more-capable, domestically developed SAM and radar systems to help fill gaps in its air defenses.

Unconventional Warfare

Iran’s unconventional warfare capability serves as a means of power projection and as part of its A2/AD strategy. Iran could use its strong ties to militant and terrorist groups in the region— such as Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Huthis—to target critical adversary military and civilian facilities. Proxy attacks against adversary military bases in the region could complicate operations in theater.

Unconventional Operations

Iran has consistently demonstrated a preference for using partners, proxies, and covert campaigns to intervene in regional affairs because of limitations in its conventional military capabilities and a desire to maintain plausible deni- ability, thereby attempting to minimize the risk of escalation with its adversaries.

Iran’s reliance on unconventional operations— which is enabled by its relationships with a wide range of primarily Middle Eastern militias, militant groups, and terrorist organizations—is central to its foreign policy and defense strategy. The IRGC-QF is Tehran’s primary tool for conducting unconventional operations and pro- viding support to partners and proxies. The commander of the IRGC-QF, Major General Soleimani, has a close relationship with Khamenei, often communicating with and taking orders from him directly. 

Through the IRGC-QF, Iran provides its partners, proxies, and affiliates with varying levels of financial assistance, training, and materiel support. Iran uses these groups to further its national security objectives while obfuscating Iranian involvement in foreign conflicts. Tehran also relies on them as a means to carry out retaliatory attacks on its adversaries. Most of these groups share similar religious and ideo- logical values with Iran, particularly devotion to Shia Islam and, in some cases, adherence to velayat-e faqih. However, Iran has also established relationships with more diverse groups based on shared enemies, common threats, and mutually beneficial goals.

The strength of Iran’s relationship with these groups varies widely. Iran’s strongest and most successful regional partnership is with Hizballah, dating back to 1982. The relationship today involves Iranian sponsorship, cooperation, and shared sectarian and political interests, especially against Israel and the United States. However, Hizballah retains its decisionmaking in internal Lebanese affairs.

In recent years, the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have placed new demands on the IRGC-QF to manage Iranian involvement in multiple combat zones, including some support from Iranian conventional forces. In Syria, Iran maintains a strong relationship with the Asad regime, which it views as a critical ally and conduit to Hizballah. In Iraq, the IRGC-QF has strong influence with Iranian-aligned Shia groups operating within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), many of whom have cooperated with Baghdad to defeat ISIS. In Yemen, Iran has supported the Huthi rebels with finan- cial assistance, weapons, military training, and operational advice.

Iran also uses the IRGC-QF to provide varying levels of support to Shia groups in Bah- rain, some Palestinian militant groups, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. As active com- bat operations have drawn down in Syria and Iraq, Tehran could choose to increase support to historical unconventional lines of effort in the region or pursue new opportunities. 

Expeditionary Operations

Iran has limited expeditionary warfare and force projection capabilities. It has shown itself capable of sending small groups of conventional forces—including ground forces, military air-lift, and UAV operators—into permissive allied countries to support larger operations. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has become increasingly involved in regional conflicts, with varying levels of military intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The IRGC-QF remains the lead for these operations, but Iran has adapted its approach to external operations by incorporating conventional Iranian forces in addition to large numbers of Shia foreign fighters. Iran’s military has also revised professional military education to emphasize lessons learned from operations in Syria and Iraq, where it also has gained its first experience conducting combined operations with allied military forces. 

CYBERSPACE

 cyberspace capabilities remain underdeveloped. Although accounts of Iranian hacking first emerged in the early 2000s, state-sponsored cyberspace activities did not appear publicly until 2007. Prompted by the 2010 Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, Iran recognized the need to develop its cyberspace capability as a strategic priority. Tehran receives technical assistance for cyberspace defense from Russia and China, and Ruhani has repeatedly made commitments to increase Iran’s cyberspace budget. Iran has quickly evolved from using web defacements and basic censorship to conducting more-sophisticated internal information controls, destructive attacks, and espionage campaigns. 

Iranian cyberspace actors use phishing and defacing campaigns against commercial enterprises, as well as cyberespionage against mili- tary and government data. Iranian cyberactors frequently target aerospace companies, defense contractors, energy and natural resource companies, and telecommunications firms for cyber- espionage operations. Since at least 2014, Iranian cyberactors have stolen credentials and spread malware on business networks. These cyberespionage efforts can support Iran’s military research and development efforts and commodities industries.

Iran has shown it is capable of disruptive and destructive offensive cyberattacks, including against U.S. targets. After a 2012 malware attack targeting an Iranian oil facility, Iran responded with a cyberattack on Saudi Aramco and Qatari RasGas, using malware to cause irreparable damage to thousands of computers. During 2012–2013, Iranian hackers launched a distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaign against major U.S. banks and the U.S. Stock Exchange, and in 2014 conducted a data-de- letion attack on a U.S. casino. During the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Iranian cyberactors launched a DDoS attack against Israel Defense Forces infrastructure. From late 2016 to early 2017, Iran conducted another larger and more damaging malware attack against Saudi tar- gets, including the civil aviation authority, labor ministry, and central bank.

Iranian cyberactors also conduct ongoing information operations aimed at promoting pro-Iranian political interests via the use of a network of fake social media accounts. These accounts promote anti-Saudi and anti-Western stances and support policies that Tehran views as favorable.218 

                                       Intelligence

Iran’s intelligence services are capable of sophisticated operations worldwide to counter potential threats to the regime, its revolutionary ideology, and its interests. Iran’s intelligence community is composed of 16 organizations charged with foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal monitoring and security missions.

Space/Counterspace

Tehran claims to have developed sophisticated capabilities, including SLVs and communications and remote sensing satellites. Iran’s simple SLVs are only able to launch microsatellites into low Earth orbit and have proven unreliable with few successful satellite launches. The Iran Space Agency and Iran Space Research Center—which are subordinate to the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology—along with MODAFL, over- see the country’s SLV and satellite development programs. Iran initially developed its SLVs as an extension of its ballistic missile program, but it has genuine civilian and military space launch goals. 

Iran has conducted several successful launches of the two-stage Safir SLV since its first attempt in 2008. It has also revealed the larger two-stage Simorgh SLV, which it launched in July 2017 and January 2019 without successfully placing a satellite into orbit. The Simorgh could serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. 

Because of the inherent overlap in technology between ICBMs and SLVs, Iran’s development 

of larger, more-capable SLV boosters remains a concern for a future ICBM capability. In 2005, Iran became a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), which is led by China, in order to access space technology from other countries. 

Iran’s counterspace capabilities have centered around jamming satellite communications and GPS, and Iran is reportedly making advancements in these areas.  Iran is also seeking to improve its space object surveillance and identification capabilities through domestic development and by joining international space situational awareness projects through APSCO.

                                       Chemical and Biological Warfare

In November 2018, the United States found Iran noncompliant with its CWC obligations. Iran failed to declare its transfer of chemical weapons to Libya in the 1980s or its holdings of riot control agents, such as the tearing agent CR, and has not submitted a complete chemical weapons production facility declaration. The United States is also concerned that Iran is pursuing central nervous system-acting chemicals for offensive purposes. Although these chemicals have legitimate uses as pharmaceuticals, they can be lethal at certain doses.

Denial and Deception

Denial and deception (D&D) is a core component of Iranian military doctrine, and Iran uses D&D techniques extensively to reduce the vulnerability and increase the survivability of its military forces. To apply these techniques across the military, Tehran has established what it calls a “passive defense” doctrine. The effort was based on lessons learned from past military conflicts, including U.S. operations in the Middle East and the 2006 Israel-Hizballah conflict. Iran’s nationwide passive defense pro- gram comprises a wide range of D&D tactics to hinder foreign intelligence collection and ensure the survivability of critical infrastructure and core military capabilities. Key Iranian passive defense measures include camouflage and concealment, force dispersals, underground facili- ties, and highly mobile units. For example, Iran configures some military vehicles to resemble civilian trucks. Iran’s passive defense doctrine also includes aspects of cyberdefense, mainly to protect networks from cyberattack and intru- sion from outside influences. 

Underground Facilities

Iran has the largest underground facility (UGF) program in the Middle East. Based on the central pillars of Iran’s passive defense doctrine, Tehran has invested heavily in constructing UGFs to con- ceal and protect critical military and civilian infra- structure throughout the country. Iran designed and built these facilities to support various aspects of its defense industries, key nuclear infrastructure, and military forces, including naval sites, missile bases, and equipment storage.

In late 2009, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), stated Iran would build nuclear facilities in mountains as a response to international pressure for Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.239 Iran houses portions of its nuclear program within deep tunnels and underground bunkers at locations such as Natanz and Fordow (Qom). However, both sites are subject to restrictions outlined in the JCPOA and closely monitored by the IAEA. 

UGFs support most facets of Tehran’s ballistic missile capabilities, including the operational force and the missile development and production program. Missile-related UGFs house weapons and equipment storage, underground basing of mobile missiles, and hardened launch sites.242 In recent years, Iran has used state media to broadcast the launch of ballistic missiles from underground launch chambers and showcase underground missile garrisons.243 Regional media also indicates Iran is aiding proxies in the Middle East by helping them construct under- ground missile production facilities.

Outlook: Building a More Capable Military

• Missile Force. Iran will deploy an increasing number of more accurate and lethal the ater ballistic missiles, improve its existing missile inventory, and field new LACMs. It will also pursue technical capabilities that could enable it to produce an ICBM. 

• Naval Forces. Iran’s naval forces will field increasingly capable platforms and weapons, including improved naval mines, faster and more lethal surface platforms, more-advanced ASCMs, larger and more-sophisticated submarines, and new ASBMs. 

• Air and Air Defense Forces. Iran will modernize its IADS with new air surveil- lance radars, SAMs, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. Once the UN arms embargo ends, Tehran can purchase advanced fourth-generation fighter aircraft. Iran will also develop and field more-capable UAVs, including armed platforms. 

• Ground Forces. The ground forces will continue structural changes, including the creation of new rapid-response brigades, which could enable them to become more agile and effective in countering threats. Iran also will be able to buy modern main battle tanks after the UN embargo ends. 

Despite these goals, ongoing financial constraints and sanctions will challenge Iran’s military modernization efforts. Tehran will be unable to meet all of its acquisition priorities and requirements in this environment. The complex security situation of the Middle East—with the continued presence of U.S. forces, the superior force projection capabilities of Israel, and the growing military means of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—will further complicate Iran’s efforts to build its conventional force. 

As Iran’s perception of the threats it faces evolves during the coming years, the military will be forced to contend with new roles and missions. Iran’s current modernization plans emphasize a broader range of conventional capabilities than in the past.

Iranian Military Modernization Goals

  • CapabilitIncrease the accuracy, lethality, and production of ballistic and cruise missiles 
  • Air DefDevelop longer-range SAMs and improve short- and medium-range systems 
  • Ai        Develop advanced offensive and defensive air power 
  • Navy   Attain regional and deterrent sea power 
  • Groun Strengthen ground combat and rapid-reaction capability 
  • EW/C4Improve EW and C4ISR posture, including space-based capabilities 
  • CybersIncrease cyberspace presence and hold adversary infratructure at risk 
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SUMMARY OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY

Services: 

The ARTESH is the regular military.

The IRGC [description from outside source] is a combined arms force with its own ground forces, navy, air force, intelligence, and special forces. It also controls the Basij militia.

The LEF is the Law Enforcement Force.

There are approximately 600,000 active duty personnel, supplemented by 450,000 active reserve, and at least 500,000 inactive reserve. LEF has between 200,000 to 300,000.

Iran’s equipment consists of older western weaponry, Chinese equipment, and soviet-era material.

Iran’s official defense budget for 2019 was approximately $20.7 billion, roughly 3.8% of GDP. The IRGC, although smaller in size than the ARTESH, receives a greater proportion of the defense budget.  IRGC received 29%, compared with 12% for the ARTESH.

Photo: Remains of Iranian Qjam ballistic missiles and guidance components are part of a display at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington, D.C. The Defense Department established the Iranian Materiel Display in December 2017 to present evidence that Iran is arming dangerous groups with advanced weapons, spreading instability and conflict in the region. The display contains materiel associated with Iranian proliferation into Yemen, Afghanistan and Bahrain. DOD photo by Lisa Ferdinando

Categories
Quick Analysis

Understanding Iran’s Military Power and Outlook, Part 2

The Defense Intelligence Agency has just released a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s military power. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its provision of key excerpts.

Iran’s Military Doctrine and Strategy

Tehran employs a complex set of military and security capabilities, including a combination of conventional and unconventional forces. Iran’s conventional military strategy is primarily based on deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an attacker. Its unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners and proxies enable Tehran to advance its interests in the region and attain strategic depth from its adversaries. If deterrence fails, Iran would seek to demonstrate strength and resolve, impose a high cost on its adversary, and reestablish deterrence using the full range of these capabilities. 

Iran’s “way of war” emphasizes the need to avoid or deter conventional conflict while advancing its security objectives in the region, particularly through propaganda, psychological warfare, and proxy operations. Iran’s deterrence is largely based on three core capabilities: ballistic missiles capable of long-range strikes, naval forces capable of threatening navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and unconventional operations using partners and proxies abroad.

Perceptions of Modern Conflict

During the past two decades, Iran has gradually shifted its military thinking and approach to warfare based on the 21st-century conflicts of the Middle East. It developed its military doctrine to face technologically advanced Western militaries, aiming to raise the human and financial costs to a potential adversary to deter an attack. Iran has sought to build its armed forces with niche capabilities emphasizing asymmetric tactics intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of its enemies, such as an aversion to casualties and overreliance on technology.

Iran probably views modern warfare as a spectrum with multiple levels of conflict, including “soft” and “hard” war. Iranian decisionmakers realize the importance of engaging an adversary in competition short of armed conflict across all domains of state power: diplomacy with neighboring states and international bodies; information and psychological operations; conventional and unconventional military posture and presence; and economics through its ability to influence global energy markets. Tehran believes the United States is engaged in a hybrid war to subvert the regime and its objectives, blending conventional and unconventional tactics with all elements of state power. Iran views this situation as short of armed conflict.

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Military and Security Leadership

The regime often views political, cultural, and social dynamics as national security issues because these domains can affect the regime’s ability to maintain clerical rule. Iran’s power structures and decisionmaking bodies reflect this clerical oversight in all aspects of military and security policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei, Iran’s head of state since 1989, is the ultimate decisionmaker in the Iranian political system. Khamenei is responsible for delineating and supervising “the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” accord- ing to the Iranian constitution, giving him the authority to direct all of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. As commander in chief, the supreme leader can declare war or peace. He has the power to appoint and dismiss military offi- cials and the head of the judiciary, and appoints 6 of the 12 members of the Council of Guardians, which vets Iranian legislation and candidates for public office.

President Ruhani is a pragmatic conservative cleric who serves as the popularly elected head of government. The president oversees the cabinet ministries, manages the budgetary process, and chairs the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS). However, the Iranian constitution limits the authority of the president, who has no operational control of the military and can operate only within the boundaries set by the supreme leader. 

National Military Command and Control

Iran’s constitution designates the supreme leader, not the president, as commander in chief of the armed forces, with the power to exercise military C2, declare war and peace, and approve military operations. Khamenei traditionally issues orders through the AFGS and KCHQ, which oversee and coordinate between the IRGC and Artesh, but sometimes bypasses these organizations to give orders directly to lower-level commanders.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow

Photo: Remains of a Shaheh-123 unmanned aerial vehicle are part of a display at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington, D.C. The Defense Department established the Iranian Materiel Display in December 2017 to present evidence that Iran is arming dangerous groups with advanced weapons, spreading instability and conflict in the region. The display contains materiel associated with Iranian proliferation into Yemen, Afghanistan and Bahrain. DOD photo by Lisa Ferdinando

Categories
Quick Analysis

Understanding Iran’s Military Power and Outlook

The Defense Intelligence Agency has just released a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s military power. The New York Analysis of Policy and Government provides key excerpts.

How does Iran perceive military threats? What steps does it take to react to its own worldview?

Threat Perceptions

Iran views the United States as its greatest enduring threat and believes the United States is engaged in a covert and “soft war” to subvert the regime, undermining what Iran perceives as its rightful place as a regional power. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei maintains a deep, long-standing distrust of U.S. intentions. Many regime elites view regional dynamics through the lens of perceived U.S. aggression, leading some to adopt the extreme view that the United States created ISIS in part to weaken Iran and its allies. Distrust of the United States predates the regime’s founding, dating back to the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh that returned the shah to power.

Iran has focused on preparing and equipping its military forces for defense against air attack and ground invasion by a technologically superior adversary, primarily the United States. The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s and international scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program raised Iran’s fears of encirclement and potential Western attack. Tehran recognizes that it cannot compete with the United States on a conventional level and has prioritized the development of defensive capabilities that emphasize asymmetric tactics to protect the country and the regime.

In recent years, Tehran’s immediate perceived threats have shifted to those coming from regional state and nonstate actors. Iran probably views Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Sunni extremist groups, such as ISIS, as its next most dangerous threats because of their immediacy and proximity to Iran’s territory, allies, and regional influence. Iran’s expanding regional activities have only exacerbated these views. The growth in militant Sunni extremism, particularly ISIS, and Iran’s perception of its regional adversaries’ growing military capabilities has prompted Tehran to adjust some of its military modernization priorities. Iran’s latest national development plan reflects this shift in threat perceptions by emphasizing a broader range of conventional capabilities than previous plans.

National Security Strategy

Tehran’s national security strategy aims to ensure continuity of clerical rule, maintain stability against internal and external threats, secure Iran’s position as a dominant regional power, and achieve economic prosperity.

 Iran has developed its security and military strategies based on these four enduring strategic objectives:

• Ensure Continuity of Clerical Rule. The supreme leader’s position is based on the popular acceptance of velayat-e faqih. To ensure the regime’s continued legitimacy with the Iranian populace, Tehran attempts to control much of the domestic political, social, and cultural environment and promote its interpretation of Islamic ideology.

• Secure the Nation From Internal and External Threats. The regime uses its military and security capabilities to counter internal threats from political and ethnic opposition movements and terrorist groups and to prevent neighboring states’ instability from spilling over or causing violence in Iran.  The military defends Iranian territory from foreign adversaries—including perceived existential threats, such as the United States, and regional rivals, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia—and provides support to allies and partners to counter regional threats. 

• Become a Dominant Regional Power. Tehran aspires to lead a stable regional order in which it has dominant influence. In Iran’s vision for the region, its allies remain intact, the influence of the United States and U.S. regional partners is degraded, and Sunni extremist groups are defeated. In pursuit of these goals, Iran provides extensive military, advisory, and financial assistance to allies and partners, seeking to protect its regional interests and pressure adversaries. 

• Attain Economic Prosperity. Domestically, President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani’s priority is to achieve national economic prosperity by reducing subsidies to the populace, curbing corruption, reforming the financial sector, and attracting foreign investment. Tehran aims to balance foreign investment and partnerships with the priority it places on economic self-sufficiency, in part to reduce the effects of U.S. and multilateral sanctions.

Iran remains committed to modernizing its military, forging new partnerships, and building the capacity of its partners across the region— including designated FTOs—all while balancing a desire to benefit from integrating into the global economic system. Despite some internal instability, Iranian military and security forces have also proven able to manage public unrest and low-level insurgencies from several ethnic opposition movements.

Stability Issues

Since the 1979 revolution, the regime has regularly cracked down on dissent to maintain political stability. Iranian political and ethnic opposition groups are largely localized and lack unity, posing little threat to the regime. Iran’s internal stability continues to be threatened by a growing schism between the country’s leaders, dominated by military and clerical elites, and the common people. The past 40 years have seen a growth in income inequality, increased IRGC political influence and control of key economic sectors, sustained sectarian and ethnic tension, violent suppression of dissent and reformists, persistent gender inequality, and tension stemming from the In other words, it is common practice for abusive relationships in route to divorce. prescription de cialis Small problems such as pains, burns or any other problem from which cheap cialis viagra human commonly sufferer are cured using these two local anesthetic chemical. The absorption of tadalafil does not require pfizer viagra tablets adherence to food during the reception, as it is completely natural and safe that would just help to arouse you sexually and spend a happy time with your partner. When to visit an IVF spe prescription for cialis purchaset in Goa Rule of Thumb: Couples who are under 35 years in age and have been unsuccessfully trying to get pregnant naturally. military’s involvement in regional conflicts. 

In 2009, after the disputed reelection of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a loosely organized opposition called the Green Movement emerged with large-scale protests demanding democratic reforms. The demonstrations marked the country’s most significant unrest since the revolution. Bolstered by the Internet, hundreds of thousands of protesters turned out across the country. The government responded by ordering security services to crack down, which resulted in dozens of deaths, hundreds of arrests, restricted access to social media, and the closure of several newspapers. The regime quelled the unrest and nearly eliminated the Green Movement.

Between December 2017 and January 2018, small incidents of civil disobedience converged into widespread public protests, the largest unrest Iran has faced since 2009. Some protestors challenged Iran’s foreign policy—including its involvement in regional conflict and support to proxy groups—but most focused on economic and social issues. Elected in 2013, President Ruhani promised increased financial benefits and eco- nomic growth, but these have not translated into an improved standard of living for everyday Iranians. While oil output had risen before the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, significant economic growth did not follow, and domestic prices for both food and fuel increased. 

Some longstanding opposition groups, mostly originating from minority ethnic and religious groups, continue to challenge Iran’s internal security. Along the western border, the regime faces several militant Kurdish opposition groups— including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK)—which advocate for increased autonomy and the right to Kurdish self-determination. Armed opposition from PJAK has been especially violent, resulting in dozens of Iranian deaths annually since 2005. Iran also faces periodic violence from Baluchi militants in southeastern Iran along the Pakistani border. The most prominent of these groups, Jaish ul-Adl (JAA), periodically attacks Iranian military facilities, border posts, and security patrols and occasionally takes military and security personnel hostage. JAA hampers Iran-Pakistan relations, with Tehran accusing Islamabad of failing to curb Baluchi militants operating from Pakistani soil. The Iranian military conducts counterinsurgency campaigns against the Kurdish and Baluchi militants in these regions on a nearly annual basis. 

The most well-known group opposed to the regime is the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK). The MEK, founded in 1965 by Muslim students advocating a combination of Marxist communism and Islamist ideology, is an Iranian political-militant organization in exile that proposes the overthrow of the Iranian regime to establish itself as a new government. After initially supporting the 1979 revolution, the MEK fought on behalf of Saddam late in the Iran-Iraq War and was responsible for a series of bombings and assassinations in the 1990s and early 2000s. Widely unpopular in Iran, the MEK remains one of the regime’s foremost internal security concerns. Formerly designated as an FTO by the United States, the Iranian government still considers the MEK a terrorist group.

External Defense Relations

Tehran maintains defense and security ties to both state and nonstate actors to project power and support Shia groups and Shia-led governments in the Middle East. Iran relies on its regional partnerships to help counter perceived threats from Sunni extremist groups, adversarial states, and Western military presence in the region. Iran refers to its efforts to build a regional network to counter Israeli and Western influence as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran, Syria, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Huthis, and some Palestinian militants. Beyond these closer allies, Tehran seeks to cultivate relations with other countries; Iran is also a member of the Nonaligned Movement and has observer status with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 

Particularly in recent years, Tehran has committed extensive resources and deployed military personnel to support key partners facing internal conflicts. Since at least 2012, Iran has escalated its involvement in the Syrian civil war to include providing arms, training, advisers, and select combat personnel to support the Syrian regime. Since at least 2014, Iran has also provided direct military assistance—including IRGC advisers, training, and materiel support—to Iraqi Shia militias to help combat ISIS, which Tehran views as a critical national security threat, and to strengthen its influence in Iraq. 

Iran maintains strong defense ties to Hizballah in Lebanon—its most significant and oldest nonstate partner and a core member of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance”—and provides sup- port to some Palestinian groups in an attempt to pressure Israel. Iran also provides advanced 

weapons support to the Huthis in Yemen and calibrated support to Shia militants in Bahrain and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF, the IRGC’s external operations element, is Iran’s primary conduit of support and guidance to these nonstate partners and proxies.

Tehran maintains particularly close military-to-military ties with Syria and Iraq and has signed basic military cooperation agreements with Afghanistan, Belarus, China, Oman, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, and Venezuela. Iran has also held discussions on defense and security issues with a wider range of countries, including Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Djibouti, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, Turkey, and Turkmenistan.  Djibouti and Sudan have since severed diplomatic ties with Iran. Tehran has also purchased military equipment from Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine. 

Military cooperation between Russia and Iran has grown significantly in recent years, despite Tehran’s uncertainty about Moscow’s long-term regional objectives. Iran and Russia have cooperated to support Asad’s regime in Syria since at least 2015. Iran has briefly allowed Russian combat aircraft to use its Hamadan Airbase as a stopover to launch strikes in Syria, marking the first time Tehran has permitted a foreign military to use its territory since the Islamic Revolution. Iran also seeks to procure Russian military hardware. In 2016, it completed its high-profile purchase of the Russian SA-20c air defense sys- tem, which provided Iran with its first capability to defend against a modern air force.

The Iranian military is also increasing its defense diplomacy efforts, particularly through near-continuous naval deployments beyond its immediate neighbors. Since 2009, Iran has sent small naval groups to “show the flag” through a series of port calls overseas and counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Intended to enhance its soft power, Iran’s use of naval diplomacy has demonstrated its capability to con- duct out-of-area operations increasingly farther from Iranian shores, extending from the Medi- terranean Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait in the west to the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca in the east. 

The Report Continues Tomorrow

Photo: Iran’s Shahab-3 missile (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance)

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Quick Analysis

Is America Doing Enough for Freedom Protesters?

This article was prepared exclusively for the New York Analysis of Policy and Government by Judge John H. Wilson (Ret.)

In two places on our globe, Democracy movements have broken out in full force – Hong Kong, and Iran.  Both are inspired by the freedom and self-rule which the United States of America represents.  But just what as a country are we doing to fan these sparks into a blaze?

Overall, it seems we are doing next to nothing in support of either of these movements.

The current protests in Hong Kong began in April of this year, when the Chinese government introduced a bill which would have allowed for people accused of crimes in Hong Kong to be extradited to mainland China for their trials.  As described by the BBC,  “Until 1997, Hong Kong was ruled by Britain as a colony but then returned to China. Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, it has some autonomy, and its people more rights.”   

Fearing that this bill would lead to the incarceration and potential execution of dissidents, the people of Hong Kong took to the streets, and have been there ever since.  Despite the extradition bill being withdrawn in September, the protestors have four other demands –  “For the protests not to be characterized as a “riot”;  Amnesty for arrested protesters; An independent inquiry into alleged police brutality; and Implementation of complete universal suffrage.” 

Despite the efforts of mainland China to suppress the protestors, the desire for freedom continues to spread.  Last month, 7 out of 10 eligible voters cast their ballots in Hong Kong’s local elections for pro-democracy candidates, who took 389 out of 452 seats in local district councils. 

The protests continue up to the time of this writing, and during a Thanksgiving day rally, the protestors sang our national anthem, and held up pictures of President Donald Trump – at least, President Trump’s face superimposed on an image of Sylvester Stallone as Rocky Balboa.  

What exactly has the United States done to support the huddled masses of Hong Kong, yearning to be free?

At the end of November, President Trump signed two bills;  “The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act mandates sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials who carry out human rights abuses and requires an annual review of the favorable trade status that Washington grants Hong Kong. The second bill prohibits export to Hong Kong police of certain nonlethal munitions, including tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, water cannons, stun guns and tasers.” 

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Meanwhile, in Iran, there have been a series of protests against the government installed by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.  In June, the streets of Tehran were filled with thousands of protestors, who were described by the Independent as a “response to the soaring cost of living and plummeting value of the rial, following Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the (Obama) nuclear deal.”  In reality, however, these on-going protests are not merely in support of economic concerns. 

According to Amnesty International, more than 100 protestors in 21 cities have been killed by the Iranian security forces in the past month.  More than 1,000 have been detained.  Yet, the protests go on.

While it is true that the recent protests were sparked by an increase in fuel prices in Iran, that increase, and other economic “belt-tightening” was necessitated by heavier sanctions imposed on Iran by the Trump administration.   But despite these efforts to free themselves from the tyranny of the mullahs, sanctions are the only concrete measure taken by the US government to date.

Both the Chinese and the Iranian governments blame the US government for the unrest in their countries, and claim that President Trump is fostering these protests. But in reality, other than sanctions and toothless bills in support of the protestors, the US government is not doing anything to encourage or support these protests.

In the 1980’s, President Ronald Reagan reversed the policy of “containment” of communism in favor of a “roll back” policy – that is, as Reagan said,  “We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.” 

It is time that the United States returns to this robust policy of increasing democracy and freedom across the globe.  However, it has become equally obvious that President Trump is not interested in involving the United States in any foreign wars whatsoever. 

No one is seriously advocating war with either the Chinese or with Iran.  But unless more is done to help the people of Hong Kong and Iran, both may suffer the fate the Iranians suffered in 2009 when President Obama failed to act in support of the “Green Revolution” – death and incarceration of protestors on a large scale.

Photo: Pixabay

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Quick Analysis

Foreign Policy Update

CHINA

Washington and Beijing have been locked in a trade war that has witnessed China’s GDP contract to levels that indicate the country will be unable to meet its 10-year growth plan projections. The pressure put on China by the Trump Administration appears to be succeeding. President Trump tweeted that “We have agreed to a very large Phase One Deal with China. They have agreed to many structural changes and massive purchases of Agricultural Product, Energy, and Manufactured Goods, plus much more.” 

Although details have not been confirmed it appears to be the beginning of the end of the trade dispute. China has agreed to purchase $50 billion in farm goods from the US over the next two years along with changes in the financial services sector, intellectual property rights and currency reform. Tariffs remain a bargaining chip as further Phase 2 negotiations must be conducted to resolve the remaining issues.

IRAN

Secretary Pompeo, in a press briefing Wednesday, pointed out that a number of Americans still are being held against their will by Iran. The US is following every opening it sees to get the people out. According to Pompeo, Washington is continuing its maximum pressure campaign. As part of that campaign, he said, the US is working to make sure every nation complies with the JCPOA. China is no exception, he added. Washington has asked China not to take Iranian crude oil. The Secretary also said that the United States will “continue to impose our sanctions regime on those countries that are violating, especially when the violations relate to their WMD programs. That’s important for the Middle East.  It’s important for our friend and ally, Israel.  It’s important for the United States and for the whole world.  And so these sanctions are aimed not at China, not at the Iranian people, but at the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran that is engaged in activity that poses threats around the world.” The US goal is to forced Iran to behave as a “normal nation.”

NATO

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The Secretary said the US has taken corrective actions to ensure NATO is an organization for our times. He pointed out that Washington is making “sure that the correct adversaries were identified, that we were fighting the right fight.”

And second, he added, the President “rightly recognized that there needed to be burden-sharing in a way that there was not, and he demanded that other countries step forward not just for America and for the American taxpayers – that’s certainly important – but it’s important for those countries too to step up and commit to defending themselves.”

Pompeo believes that Washington has made real progress. He said it amounts to $130 billion so far, with another roughly $400 billion to be paid into NATO between now and a couple years from now He called these significant changes as they amount to over half a trillion dollars in increased defense spending inside of NATO not coming from the American taxpayers. Canada and Germany are just two of the nations that have fallen short of the agreed upon 2% payment to NATO.  

RUSSIA

In a December 9 interview, Secretary Pompeo spokes about the US-Russia relationship. He noted that there’s “work that we can do alongside Russia, we have an obligation to do it for the American people.” He added that he hoped Foreign Minister Lavrov and he could make progress on that. One area the US is working on is business-to-business relationships. Another is arms control issues between our two countries. Pompeo noted that the US wants to bring China into that discussion as well.  

DARIA NOVAK served in the United States State Department during the Reagan Administration, and currently is on the Board of the American Analysis of News and Media Inc., which publishes usagovpolicy.com and the New York Analysis of Policy and Government.  Each Saturday, she presents key updates on U.S. foreign policy from the State Department.

Illustration: Pixabay

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Bipartisan Agreement on Hong Kong and Animal Cruelty

Finally, there are some issues that everyone in Congress can agree on, and President Trump is onboard as well. Aside from the significance of the specific pieces of legislation, the ability to come together on meritorious issues is noteworthy.

Rep. Ted Deutch, a Florida Republican, along with Rep. Vern Buchanan, a Florida Democrat, introduced legislation to make animal cruelty a federal crime. The Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (PACT) Act (H.R. 724criminalizes certain acts of animal cruelty.) Just briefly before that, legislation was passed approving sanctions on China’s illegal repression of Hong Kong. 

The U.S. Senate unanimously passed the animal cruelty bill. The Hong Kong measure passed the House by 417-1. 

In 2010, Congress passed the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act, which made the creation and distribution of animal crushing videos illegal. However, the underlying acts of cruelty against animals were not included. The PACT Act closes this loophole by prohibiting certain cases of animal abuse.

Rep. Duetch stated “With President Trump signing the PACT Act, animal cruelty is no longer just unacceptable, it is now illegal. We can now finally say that animal abuse is a federal crime in the United States. Americans have long stood in support of animal welfare protections, and now our national laws reflect these values. This bipartisan achievement has been years in the making, and I am proud to have been a part of this great effort alongside Congressman Buchanan and so many advocates and passionate citizens who made this possible.”

China’s pattern of flagrant violation of human rights on an epic scale, and its habitual use of force and intimidation to steal resources from other nations, was unopposed by the Obama Administration.  Similarly, the former President did nothing of significance to deter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The results have been dire.  Beijing has accelerated its terrible practices in the Indo-Pacific, and operates one hundred concentration camps on its soil.  Putin has designs on recapturing the nations that gained their freedom following the fall of the Soviet Union.

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History has clearly taught that it is wise to put aggressors in their place early on, or face dramatic consequences down the road.  The Hong Kong legislation is a start in doing just that. 

While both of these measures passed on their own very worthy merits, the ability to put aside the partisan warfare that has characterized Washington on behalf of the national good has gained a small and tentative first step.  It should be extended significantly further, and public opinion may just force that result. 

According to recent polls, the most extreme example of excessive partisanship, the ongoing impeachment process, is unpopular.  It’s a clear result of the almost total lack of solid evidence of any wrongdoing, and the inability of the House Democrats to even believably describe what crime was committed (they are almost comically reliant on “focus groups” to decide what to charge the President with.) The absurdity of the Democrats move is highlighted by the reality that the next election is less than a year away.

There are other issues that should transcend party politics.  The need to address key issues, such as providing an adequate defense in a consistent manner, may be the most significant. The need to wrest government from bureaucrats and restore it to electeds is another. 

The budgetary and legislative process has, for far too long, emphasized the needs of careerists over the good of the people.  Urgent national requirements are held hostage to the schemes of those attempting to pork barrel their way to longevity in their jobs. The urge to embarrass and harass political opponents, no matter the collateral damage to the nation and citizenry, should be met with staunch disdain by the voters. Individuals of good conscience in government must come together to do this. 

Photo: American Analysis of News & Media, Inc.

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Quick Analysis

Is China in Trouble?

This report was provided exclusively to the New York Analysis of Policy & Government by Daria Novak, who served in the United States State Department during the Reagan Administration.

The 2019 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission is public and the picture is provides indicates not much has improved since last year. While China’s domestic economy has cooled to the slowest pace in 30 years, the country’s unwavering commitment to state management means that its decades-long history of unfair trade practices remains a serious threat to US national security and global competitiveness. Washington has pushed hard for Beijing to codify its commitments to strengthened intellectual property rights protection, prohibition of forced technology transfer, and the removal of industrial subsidies. 

Since receiving permanent Most Favored Nation status almost two decades ago China has refused to abide by its commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States, in response, has imposed tariffs impacting more than $500 billion in bilateral goods trade and reduced overall trade with the country. China’s response has been to improve its pursuit of domestic technological advances using whatever means available, including stealing intellectual property and industrial espionage. 

According to the eight key findings in the 2019 report, China’s economy is not moving toward the broader market liberalization advocated by Washington. Beijing remains determined to preserve its dominant role in the economy and its trade-distorting practices. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views US actions on fair trade compliance as an attack on its internal affairs and has attempted to apply pressure on US companies by imposing its own tariff regime in response.

In an attempt to stimulate its slowing domestic economy Beijing has instituted infrastructure spending, tax cuts, and targeted monetary stimulus. In 2020 and for several years following it, China’s GDP is not expected to meet the minimum growth requirement of 6.2% needed to meet its 10-Year Plan for Economic Development. The GDP may fall as much as .3% lower than the artificial figures published by the government.

Other efforts by Beijing to influence its economy have met with limited success. While its deleveraging campaign has contained corporate debt growth, local governments continue borrowing at high rates. Individual household debt also is expanding rapidly as the Chinese attempt to maintain their standard of living during the slowdown. This not only poses a significant risk to China’s financial system, it also presents government policymakers with a major challenge. The population may not tolerate the economic policies of the CCP leadership without dispute. Beijing will have a difficult time limiting domestic expectations while attempting to expand the economy.

The combination of the economic slowdown and China’s global ambitions has resulted in an expansion in the strength and breadth of the state sector of the economy while private companies are floundering in debt and inventory. In 2019 these companies had a difficult time obtaining credit to expand operations. When China did purpose market liberalization this past year it only was in terms that were favorable to the state. Overall, Beijing faces a difficult time in the coming year.

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The safety of Chinese pharmaceuticals also is of concern. Drugs, and the raw materials to make them, are provided to US firms, the US military and other USG-related departments and agencies. They should not be manufactured in China, according to a report recommendation. It urges Congress to require the FDA, within six months, to investigate and certify to Congress whether the Chinese pharmaceutical industry is being regulated for safety at US standards, either by Chinese authorities or the FDA.  

The Report also contains a number of defense recommendations related to China’s global expansionist goals. It urges Congress to direct DOD to make assessments of China’s overseas basing, investment in strategic assets such as ports and airfields, and attempt to dissuade from nation from hosting a Chinese military presence. 

Regarding China’s space ambitions, it urges Congress to direct the National Space Council to develop a strategy to ensure the United States remains the preeminent space power in the face of growing competition from China and Russia. This includes a long-term economic space resource policy strategy, including an assessment of the viability of extraction of space-based precious minerals, onsite exploitation of space-based natural resources, and space-based solar power. 

To counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region is recommends the US assess the viability and impact of establishing new military training centers hosted by Indo-Pacific allies and partners to increase connectivity, interoperability, and shared professional military education among countries throughout the region. And, finally, it urges Congress to ensure the US limit China’s attempts to isolate Taiwan’s democratically-elected leaders and to strengthen support for Taiwan’s engagement with the international community, including actions the Administration will take should Beijing increase its coercion against Taiwan.

Overall, the 2019 Report indicates not much has improved in US-China economic and security affairs since last year and there also are numerous indicators warning that Beijing’s aggressive posturing in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere will continue unabated if not opposed by other nations.

Photo: Two pilots assigned to a naval aviation brigade under the PLA Eastern Theater Command get settled in the cockpit of a J-10 fighter jet before takeoff for the round-the-clock air-to-air live-fire training in late November, 2019. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Sha Lingyun and Tian Jianmin)

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Quick Analysis

America’s Alliances, and the Threats Faced

Recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper, speaking at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, Belgium, outlined America’s alliances, the threats faced, and the future of global conflicts.  The New York Analysis of Policy and Government provides key excerpts:

In Afghanistan, the Resolute Support train, advise and assist mission continues to improve the capability of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces.  Their ability to maintain security during the recent elections was a good indication of the progress that they’ve made.

In Saudi Arabia, we continue to reinforce our partners with additional aircraft, air and missile defense systems, and other defensive assets.  We urge our allies in Europe to follow our lead and contribute their own support to help deter Iranian aggression, to promote stability in the region and defend the international rules-based order.

And in Iraq, where I just came from yesterday, the Defeat-ISIS Coalition continues to support the Iraqis and their efforts to ensure the lasting defeat of that terrorist organization.

Despite these positive signs, however, threats to the security and stability of the Middle East still abound.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s unwillingness to stop their senseless attacks on innocent civilians set back negotiations to establish peace.

Iran’s continued malign behavior throughout the Middle East, to include its recent attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities, presents a persistent threat to our partners in the region.

And Turkey’s unwarranted incursion into northern Syria jeopardizes the gains made there in recent years.

It is clear there is still a long way to go to achieve peace and stability in that part of the world.  In fact, the numerous security challenges today have the potential to consume our time, to sap our resources, and to dominate our focus.

The commencement this month of our 19th consecutive year of conflict in Afghanistan is just a reminder of just how difficult it is to end a war.

As we continue our efforts around the world to protect the homeland, to help defend our allies and partners, and safeguard our interests, we must do so with an eye to the future.  New threats are on the horizon that we ignore at our own peril.

Meeting these challenges requires us to contend with today’s foes while simultaneously preparing for tomorrow’s potential adversaries — before it’s too late.

The world around us is changing at a pace faster than ever before. New technologies have emerged that could dramatically alter the character of warfare.  Advancements in fields such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons and directed energy are increasing the lethality of modern weapon systems and expanding the geometry of the battlefield.

Staging areas for troops, aircraft and ships safely removed from the effects of enemy weapons in the past are now within range of modern missile systems.  Satellites that transmit vital communications and positioning data miles overhead are increasingly vulnerable to attack. And military bases used as power projection platforms are exposed to cyber threats that aim to disrupt infrastructure needed to deploy forces.

In the future, wars will be fought not just on the land and on the sea, as they have for thousands of years, or in the air, as they have for the past century, but also in outer space and cyberspace in unprecedented ways.

Preparing for this type of warfare requires a renewed focus on high-intensity conflict, it requires continued alliance on allies and partners, and it requires the foresight to expand our warfighting capabilities across all five of these domains.

The United States National Defense Strategy remains the department’s guidepost as we adapt the force to this new environment.  The NDS prioritizes China first, Russia second, as we transition our primary focus towards great power competition.

It is increasing — increasingly clear that Beijing and Moscow wish to reshape the world to their favor at the expense of others.  Through predatory economics, political subversion and military force, they seek to erode the sovereignty of weaker states.  Over time, this activity is undermining the current international rules-based order that generations before us worked so hard to achieve.

It is quite fitting that this very institution where we gather this morning was first established to commemorate the strategy that helped create this order.  The Marshall Plan, along with other post-World War II initiatives, was grounded in a common set of principles, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, national sovereignty and free trade.

The international system that followed has long served as the foundation for our security and our prosperity. But today, China and Russia, nations with a view of the world very different than our own, are using their power to coercively alter the strategic environment, and they’re doing so in a way that uses this system against us.

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Throughout my travels in my first three months as Secretary of Defense, I’ve heard firsthand from allies and partners around the world about the damage that’s being done.

China’s One Belt, One Road initiative has left several nations with unsustainable debt, forcing them to trade sovereignty for financial relief.  Even developed nations fear China’s growing leverage, which not only impacts their economic and political decisions but, perhaps worse, leads them to make suboptimal security choices.

I would caution my friends in Europe against adopting the mindset that American concerns about Chinese economic and military expansion are overstated or not relevant to their national security.  The PRC’s influence is rapidly expanding as it continues to pursue new partners well beyond the region.  Our security must not be diminished by a short and narrow-sighted focus on economic opportunity.

The United States is not asking nations to choose between China and the rest of the world, but we are asking them to pursue a future that supports democracy, that enables economic prosperity, and that protects human rights.

All countries must enter their relationship with the PRC with eyes wide open.  China’s state-sponsored theft of intellectual property, its militarization of the South China Sea and its mistreatment of ethnic minorities are all clear examples of Beijing’s unwillingness to abide by international rules and norms.  The ongoing protests in Hong Kong are a consequence of Beijing’s gradual erosion of the rights guaranteed under the One Country, Two Systems agreement in 1997.

In a world dominated by China, these actions by the state, regrettably, would constitute acceptable behavior.

Similarly, Russia’s foreign policy demonstrates a blatant disregard for state sovereignty.  In addition to their military incursions in Georgia and Ukraine, their use of cyber warfare and information operations continues to interfere with other states’ domestic affairs.

In the case of both China and Russia, their malign behavior, combined with aggressive military modernization programs, puts the international security environment on a trajectory that should concern all free nations.

Over the next two days, as I meet with our NATO allies here in Brussels my message will be clear.

First, the United States commitment to NATO and Article 5 is iron-clad.  However, for the alliance to remain strong, every member — every member must contribute its fair share to ensure our mutual security and uphold the international rules-based order.

This means not only contributing to the important NATO security missions around the world today, but also making sufficient investments towards the capabilities needed to deter our potential adversaries tomorrow.

In 2014, all 28 NATO allies made a commitment to the defense spending goal of 2% of GDP by 2024.  However, only eight nations have so far achieved this important milestone.  Just over half of the allies are currently on track to reach this level of defense spending.  I commend them for meeting their obligation on time.  But a number of other NATO members are, unfortunately, falling short.

Cumulatively, allies plan $100 million in defense spending increases through the next year. A lot of money, but as we all agreed, we can, must and will do more.

Anticipating our Leaders Meeting in December, I urge all allies that do not yet have a credible plan to implement the Wales Defense investment plan to develop one soon.  There can be no free riders for our shared security. Regardless of geographic location, size or population, all must do their part to help deter war and defend the alliance.  We’re only as strong as the investments we are willing to make towards our common defense.

In terms of readiness, I’m encouraged by the progress allies are making.  We are close to our goal of the Four 30s by 2020.  As our leaders agreed when they adopted the NATO Readiness Initiative, having the addition of 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels and 30 mechanized battalions ready to fight in 30 days or less is a critical first step to re-instilling a culture of readiness in the alliance. I expect that by the NATO Leaders Meeting in December, we will have 100% of these important contributions identified.

Together, we all have an obligation to prepare for the challenges of the future, even as we manage the security issues of the present.  The international order constructed following World War II benefited the entire world.  Initiatives like the Marshall Plan helped to rebuild the continent, restore political order and bring about economic prosperity following a time of great destruction.

That order has largely remained intact, but there is no inherent permanence to its design.  Our potential adversaries seek to weaken the integrity of these institutions and incrementally reshape the international system. Should we remain complacent and fail to recognize the shifting landscape, we risk inviting greater aggression and further challenges to our shared values and security.

Defending this system and deterring this aggression remains my primary task, and we can only do this by working closely together to maintain a ready, capable alliance that’s prepared to fight when ready. I am confident that we will be successful in doing so if we fully commit to this task and lead our citizens toward this goal.

Photo: The guided missile destroyer USS Halsey travels in the Indian Ocean, March 28, 2018, while supporting security efforts in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. (USN)

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Quick Analysis

America’s Role in the IndoPacific, Part 2

As part of the major economic and diplomatic meetings this month, the U.S. State Department prepared a long-awaited summary of its relations with the nations of the IndoPacific region.  Today’s excerpt examines national security issues, and America’s ties with the regional economy.

ENHANCING ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

Market-based economic systems, private sector finance, and open investment environments have driven the Indo-Pacific region’s prosperity. In the developing world, the private sector supplies nine of ten jobs, and foreign direct investment exceeds development assistance by a factor of five to one. State-directed financing, by contrast, is more limited and often comes with strings attached.

The United States believes that the role of government is to enable free enterprise while protecting individual rights and empowering people. We respect the sovereignty of every nation, and our economic engagement seeks to equip states to resist coercive economic practices, unsustainable debt burdens, and other dangers. We do this by improving market access and competitiveness, facilitating business-to-business ties, and promoting free, fair, and reciprocal trade.

 At the inaugural Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Mark Green, and other senior U.S. officials launched new initiatives to catalyze private sector investment in Indo-Pacific infrastructure, energy markets, and the digital economy. To date, support has included $2.9 billion through the Department of State and USAID for the economic pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy since the beginning of the Trump Administration, and hundreds of millions more through other agencies, including the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)

The U.S. government is deploying new and innovative mechanisms to improve market access and level the playing field for U.S. businesses. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), created by the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act in 2018, will be at the forefront of this effort with $60 billion in development financing to attract more private sector investment into emerging markets USAID is another major contributor to business environment development, with longstanding programs to improve regulatory and economic practices. USAID is expanding programs focused on Indo-Pacific trade and competitiveness to help reduce barriers to market entry, strengthen regulatory capacity, improve private sector competitiveness, and increase trade.

We are also continuing efforts to promote free, fair, and reciprocal trade. In October 2019, the United States and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement and the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement. Under the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement, Japan will eliminate or reduce tariffs on approximately $7.2 billion in U.S. agricultural exports. Once this agreement is implemented, over 90 percent of U.S. agricultural imports into Japan will be duty free or receive preferential tariff access. The U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement includes high-standard provisions that ensure data can be transferred across borders without restrictions, guarantee consumer privacy protections, promote adherence to common principles for addressing cybersecurity challenges, and support effective use of encryption technologies. The agreement will boost the already approximately $40 billion worth of digital trade between the United States and Japan.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The United States supports the development of infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region that is physically secure, financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially responsible. This is the sort of infrastructure that we and our partners have fostered in the region for 70 years. Through foreign assistance, diplomacy, and international finance institutions such as the World Bank and ADB, we have been facilitating infrastructure projects across the Indo-Pacific for decades. We have promoted investment, innovation, market-based growth, and transparent policies that have helped spur economic growth, while also underwriting regional security.

DIGITAL ECONOMY

The internet and digital economy have spurred tremendous economic growth and improved living standards around the world. The Indo-Pacific is home to some of the most connected and technologically sophisticated economies on the planet. One major challenge over the next decade will be to maintain open and interoperable cross-border data flows while protecting the digital economy from cybersecurity threats. Online data will be massively expanded by growth in “internet of things” devices, while fifth-generation “5G” telecommunications will empower new critical infrastructure, including autonomous vehicles and smart electricity grids.

To meet the challenges of a digitally connected world, the United States promotes an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable internet. We urge all countries to take a risk-based approach to evaluating technology vendors, including those that might be subject to control by or the undue influence of foreign powers.

CHAMPIONING GOOD GOVERNANCE

Americans believe in the vision of a world of open societies and free markets. We believe in fundamental freedom of conscience, religion, speech, and assembly. Our foreign policy is predicated on the belief that the world would be safer and more prosperous if all people were free to achieve their greatest potential within pluralistic systems governed by equal treatment under the law.

To address governance challenges across the Indo-Pacific region, U.S. programs empower the region’s citizens and civil societies, combat corruption, and build resilience to foreign influence that threatens nations’ sovereignty. In November 2018, Vice President Pence launched the Indo-Pacific Function and caution of kamagra:- Due to genital disorder a patient is unable to get cost viagra sturdy and proper erection it is termed as erectile dysfunction. It is one of the fastest working medicines that order generic cialis https://www.unica-web.com/archive/2015/english/GA2015-secretary-report.html relax blood vessels and pumps up more blood into the chamber. If, for some reason, your special needs child is being diagnosed and treated tadalafil online india for behavioral disorders. The medication is effective for viagra sildenafil mastercard https://unica-web.com/ENGLISH/2014/obituary-for-stanislaw-puls.html up to 6 hours, depending on your health. Transparency Initiative, which focuses on anti-corruption, fiscal transparency, democracy assistance, youth development, media freedom, and protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights. Our efforts under the Transparency Initiative involve over 200 programs totaling more than $600 million since the beginning of the Trump Administration.

At the November 2019 East Asia Summit, the United States is announcing $68 million, including for a major new regional governance program in the Pacific Islands and free and fair elections in Burma. Other Transparency Initiative programs have helped the government of Indonesia improve responsiveness to public complaints, assisted indigenous people displaced by a Chinese-Cambodian hydropower dam, supported public outreach by the Sri Lankan parliament through establishing a new, state of-the-art media center, and strengthened civil society contributions to legislation in Nepal. The United States is developing partnerships in governance priorities with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, and others.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) practices repression at home and abroad. Beijing is intolerant of dissent, aggressively controls media and civil society, and brutally suppresses ethnic and religious minorities. Such practices, which Beijing exports to other countries through its political and economic influence, undermine the conditions that have promoted stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific for decades.

We have called on the PRC publicly to halt its brutal repression of Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and members of other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang. We urge that the selection of religious leaders by the Tibetan community be free of interference by the Chinese Communist Party. With respect to Hong Kong, we have cautioned Beijing that it must uphold its commitments to maintaining Hong Kong’s autonomy and civil liberties under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. We believe that freedom of expression and peaceful assembly must be vigorously protected in Hong Kong and across the Indo-Pacific region.

ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY

The United States seeks to build a flexible, resilient network of like-minded security partners to address common challenges. We share information and build the capacity of security sector forces to respond to transnational crime, protect the maritime domain, address environmental challenges, and response collectively to emerging threats. We also ensure that the U.S. military and its allies maintain interoperable capabilities to deter adversaries.

Our enduring commitment to the Indo-Pacific is demonstrated daily by our presence in the region with approximately 375,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility.

We are continuing to strengthen this forward presence. President Trump and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong signed an update to the 1990 memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding U.S. use of facilities in Singapore. This agreement allows continued U.S. military access to Singapore’s air and naval bases and provides logistic support for transiting personnel, aircraft and vessels. It also extends the original MOU by 15 years.

An important focus within the Indo-Pacific strategy is expanding security sector and law enforcement capacity to counter transnational crime. This includes illicit trafficking; terrorism and violent extremism; cybercrime; illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; and other crimes that cross national borders. In August 2019, we expanded our partnerships to counter transnational crime along the Mekong River. We also held the first of a three-part workshop series with ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to address aviation security and information sharing, building on our long history of cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

Among the most urgent transnational threats are threats in the cyber domain. The United States is increasing support to our Indo-Pacific partners to defend their networks and counter malicious cyber activities by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK), the PRC, Russia, and other state and non-state cyber actors that seek to steal money, intellectual property, and other sensitive information. The United States coordinates with like-minded partners such as Australia, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to build cyber capacity in the region. Our activities include helping countries develop cyber strategies, policies, and legal frameworks; enhancing incident response and network defense capabilities; improving financial sector cybersecurity to protect IndoPacific economies; countering the use of the internet for terrorists’ purposes; increasing cybersecurity awareness in both the public and private sectors; and promoting rule of law, privacy, internet freedom, and responsible governance frameworks when considering cybersecurity needs.

We are partnering with Singapore to improve cybersecurity and stability in cyberspace in ASEAN member states, including collaborative efforts within the region such as adoption and implementation of regional cyber confidence building measures. The capstone of our ASEAN engagement was the first U.S.-ASEAN Cyber Policy Dialogue in Singapore in October 2019. The United States also works with partners on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other dangerous materials. Together, we counter DPRK proliferation activities, enforce United States and UN Security Council sanctions, build strategic trade control frameworks, educate industry on their compliance obligations, and strengthen the enforcement at key land, maritime, and air ports of entry. We build capacity and raise awareness on proliferation activities with governments, shipping companies, shipboard personnel, and facility personnel to ensure the safe and secure flow of legitimate international trade.

To protect the maritime domain, we cooperate with Indo-Pacific partners to maintain freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of the sea so that all nations can access and benefit from the maritime commons. In the South China Sea, we urge all claimants, including the PRC, to resolve disputes peacefully, without coercion, and in accordance with international law. PRC maritime claims in the South China Sea, exemplified by the preposterous “nine-dash line,” are unfounded, unlawful, and unreasonable. These claims, which are without legal, historic, or geographic merit, impose real costs on other countries. Through repeated provocative actions to assert the nine-dash line, Beijing is inhibiting ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves, while contributing to instability and the risk of conflict.

Since the beginning of the Trump Administration, we have provided more than $1.1 billion for Department of State and USAID security cooperation in South and Southeast Asia. This includes $356 million for programs such as the Department of State’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (SAMSI) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative. These programs provide training and equipment that enables South and Southeast Asian countries to better detect threats, share information, and respond collectively to natural and man-made crises. Over the same period, the Department of Defense’s Maritime Security Initiative and “Section 333” funds provided nearly $250 million for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance information sharing, interoperability, and multinational maritime cooperation. We are providing new advisors to enhance maritime security and defense reforms in the Pacific Islands and develop cyber policy and governance frameworks in Mongolia.

Photo: A guided-missile destroyer attached to a destroyer flotilla with the navy under the PLA Southern Theater Command throws jamming bombs to make smoke screen to mask the movement during a maritime training exercise in waters of the South China Sea on August 14, 2019. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Li Hongming and Qian Chunyan)

Categories
Quick Analysis

America’s Role in the IndoPacific

As part of the major economic and diplomatic meetings this month, the U.S. State Department prepared a long-awaited summary of its relations with the nations of the IndoPacific region.  The New York Analysis of Policy and Government presents key excerpts, starting with the State Department’s overall perspective.

In November 2017 in Vietnam, President Trump outlined a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all countries prosper side by side as sovereign, independent states. That vision, shared with billions of people in more than 35 countries and economies, is based on values that have underpinned peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific for generations. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, good governance, and freedom of the seas are goals shared by all who wish to prosper in a free and open future.

■ The United States remains deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific region and committed to its prosperity. With $1.9 trillion in two-way trade, our futures are inextricably intertwined. U.S. government agencies, businesses, and institutions are spurring private sector investment and gainful employment in infrastructure, energy, and the digital economy, strengthening civil society and democratic institutions, countering transnational threats, and investing in human capital across the Indo-Pacific.

 ■ The United States, our allies, and our partners are at the forefront of preserving the free and open regional order. All nations have a shared responsibility to uphold the rules and values that underpin a free and open Indo-Pacific. We are increasing the tempo and scope of our work with allies, partners, and regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Mekong states, the Pacific Island countries, and our strategic partner India to address shared challenges and advance a shared vision.

■ The United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy is driving a tangible increase in resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific region. Since the start of the Trump Administration, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have provided the region with over $4.5 billion in foreign assistance. This has been augmented by hundreds of billions more in development financing, investment by U.S. firms, and other sources. We are investing new resources, launching new programs, and building new partnerships to ensure a safe, prosperous, and dynamic future for the region.

In recent decades, the Indo-Pacific has undergone a remarkable transformation. As hundreds of millions of people climbed out of poverty, the region has become home to world-class companies and an important engine of global economic growth. This transformation was possible because a free and open regional order ensured stability and a level playing field on which countries could grow and prosper as sovereign, independent states.

[The United States] is committed to upholding a free and open IndoPacific in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with international law and principles of fair competition. We will compete vigorously against attempts to limit the autonomy and freedom of choice of Indo-Pacific nations.

Competition, however, is not conflict. Rather, it can prevent conflict and elevate the performance of all. The United States and our partners believe that the best way to prevent conflict is to reinforce the values that supported the Indo-Pacific region’s remarkable progress.

We have a fundamental interest in ensuring that the future of the Indo-Pacific is one of freedom and openness rather than coercion and corruption. The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Indo-Pacific. In 2018, we conducted over $1.9 trillion in two-way trade with the region, supporting more than 3 million jobs in the United States and 5.1 million jobs in the Indo-Pacific. All five of our non-NATO bilateral defense alliances are in the Indo-Pacific. We are also the largest donor of foreign assistance in the region, contributing $2 trillion in constant dollars since the end of World War II.

The U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. We do not ask countries to choose between one partner or another. Instead, we ask that they uphold the core principles of the regional order at a time when these principles are under renewed threat.

The United States is strengthening and deepening partnerships with countries that share our values. Our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have helped sustain peace and security for generations. ASEAN sits at the geographical center of the Indo-Pacific and is central to our vision. Our strategic partnership with India, a fellow democracy of 1.3 billion people that shares our vision for the Indo-Pacific, is reaching new heights. We are joining with the Mekong states, Pacific Island countries, South Asian nations, Taiwan, and many others to face emerging challenges. In September 2019, the first ministerial-level meeting of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan at the Quadrilateral Consultations marked a new milestone for our diplomatic engagement in the region.

MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

 A strong, rules-based architecture anchors the U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific region. Representing ten countries, 650 million people, and a combined GDP of almost $3 trillion, ASEAN is central to this architecture.  ASEAN is most effective when it speaks with one voice about pressing political and security issues, and it took an important step in this regard with the June 2019 release of its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” We see a clear convergence between the principles enshrined in ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook— inclusivity, openness, good governance, and respect for international law—and the vision of the United States for a free and open Indo-Pacific, as well as the regional approaches of our allies, partners, and friends. The United States supports ASEAN’s efforts to ensure that all Indo-Pacific countries, regardless of their size, have equal stake in determining the future of the region. U.S. technical assistance strengthens capacity in the energy sector; promotes shared approaches to cybersecurity and digital trade; creates opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; and encourages women and youth innovators and entrepreneurs. U.S. programs also support the ASEAN Economic Community by reducing the cost of doing business and streamlining trade, while a new partnership between U.S. and ASEAN cities will help realize smart improvements in transportation and water security.

While ASEAN serves as the backbone of regional political and security discussions, “minilateral” engagements offer nimble ways to coordinate with like-minded partners. Through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the United States has significantly deepened our engagement with Japan and Australia on many issues, including sustainable infrastructure development, maritime security, and counterterrorism. Leaders from the United States, India, and Japan met in November 2018 and June 2019 to promote shared fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and to exchange views on pressing security and economic issues. All four countries elevated their Quadrilateral Consultation to the ministerial level in September 2019.

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS

The U.S. vision and approach in the Indo-Pacific region aligns closely with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, India’s Act East Policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic of Korea’s New Southern Policy, and Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy.

We are working with Japan to improve energy and infrastructure under the Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP) and Japan-U.S. Strategic Digital Economy Partnership (JUSDEP) from the Indo-Pacific Being mentally healthy is http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482461379_add_file_1.pdf cialis cheap canada very important for us. Website link directories, although canadian sildenafil http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482456353_add_file_1.pdf not what they tell you they are. Mast Mood oil is developed using herbal ingredients like Tulsi, Jawadi Kasturi, Jaiphal, Javitri, Dalchini, Ashwagandha, Kapur, Nirgundi, Samudra Phal, Sona Patha, Nirgundi, Dalchini, Javitri, Jawadi, Kapur, Tulsi, Bueylu Oil and Kasturi are the key ingredients of Mast Mood capsules: Abhrak Bhasma, Ras Sindoor, Valvading, female viagra canada Himalcherry, Girji, Sudh Shilajeet, Umbelia, Lauh Bhasma, Embelia Ribes, Adrijatu. There are also other requirements for PTDE courses, for instance the whole course time can comprises sixty six hours (32 in course of study and thirty four hours in behind the wheel apply. viagra sales in india to the east coast of Africa. Our commitment of $29 million for energy development in the Mekong region in support of Asia EDGE (Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy) will further strengthen this partnership, as will the alignment of U.S. investment with the Japanese government’s target of $10 billion in public and private investment and capacity building.

We are working with the Republic of Korea to expand development collaboration across the Indo-Pacific region through a memorandum of understanding signed September 30 between USAID and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). A joint statement released with the Republic of Korea in November will build on governance and law enforcement programming, increase water security cooperation in the Mekong region, and deepen the links across our infrastructure finance and cybersecurity agencies to jointly invest in human capital across the region.

We are also strengthening and deepening our relationship with Taiwan. We have repeatedly expressed our concern over Beijing’s actions to bully Taiwan through military maneuvers, economic pressure, constraints on its international space, and poaching of its diplomatic partners. These actions undermine the cross-Strait status quo that has benefitted both sides of the Strait for decades.

Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States supports an effective deterrence capability for Taiwan. In 2019, the Trump Administration approved and notified Congress of potential sales of critical defense equipment totaling more than $10 billion Through the American Institute in Taiwan, we worked together to convene hundreds of Indo-Pacific policymakers and experts on issues including public health, women’s empowerment, media disinformation, and the digital economy. We also co-hosted the first-ever Pacific Islands Dialogue in October 2019 to explore areas of cooperation among like-minded partners in the Pacific Islands.

As a major exporter, trader, and investor in Southeast Asia, the United States is committed to engagement with ASEAN member states. ASEAN collectively remains the United States’ fourth largest export market, while Thailand and Singapore are two of the six fastest growing sources of foreign direct investment in the United States. In maritime Southeast Asia, U.S. companies have been selected to participate in the “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure initiative in the Philippines as we deepen our security partnership. The opening of a new U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in early 2019 highlighted our strategic partnership with the world’s third largest democracy and largest Muslim-majority nation, and we remain committed to the sustainable development of Timor-Leste, one of the world’s newest democracies. In Malaysia, the United States has worked locally to support the government’s reform efforts, including with a two-year program launched this year for transparency and accountability reforms. 

In mainland Southeast Asia, we supported Thailand’s chairmanship of ASEAN and continue to deepen our partnership with Vietnam, who will chair ASEAN in 2020. The Mekong region of Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam is strategically important to the United States. This region is facing new challenges that put autonomy and economic independence at risk, including debt dependency, a spree of dam-building that concentrates control over downstream flows, plans to blast and dredge riverbeds, extraterritorial river patrols, increasing organized crime and trafficking, and a push by some to mold new rules to govern the river in ways that undermine existing institutions.

Over the last 10 years, U.S. government agencies have provided over $3.8 billion in assistance to the countries of the Mekong. This has helped strengthen local human capital to better address transboundary challenges on water security, smart hydropower, energy and infrastructure planning, and education. We are also strong supporters of the Ayeyawady-Chao PhrayaMekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), an inclusive cooperation framework to support the development of this important region.

Our engagement with Pacific Island nations rose to unprecedented levels with President Trump’s historic Oval Office meeting with the three Presidents of the Freely Associated States on May 21, 2019; the Secretary of the Interior’s attendance at the annual Pacific Islands Forum Partners Dialogue in 2018 and 2019; Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert Wilkie’s attendance at the inauguration of Micronesian President Panuelo in July 2019; and Secretary Pompeo’s historic visit to the Federated States of Micronesia in August 2019.

In September 2019, the United States announced a new $100 million “Pacific Pledge.” This assistance is in addition to the approximately $350 million annually that U.S. agencies invest in projects, assistance, and operations to build a more prosperous future for the people of the region. As part of the Pacific Pledge, USAID plans to provide more than $62 million in new programs over the next year, more than doubling development assistance over prior years. This year, the United States also made an initial grant to the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB’s) Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) to support infrastructure planning in the Pacific Islands. In addition, USAID will expand its staff presence in Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau.

In September 2019, the United States announced a new $100 million “Pacific Pledge.” This assistance is in addition to the approximately $350 million annually that U.S. agencies invest in projects, assistance, and operations to build a more prosperous future for the people of the region. As part of the Pacific Pledge, USAID plans to provide more than $62 million in new programs over the next year, more than doubling development assistance over prior years. This year, the United States also made an initial grant to the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB’s) Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) to support infrastructure planning in the Pacific Islands. In addition, USAID will expand its staff presence in Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau.

The United States is also increasing bilateral engagement with South Asian partners. We are helping Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives equip and train their navies and coast guards to safeguard strategic sea lines of communication, combat human trafficking, prevent illegal fishing, disrupt drug smuggling, and respond to natural disasters. Piracy and thefts have dropped by 70 percent in the Bay of Bengal thanks to the Bangladesh Navy and Coast Guard utilizing boats procured under various U.S. programs as well as U.S. training

We have helped United Nations (UN) peacekeepingcontributing states like Bangladesh and Nepal become more effective by providing equipment, such as the Unmanned Aircraft System we transferred to Bangladesh, and by providing training for these partners’ senior military officers at American professional military education schools. 

The United States is enhancing the counterterrorism capacity of our South Asian partners through hands-on investigative assistance, such as the deployment of FBI investigators to Sri Lanka after the ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks on Easter Sunday, as well as helping to prevent attacks through enhanced border control processes and technology in countries like Bangladesh and Maldives.

Following the Maldives’ election last year that brought to power a reform-oriented leader committed to rebuilding the country’s democratic institutions, we mobilized $23 million in foreign assistance to encourage the country’s anti-corruption, rule of law, and counterterrorism agenda. 

The Report concludes tomorrow.

Illustration: Pixabay