The White House has stressed that the battle to defeat ISIS will extend beyond the end of the Obama Administration. Former Obama defense secretary Leon Panetta is even more pessimistic. He recently stated that it could take thirty years.
It’s time to ask why.
Since the end of the Second World War, it has become accepted that the United States will only fight using a small part of its military prowess. For struggles in Vietnam and Korea, concern over inciting a larger conflict with the Soviet Union or China was a factor in exercising restraint. There may have been some validity in that worry, but the reciprocal question must be asked: with America, at the time, probably superior to those powers in armed strength, would not that same concern also have restrained those powers?
Those factors did not exist during the first Gulf War, yet President Bush (41) chose not to press the advantage and left Saddam Hussein in power after crushing his military and the Iraqi leaders’ dream of annexing Kuwait and possibly Saudi Arabia. The task of finally eliminating Saddam was left to Bush 43, who did oust the tyrant. The potential to transform Iraq into a functioning democracy, a difficult but important goal, was cut short by the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops during the subsequent Obama Administration. Islamic extremists also took great comfort in the complete absence of any armed response to the Benghazi assault.
The concept of an enduring, encompassing victory, which motivated allied leadership during the darkest days of the WWII, is no longer in vogue. Instead, the least necessary force is employed, with concern for collateral damage taking precedent over winning. America’s opponents see that and the strength of the “peace at any price” sentiment in the West as a sign of weakness and use it against the U.S. Problems are not resolved; they are merely pushed down the road.
Defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria would not take Panetta’s 30 years if the full force of the United States military, with the exception, of course, of nuclear weapons, were brought to bear, and if that force was employed with the same necessary ruthlessness with which the victories of the Second World War were won. The conflict could be concluded far more rapidly, and in a manner that would discourage further such attempts by Islamic extremists. It would also serve as a potent deterrent to Iran’s belligerent plans.