Author: Daria Novak

Most Americans know the Mediterranean Sea is located between Europe and North Africa. In comparison, few know the location or importance of the nearby Black Sea, which sits between Asia and Europe and serves as a drainage basin for 24 countries across Europe. There are six nation-states along its coastline, including Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The Turkish Straits, consisting of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, serves as a gateway into the eastern Mediterranean. The Black Sea itself contains over 30 operating merchant seaports, including 12 in Ukraine, and forms a strategic corridor for trade, moving legal and illegal goods, alongside radioactive materials. Today oilfields and natural gas resources in the western portion under Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone are in danger due to Russia’s invasion of the country. According to John Daly of the Jamestown Foundation, Putin has turned the northern Black Sea into a de facto war zone, putting the entire region at risk.

The director of the Institute for Agricultural Market Studies, Dmitri Rylko, points out that the conflict has doubled the insurance premiums for merchant vessels entering the Black Sea and is likely to “result in massive unsold grain stocks.” Bulgaria and Romania, NATO Member states, normally receive Black Sea shipments of approximately 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day via their coastal terminals. Putin’s war, Daly says, has left Black Sea maritime trade in limbo. Although Russia has not formally declared a blockade of the Ukrainian coast along the Black Sea, insurance companies remain unsure whether to guarantee the safety of shipments, while foreign companies are uncertain about assuming the additional risk themselves. Since the end of February four cargo ships traveling in the Black Sea were either sunk or damaged by Russian missile attacks.  

With grain shipments stopped and well over 90 foreign-flagged ships remaining in the line of fire, NATO’s Shipping Center is defining the Black Sea as “very high risk.” Tethered mines in the waters around Odessa, in particular, have broken free and are floating in the currents. As of last week, Turkish authorities, with assistance from Bulgaria and Romania, disarmed several of the naval mines drifting near the Bosporus. Daly points out that “foreign interest in utilizing Georgian seaports grew by 250 percent, mainly from European and Chinese shippers, since the start of the current Russo-Ukrainian war” as it is one of the safer areas located on the eastern side of the Black Sea. NATO announced recently, that “the threat of more drifting mines cannot be ruled out.” 

The Financial Times is reporting that the conflict has severed Moldova’s normal import channels via maritime and Ukrainian overland corridors and ruptured exports to Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. “This has forced the country to utilize more costly alternative routes and suppliers, aggravated by rising prices and energy deficits.” Naval mines, although outlawed in 1907 under the Hague Convention, have created an area of undeclared war in the Black Sea. 

The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) completed a 12-month study on security in the Black Sea region in which it concluded it is a critical but “largely overlooked component in Russia’s military strategy” in the context of Moscow’s revisionist geopolitical ambitions in the Central and Eastern European region. According to the CEPA report, Moscow’s increased militarization of the Black Sea has altered the balance of power in the region, restored Russia’s dominion in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and enabled Putin to project power into the Mediterranean and Middle East. 

In a CEPA document released this week, Lauren Speranza and Lt. General (Ret.) Ben Hodges argue that “Going forward, much more is needed to boost defense in the Black Sea region to support Ukraine, reassure vulnerable allies, and push back on Vladimir Putin’s unjustified aggression. Home to three NATO allies and two close partners, the Black Sea is a strategically important arena for the West to not only contain Russia, but counter China and defend against Iran. 

The region also holds significant economic potential as the east-west corridor between Europe and Eurasia.” One solution, they suggest, is that NATO establish a “continuous blue water NATO naval presence in the Black Sea 365-days-a-year, with naval support infrastructure in Romania, Ukraine, Georgia, and Bulgaria that enables the maximum US naval presence within the parameters of the Montreux Convention.” The Black Sea was a critical frontier for a new European new security architecture before Putin invaded Ukraine. Today it is even more important if the West is to contain Russian imperialist ambitions. 

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department.

Illustration: Wikipedia

 Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership are watching events unfold in Russia’s war in Ukraine. As the days pass into weeks, Beijing is growing more concerned that spillover effects from the war could eventually impact China’s domestic economy and its political standing in the world. Over the last decade relations between Putin and Xi have evolved into a close strategic partnership based on mutual convenience. With the world uniting in condemnation of Putin, and sanctions against Russia mounting, Xi is starting to back pedal in China’s public support of Russia by intermittently distancing his country from its companion. 

There are other signs, however, that behind-the-scenes Beijing is continuing to strongly back Putin’s efforts. China, like Russia, employs a sophisticated propaganda and disinformation bureaucracy that currently is tasked with helping to shape China’s global image and limit fallout from its partnership with Russia. The world is seeing and hearing the message China intends, while Xi continues his strategic partnership relatively unimpeded with Putin. Xi is a world-class strategist who knows that maintaining a position Western leaders find reasonable is key to not getting dragged into a whirlpool of economic sanctions from which China might not readily escape.

At last week’s China-European Union virtual summit, European leaders pressed China hard to remain neutral and stop actively assisting China. They warned the communist giant against continuing to sustain normal economic relations with Russia while the world is attempting to target and isolate it to force an end to the war. While most of the West is united in its stance, a few European Summit participants still, however, suggested that China could play a mediating role. It is evidence of the effectiveness of the Chinese propaganda machine.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang told EU leaders that his country would seek to advance peace in “its own way.” Previously, at the end of March in a press conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Russia is China’s “most important close neighbor and strategic partner.” When he met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Wang Yi hailed efforts to advance bilateral cooperation to “higher levels.” China also inked a deal to buy Russian wheat that it no longer can sell elsewhere due to economic sanctions. Zhang Jun, China’s envoy to the United Nations, told the Security Council on Tuesday that all parties should exercise restraint and then followed up by calling for the world to avoid “groundless” accusations. He then added that “Reports and images of civilian deaths in Bucha are very disturbing, and the circumstances and specific causes of the incident must be ascertained.” Foreign policy analysts in Washington this week are pointing out that China is playing a destabilizing role in its relationship with Europe rather than a mediating one. 

Despite pressure from the West, China has not condemned Russian atrocities in Ukraine or called for Putin to be held accountable for war crimes. China has a hidden agenda. Zhang argued at the UN that countries not directly involved in the war should not be held accountable or forces to bear the consequences of geopolitical conflicts. The China-EU summit was a success from Beijing’s perspective as it ended without a commitment from the Chinese leadership to withhold military and economic support from Moscow. The EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell told the European Parliament on Tuesday that “The Chinese side stuck to their general statements of wishing to see peace, we are a peaceful people, we don’t invade others, asking for de-escalation, but avoiding specific commitments or avoiding any sort of line on Russia.” It is over 40 years since China opened to the West. During that time China’s envoys have gained diplomatic skills and learned to manipulate the global media and world leaders. Beijing continues to pose a fundamental challenge to democratic states, despite China’s propaganda machine moderating its public position. 

Larry Diamond and Glenn Tiffert, co-chairs of the Hoover Institution’s project on China’s Global Sharp Power, this week reminded the world that “China’s leaders have a grandiose vision of ‘national rejuvenation.’ The CCP’s ultimate goal is global hegemony – to make China the world’s leading power, dominating not only global trade (and, someday, finance) and resource flows but contested spaces like the Arctic, outer space, and international institutions.” That requires secret diplomatic moves, generating propaganda, and back-room deals with Putin. Western democratic leaders must come to terms with how China operates in the real world and learn to recognize that Xi and the CCP are playing the long-game. China still finds Russia useful for supplying energy, AI technology, and missiles. Xi and the CCP leadership will say and do what is necessary to obtain the advanced technologies needed for its hegemonic goals. Even China would admit that there are two side to every coin. Right now that means avoiding economic sanctions and global condemnation that could deprive the communist regime of the short-term resources it needs to meet its long-term goals. 

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Illustration: Pixabay

Reports coming in from Ukraine and Eastern Europe speculate that Russia is not withdrawing its forces but rather refreshing them with Russian troops stationed in other regions. Eyewitnesses in Abkhazia, a Russian occupied area of Georgia with a population of about 245,000, recorded the mass exodus of much of Putin’s army and military hardware this week. Soldiers also were seen departing via rail from the city of Gagra. Russia also has occupied South Ossetia, Georgia, a territory with a population of 53,000 since 2008. “Some of the first evidence of the redeployment of forces from the 4^th Military Base in South Ossetia to Ukraine came on March 16, causing local political unease,” according to Zaal Anjaparidze of the Jamestown Foundation. 

Political analysts specializing in Georgian affairs in Washington now are suggesting that, given Putin’s hefty military losses in Ukraine, other former Soviet satellites may consider this an opportune time to rebel against Russian occupying forces. One senior military analyst in Washington said a Russian defeat in Ukraine could buttress a push for full rebellion against undue influence from Moscow in the internal affairs of other East European states and result in a “domino-like” effect in which former satellites move closer to the West. 

“The temptation to exploit this momentum carries significant risks for militarily under-resourced Georgia that will need to be carefully considered to avoid the tragic mistakes made in the past,” noted Anjaparidze. Although Medvedev was president of Russia at the time of the Georgia invasion, Putin orchestrated the operation and completed it in five days. Due to constitutional restrictions on succession, Putin had stepped down for one term but was serving as prime minister before later reassuming the presidency. 

Georgia gained its independence from the USSR in 1991. The following year it joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a forum for dialogue that was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. In 1994 Georgia joined Partnership for Peace and began working on more ambitious internal reforms aimed to make the state more democratic and create the institutions and systems needed for a successful application for full NATO membership. Although it has expressed a desire to join NATO it has yet to complete the reforms required for admission into the organization. 

Georgia borders Russia and contributes to the NATO-led operation Sea Guardian. This NATO operation is active in the Mediterranean and tasked with maritime security capacity building, support for maritime situational awareness, and maritime counterterrorism. Putin has stated that Georgia’s relations with NATO operations, the EU, and other western democratic states poses a threat to the national security of Russia and uses it to justify his continued occupation of the “separatist regions” of Georgia. 

In 2020, according to NATO, there was a joint review with the Georgian foreign affairs, defense, and interior ministries, as well as with the Georgian Defense Forces and the Coast Guard. It led to an upgraded NATO-Georgia Package, endorsed by foreign ministers in December 2020.  It encompasses most fighting domains (air, land, sea, cyberspace) and includes support activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, including conducting regular joint NATO-Georgia exercises. 

In a CNN interview this week Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili again offered her continued support for the Ukrainian government in its bid to expel Russian forces from the country. She said “Russia does not seem to be changing. We are now in the 21^st century. Things should be different. We have global challenges that we should be looking to overcome together… The old Russian aims, and objectives, are still there…[but] I think this time things will be different because Russian objectives have not been met.”

Although the war in Ukraine is far from over, the question before military planners this week is, how far will Vladimir Putin go if he perceives he has lost the war and his country is less secure. Some argue the Russian leader still may be successful in redefining his message enough to veil his military’s defeat and open a window to shut down his offensive. Whether or not this happens, what is of a longer-term concern in the West is if Putin, who is prone toward paranoia, will so fear other former Soviet-bloc states leaving the Russian sphere of influence that only the immediate battle, not the war, is over. The former Warsaw bloc states, according to some analysts, may assume the Russian withdrawal is an exhibit of Moscow’s weakness and a carte blanche to move closer to the West. It could be enough to renew conflict in Eastern Europe in the future.   

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

The 2021 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts outlined several key issues. The New York Analysis of Policy and Goverment reproduces the key part of the document here.

The first is a matter of financial disclosure and recusal obligations. Beginning this past September, the Wall Street Journal published a series of articles stating that, between 2010 and  2018, 131 federal judges participated in a total  of 685 matters involving companies in which  they or their families owned shares of stock.  That was inconsistent with a federal ethics stat ute, 28 U.S.C. §455, which requires that a judge recuse in any matter in which the judge knows of a personal financial interest, no matter how small. Let me be crystal clear: the Judiciary takes this matter seriously. We expect judges to adhere to the highest standards, and those judges violated an ethics rule. But I do want to put these lapses in context. 

According to the Wall Street Journal’s own data, the 685 instances identified amount to a  very small fraction—less than three hundredths  of one percent—of the 2.5 million civil cases  filed in the district courts in the nine years included in the study. That’s a 99.97% compliance rate. For most of the judges involved (a total of 83 of the 131), the Journal reported one  or two lapses over the nine-year period. Those sorts of isolated violations likely entailed unintentional oversights in which the judge’s  conflict-checking procedures failed to reveal  the financial conflict. But for those judges who  had multiple violations, or professed ignorance  of the ethics rule, there is a more serious problem of inadequate ethics training. New judges  are schooled on the ethical duties they assume  as part of their initial judicial training curriculum. A small number apparently did not take  sufficient note and are now learning the lesson.  Significantly, for all the conflicts identified, the  Journal did not report that any affected the  judge’s consideration of a case or that the  judge’s actions in any of those cases—often just  routine docket management—actually financially benefited the judge. 

Still, this context is not excuse. We are  duty-bound to strive for 100% compliance be cause public trust is essential, not incidental, to  our function. Individually, judges must be scrupulously attentive to both the letter and spirit of  our rules, as most are. Collectively, our ethics  training programs need to be more rigorous.  That means more classtime, webinars, and consultations. But it also requires greater attention  to promoting a culture of compliance, even  when busy dockets keep judicial calendars full.  Our systems of conflict checking should make the most of technology to help prevent the kinds  of problems that can impair the public’s confidence in the independence of the courts. Com puters cannot be blamed for errors judges and their clerical staffs have made, but the information systems that help courts catch and pre vent conflicts are due for a refresh. They need  o be refined to ensure that different ways of  spelling or listing the same stock holding— such as by company name, subsidiary, or ticker  symbol—are picked up by automated checks  regardless of how they are identified by a litigant or judge. This refresh may require addi tional funding from Congress, but it will be money well spent. 

The Administrative Office is already working with the Judicial Conference’s commit tees—including Codes of Conduct, Financial Disclosure, and Judicial Conduct and Disability—with jurisdiction to address these problems. Among the steps underway, the Administrative Office and committee staff have begun a review of the current case-management software to improve automated detection of potential conflicts. They have also begun to enhance the ethics training and refresher courses to en sure that judges are both aware of their obligations and know how to use the conflict checking tools effectively. The bottom line is that the Conference is taking the concerns seri ously and has committed itself to the careful labor of addressing them. 

The second topic is the continuing concern over inappropriate behavior in the judicial workplace. In 2017, I directed the creation of the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group, consisting of judges and senior judicial administrators, to address allegations of  serious misconduct within the judicial work place. In my 2018 Year-End Report, I summarized the Working Group’s findings and recommendations. Briefly stated, the Working Group recognized the seriousness of several high-pro file incidents, but found that inappropriate workplace conduct is not pervasive within the Judiciary. Nevertheless, new protections could help ensure that every court employee enjoys a  workplace free from incivility and disrespect.  The Working Group made more than 20 recommendations in three primary areas, proposing that the Judiciary: (1) revise its codes of con duct and other published guidance to delineate more clearly the principles of appropriate behavior; (2) strengthen and streamline its internal procedures for identifying and correcting mis conduct; and (3) expand its training programs to raise awareness of conduct issues. It also recommended that employees have multiple channels to raise their concerns, and endorsed prohibitions on any retaliation for calling out misconduct. The Judicial Conference adopted those recommendations in 2019, and the Working Group remains in place to continue to monitor the progress.

The Judicial Conference, with the assistance of the Administrative Office and the Working Group, will continue to oversee reform efforts to ensure they achieve the objective we all seek. I appreciate that Members of Congress have expressed ongoing concerns on this important matter, and the Judicial Conference and its committees remain fully engaged.

Over the past year, the Conference has tailored its model Employee Dispute Resolution Plan to  Federal Public Defenders’ Offices. The Ad ministrative Office has begun expanding the  staff of its Office of Judicial Integrity, and it has  overseen the creation of a national network of  resources—including a Director of Workplace  Relations in every federal circuit—to support  judicial employees and address complaints.  These enhancements provide robust mechanisms for reporting and addressing instances of misconduct. They also provide additional ave nues for employees to express their views so  that we can learn from all perspectives in striv ing for an exemplary workplace. 

The third agenda topic I would like to high light is an arcane but important matter of judicial administration: judicial assignment and venue for patent cases in federal trial court.  Senators from both sides of the aisle have ex pressed concern that case assignment proce dures allowing the party filing a case to select a division of a district court might, in effect, ena ble the plaintiff to select a particular judge to  hear a case. Two important and sometimes competing values are at issue. First, the Judicial  Conference has long supported the random assignment of cases and fostered the role of district judges as generalists capable of handling  the full range of legal issues. But the Conference is also mindful that Congress has intentionally shaped the lower courts into districts  and divisions codified by law so that litigants  are served by federal judges tied to their com munities. Reconciling these values is important  to public confidence in the courts, and I have  asked the Director of the Administrative Office,  who serves as Secretary of the Judicial Conference, to put the issue before the Conference.  The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management is reviewing this matter and will report back to the full Conference. This is sue of judicial administration provides another good example of a matter that self-governing  bodies of judges from the front lines are in the  best position to study and solve—and to work  in partnership with Congress in the event  change in the law is necessary.  

Photo: Chief Justice John Roberts (U.S. Supreme Court)

The Department of Defense (DoD) has transmitted the classified 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) to Congress.

According to DoD, document sets out how the it will contribute to “advancing and safeguarding vital U.S. national interests – protecting the American people, expanding America’s prosperity, and realizing and defending our democratic values.

“The NDS is the capstone strategic guidance document for the Department of Defense. It translates national security priorities into guidance for military planning and activities. The 2022 NDS is consistent with the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, released in March 2021.“

An unclassified version of the NDS will be forthcoming. An official summary from DoD is presented here:

For the first time, the Department conducted its strategic reviews in a fully integrated way – incorporating the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) in the NDS – ensuring tight linkages between our strategy and our resources. The unclassified NDS will be forthcoming.

Consistent with the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the classified NDS sets out how the Department of Defense will contribute to advancing and safeguarding vital U.S. national interests – protecting the American people, expanding America’s prosperity, and realizing and defending our democratic values.

The Defense priorities are:

1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC

 2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners

3. Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe 4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

The Department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department.

Changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats, including pandemics, are transforming the context in which the Department operates. We will adapt to these challenges, which increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force and the systems that support it.

Recognizing growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the United States’ homeland from our strategic competitors, the Department will take necessary actions to increase resilience – our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.

Mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are an enduring strength for the United States, and are critical to achieving our objectives, as the unified response to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated. Answering this “call to action,” the Department will incorporate ally and partner perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every stage of defense planning.

The Department will advance our goals through three primary ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.

      • Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

• Campaigning will strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain advantages against the full range of competitors’ coercive actions. The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Department efforts, and align Department activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors’ military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.
• Building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force involves undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.

The Department will develop, design, and manage our forces – linking our operational concepts and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. This requires a Joint Force that is lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive.

After the Afghanistan debacle and the failure to timely move to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine, President Biden may be on the verge of even more dangerous move.

According to the Arms Control Association, “President Joe Biden entered office with two objectives for nuclear weapons policy: declaring that “the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal should be to deter—and, if necessary, retaliate against—a nuclear attack” and implementing the sole purpose policy as part of a broader effort to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Although Biden has not clearly defined either goal, his support for both has signaled an intention to produce a significant shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy.”

For this year, events in Russia and Ukraine have deterred Biden’s nuclear plans, but his plans remain, and his administration holds office for three more years.

Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and the world’s most modern.  China is rapidly increasing its atomic weapons, and, like Russia, has capabilities in some instances superior to the United States. North Korea is rapidly advancing its nuclear and ICBM programs.  With or without a deal, Iran will soon become a nuclear power. Pakistan, a nation in which the Taliban has considerable influence, has an atomic weapons capability.

Despite these unpleasant and dangerous realities, the Biden Administration is seeking to reduce America’s nuclear deterrent. In the cross-hairs are initiatives begun under the prior Administration to upgrade U.S. forces in order to deter the growing threats from across the globe.

The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has been drawn down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high. While Russia initially followed America’s lead and made similarly sharp reductions in its strategic nuclear forces, it retained large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Today, Russia is modernizing these weapons as well as its other strategic systems. Even more troubling has been Russia’s adoption of military strategies and capabilities that rely on nuclear escalation for their success. These developments, coupled with Russia’s seizure of Crimea and nuclear threats against our allies, mark Moscow’s decided return to Great Power competition. China, too, is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces. Like Russia, China is pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities tailored to achieve particular national security objectives while also modernizing its conventional military, challenging traditional U.S. military superiority in the Western Pacific. Elsewhere, the strategic picture brings similar concerns. North Korea’s nuclear provocations threaten regional and global peace, despite universal condemnation in the United Nations. Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain an unresolved concern. Globally, nuclear terrorism remains a real danger.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review noted that “While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenals, increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior, including in outer space and cyber space. North Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in direct violation of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions. Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Nevertheless, it retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so. There now exists an unprecedented range and mix of threats, including major conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, space, and cyber threats, and violent nonstate actors. These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk.”

It is a bizarre time to engage in an inexplicable policy of unilaterally reducing America’s deterrent.

U.S. Representative Mike Rogers (R-AL) and U.S. Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, are warning that this policy is ill-advised. According a statement they recently released, “If reports are accurate, President Biden’s decision to cut key U.S. nuclear modernization programs is yet another example of this administration’s inability to confront the dangerous reality of the strategic threats facing the United States and its allies. This projects weakness in the midst of the worst European security crisis in decades. The President appears to have chosen a path of unilateral disarmament. If these reports are accurate, the President’s decision to eliminate key capabilities flies in the face of the best military advice of our uniformed military leadership and does nothing to improve our security. It only reinforces global perceptions that the United States is unwilling to compete seriously with China or Russia.”

Photo: Dongfeng-41 nuclear missiles takes part in a military parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 1, 2019. (Xinhua/Xia Yifang)

The mice will play while the cat is away, is a little ditty learned by children around the country. Today, North Korea is that little mouse playing around while the eyes of the world are cast westward to Europe. Thermal infrared imagery analysis at the country’s Yongbyon nuclear plant taken this year indicates that warm water is being discharged from the 5Mwe reactor; a clear indication that its cooling systems are in operation. The river alongside the plant is frozen but the water around the discharge pipe remains ice-free. “Thermal patterns from the same period suggests that the IRT-DPRK reactor, the Radiochemistry Laboratory, and the centrifuge plan facilities are occupied, but not necessarily operational, and not in a state of shutdown,” according to Joseph Bermudez, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

What this means to military analysts is that North Korea appears to be continuing its efforts to expand its inventory of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The latest report builds on evidence from March, April, and December of 2021, which found that despite statements to the contrary, Kim Jong-un’s nuclear program is active. The regime recently conducted missile tests of hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles. Once confirmed, this would be the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratorium on such tests. 

The White House now may be forced to deal soon with a minor state that can potentially aim its Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missiles at New York and hit the target. Kim’s Hwasong-15, with its  multiple warheads and an estimated range of over 8,000 miles, puts all of the continental US within its sights. Given the erratic and reckless behavior of the North Korean leader in recent years, the US must take seriously threats coming from the autarkic state. According to a BBC report, “In January 2021, North Korea unveiled another missile – a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile which it declared to be ‘the world’s most powerful weapon.’” What is more disconcerting is that weapons experts believe the newest of Kim’s arsenal may have features that make the missile had to detect by conventional system used in the United States. They suggest the regime has designed a ballistic weapon that is capable of faster speeds and does not follow a straight trajectory. There also are indications the weapons can be transported, pre-loaded with fuel, and stored for fast use cases.

North Korea has a history of violating accepted norms. In September 2017 it detonated a nuclear weapon underground that was so powerful it was the cause of a 6.3 earthquake in northeastern North Korea. A year before that it caused a 5.3 earthquake at the same site, near the   Punggye-ri nuclear test site.  While North Korea’s conventional capabilities are of low quality, they can inflict great damage if used against South Korea. Kim also has tens of thousands of special forces prepared to invade South Korea should Kim decide to infiltrate the country. An additional threat comes from the thousands of artillery pieces and rocket launchers deployed along the Demilitarized Zone, putting Seoul, which is a distance of less than 38 miles, well within range.

A decade ago, the South Korean government estimated that the North could have between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, potentially one of the largest stockpiles in the world. No one knows for sure, but given the behavior of the communist regime leadership, it appears likely that this is the case. The Nuclear Threat Initiative reports that North Korea “is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons (BW) program in violation of its international commitments, but there is no definitive information about the program’s status.” The indigenously built program is believed to be several years old and capable of creating the causative agents for anthrax, smallpox, cholera, hantavirus, among other at least nine other BW’s. Little is known about the North’s chemical weapons programs. There are, however, several facilities in the country that have been linked with the production and/or storage of chemical weapon agents, their raw chemicals, and precursors adding to the country’s deadly arsenal. Small states are extremely dangerous when they are willing to sacrifice the standard of living of the population, to devote limited resources to creating weapons of war. The North Korea communist regime, and its paranoid leader Kim Jong-un, need to be contained before they draw the world into a conflict.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

Europe is not the only geopolitical challenge to freedom facing the world. “Hong Kong is no longer a functioning civil society,” according to the US State Department. Xi Jinping, the autocratic leader in China, is imposing the communist giant’s will on the freedom-loving people of Hong Kong in an attempt to stamp out its last vestiges of democracy. As the city prepares to “celebrate” its 25^th anniversary of the handover to China, the event is marked by the grave erosion of its democratic institutions and human rights, which have intensified over the last year. 

On Thursday, the US State Department released its 2022 Hong Kong Policy Report documenting conditions in the city.  It begins by stating that “… PRC authorities took actions that eliminated the ability of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy opposition to play a meaningful role in the city’s governance and effectively criminalized peaceful political expression critical of the central and local governments.” China has imposed sweeping changes to the electoral system in 2021 that block political groups not approved by Beijing, their ability to participate in elections. Extensive arrests, a profoundly impaired independent media, and the curtailing of freedom of speech have far-reaching implications for the population and the international business and financial communities. In response, some international firms closed operations in Hong Kong in 2021 and relocated entirely, while others have moved key staff or operations to areas outside of communist Chinese control. As the best and brightest flee, the State Department reports says, the once-flourishing Hong Kong is now less competitive and suffering economically with the loss of freedom needed to retain its position as a global financial center. 

“The differences between Hong Kong and cities in mainland China are shrinking due to ongoing repression from the PRC,” according to US Secretary of State Tony Blinken. “Hong Kong is no longer a fully functioning civil society, under rule of law, and with the individual liberties” that form the bedrock on which vibrant societies grow. This would make front page news were Russia not at war with Ukraine. According to Freedom House, 60 countries last year suffered a decline in their freedom, with 30% of the world now living in societies that are “not free.”

The US Government announced that the central government of China took new actions “directly threatening US interests in Hong Kong” and that are inconsistent with the Basic Law and the PRC’s obligation pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Yet few US media organizations covered the story. Over the last year PRC and Hong Kong authorities targeted groups, associations, media companies, and labor unions affiliated with the region’s pro-democracy movement with raids, arrests, prosecutions, and asset freezes, “creating a chilling effect” and “forcing them and other organizations to cease operations,” including two of Hong Kong’s largest independent media outlets, Apple Daily and Stand News, according to the State Department. 

Hong Kong authorities continued to use the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (NSL) to undermine rights and freedoms. Police and prosecutors employed the NSL to detain individuals for lengthy periods without trial for nonviolent political expression or activities, including 47 activists and politicians charged with “subversion” for involvement in an unofficial primary election in July 2020.   

In the last 12 months Beijing overhauled Hong Kong’s electoral system to ensure it could fully control the outcome of any future election.  Today,  all candidates for public office must be pro-Beijing “patriots” and the new rules require them to undergo an extended nomination and vetting process, without possibility of appeal. 

Hong Kong authorities use the NSL to conduct politically motivated arrests and prosecutions against individuals and groups affiliated with the pro-democracy movement.  The State Department report cites at least 51 cases where authorities arrested individuals in connection with alleged violations of the NSL, including secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security, which includes “provoking hatred” against the PRC or Hong Kong governments.

There is no longer an independent judiciary in Hong Kong. The Sino-British Joint Declaration, as well as Hong Kong’s Basic Law, provide for one, but PRC and Hong Kong authorities repeatedly took actions that eroded the judiciary’s independence and ability to uphold the rule of law, particularly in cases that Hong Kong authorities designated as involving national security.  The NSL now gives the PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee, not the Hong Kong courts, the power to interpret the NSL.  NPCSC decisions have the force of law in Hong Kong and are not subject to judicial review by Hong Kong courts. The people of Hong Kong are no longer free. Global forces of repression from Moscow Beijing are descending on the world to create a new Iron Curtain.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department and has particular expertise in Chinese matters.

Did he or didn’t he? That was the question on the minds of Western intelligence officers earlier this week as they tried to determine if Putin’s claim of “drastically reducing hostilities” in Kyiv and Chernihiv was true. The conclusion most analysts reached is that Putin only “rearranged” his troops but has not withdrawn them from Ukrainian territory or given up on war. On Tuesday Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told journalists that “Nobody should be fooling ourselves by the Kremlin’s now recent claim that it will suddenly just reduce military attacks near Kyiv, or any reports that it’s going to withdraw all its forces.” One week ago, Russian general staff head of military operations, Sergei Rudskoi, announced that Russian forces had accomplished their first objective and would concentrate on their only goal, a “complete liberation of Donbass.” That also has proven false. There may be another reality on the ground that few are reporting in the West.

Putin is repositioning troops. It provides Russia two bonuses. It allows Putin to reorganize his forces to prepare for another offensive on the capital and the northern city of Chernihiv. It also serves as disinformation to quell strong international support for Ukraine’s population who have vowed to continue the fight. It may not be all that is happening. On the same day that Kirby said don’t be fooled, Russian Defense Minister Alexander Fomin formally announced Russia planned to reduce its military attacks on Kyiv during diplomatic negotiations between the governments. Putin used the past tense, yet his own Defense Minister spoke about it as a future event.

The stories coming out of Russia and its highly effective propaganda department are effective and changing. Over the past four weeks Russia has met with unexpectedly high and efficient resistance from Ukrainian forces and the general population. Putin has lost a number of generals and other high ranked military and more soldiers in a few weeks of this war than during its entire two-decade long occupation of Afghanistan. Intelligence reports coming in from the field describe logistical failures with large numbers of Russian soldiers left unfed and to forage for their own food. Troops have used up their ammunition and are idled awaiting supplies from outside Ukraine. Tanks and armored vehicles are running out of fuel. It is apparent, according to one military specialist following the situation closely, that Putin and his military planners did not calculate the dynamics of a possible extended action inside Ukraine with any accuracy. The war has “lasted much longer than the few days Moscow expected,” exposed gaps in its logistics, and exposed a lack of discipline among Russian troops. Russia may not be able to win this battle, but already Russia is suggesting another front.

Both Russia’s northern advance and southern fronts are stalled. Defense One’s Tara Coop reports that Kirby pointed out this week that Ukrainian forces are “repelling attacks in Mykolaiv and Kherson, and [there is] fierce fighting in Mariupol, where the city is still resisting despite a weeks-long siege.” What does this mean for Ukraine? If Russian forces are not fighting here, then where will they go? It appears that Putin may be assessing Russian losses and revamping his goals to align with an easier one by reprioritizing the war to concentrate on the Donbass region and breakaway territories. It does not mean the war is winding down, although it may soon become bogged down in spring mud. Putin may be switching tactics. But it does not end here, according to one Russian.

In an article entitled “Russia Will Blow up European Borders,” Moscow-based commentator Albert Akopyan (Urumov) argues that the conflict in Ukraine has given Russia “a unique opportunity” to promote border adjustments in Europe—both near its western frontiers and further afield—and to do so “in the name of justice and those same European values” that Russia is often criticized for violating, cited by Paul Goble writing for the Jamestown Foundation. He quotes Urumov as saying that Moscow can distribute its conquered territories to neighbors in ways that serve them and Russia. It also can hand over ethnic-Hungarian-populated territories in what is now western Ukraine to Budapest, and it can exchange territories with Poland and Moldova. Goble notes Uramov states this will accomplish three goals.

First, Russia will “show the peoples of Europe an alternative to the existing ‘principles’ of nation-state construction” by showing that after the war in Ukraine, “everything has changed” and that they must live in a world where force alone determines outcomes rather than any principles of law. Second, the amenable countries will share an interest in helping Russia eliminate the seedbeds of Ukrainian nationalism in the West. Third, such moves will allow Russia to secure several much-needed transportation corridors. What is perhaps most disconcerting is that Urumov’s statement is not the most extreme coming out of Moscow. Goble argues that some Russian analysts are considering the possibility of border revisions or the “creation of Russian client statelets within countries that do not neighbor Ukraine.”

The new arrangements would be made to convenience Russia. Is this what Putin is now planning to pull off since his Ukrainian war is stalled? The Russian leader’s sleight of hand may be directing the West to look one way while he carries out plans to expand the breadth of the war in an entirely new direction. Western intelligence officials remain unsure of Putin’s next plan and how far he is willing to go. That makes him a dangerous man to watch in the coming days and weeks.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Department

As the Ukraine war rages on, Russia is attempting to deter western assistance to the embattled nation by threatening cyberattacks.  Apple was recently the suspected target of one such assault.

Charles Gasparino, in a published report, warns that that “Russia appears to have officially declared cyberwar on the US, taking what’s been described as preliminary steps at crippling its banking system and possibly other major industries.”

From at least January 2020, through February 2022, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have observed regular targeting of U.S. cleared defense contractors (CDCs) by Russian state-sponsored cyber actors. The actors have targeted both large and small CDCs and subcontractors with varying levels of cybersecurity protocols and resources. On March 24, 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed indictments of three Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers and a Russian Federation Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics (TsNIIKhM) employee for their involvement in intrusion campaigns against U.S. and international oil refineries, nuclear facilities, and energy companies.

Cyber attacks emanating from Russia are not new. The Colonial Pipeline and the JBS meat processing corporation were previous targets.  In response, the Biden Administration issued a bizarre statement containing a list of 16 infrastructure entities that the President warned Moscow not to hit, essentially giving a green light to attack everyone else.

Ina Fox News Interview, Rebecca Heinrichs, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute explained “”It could actually entice Russia to increase attacks against all the other entities besides those 16 things. We should be complicating Russia’s calculations not making them simpler and certainly not essentially green-lighting any kinds of attacks… Sen. Ron Johnson, (R-Wis.) told Fox News ‘Together with deciding not to impose sanctions to halt the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, his limited demand on cyberattacks signals weakness that our adversaries will notice and take advantage of,’ said Johnson, who sits on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.”

Biden’s odd attitude towards cyber security has been noted. In 2021,Maggie Miller, writing for The Hill, noted that “President Biden‘s $2.25 trillion infrastructure plan does not include any funds to protect critical infrastructure against cyberattacks, even as the threat grows against targets such as the electric grid. Experts say it was disappointing to see there were no funds set aside to defend systems critical to everyday life from hackers, particularly as the proposal calls for things like $100 billion for improving grid resiliency, the creation of new jobs and developing more clean electricity.”

The Biden Administration has even attempted to pass the buck on this area of defense policy to the private sector. Rather unusually, notes Ryan Lovelace, in the Washington Examiner, “President Biden telling the private sector it is responsible for its own defense against Russian cyberattacks has drawn critics who counter that fighting off a hostile nation is the federal government’s job.” In a statement, the White has urged “our private sector partners to harden your cyber defenses immediately by implementing the best practices we have developed together over the last year. You have the power, the capacity, and the responsibility to strengthen the cybersecurity and resilience of the critical services and technologies on which Americans rely. We need everyone to do their part to meet one of the defining threats of our time — your vigilance and urgency today can prevent or mitigate attacks tomorrow.”

Earlier in his Administration, Biden had been  criticized for his failure to timely appoint a “Cyber defense Czar.” Eventually, however, National Cyber Director Chris Inglis and National Security Agency Cybersecurity Director Rob Joyce were appointed.

Illustration: Pixabay