Operation Rising Lion – USA Gov Policy

Iran’s nuclear weapons program has met face-to-face with Israel’s Operation rising Lion as well as America’s B2 bombers.

In an aerial bombardment campaign, not seen since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Israel took over command of the skies above Iran in just under two days and left the country weaker. It was a well-planned operation that earned Israel air superiority with Iran exhibiting military underperformance. Zohar Palti, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy says that the strike’s success presented a “profound shock to the [Iranian] regime and its public.”

Members of the intelligence community in Washington say it is understandable that Israel could no longer tolerate Iran’s growing stockpile of fissile material. With Iran’s April 2024 attack, Palti says “Iran crossed a major threshold by directly attacking Israel. That strike shattered a psychological barrier, intensified Israeli fears, and ultimately led Jerusalem to conclude that it had to take action against Iran’s nuclear progress.”

Tehran’s stockpile serves as the basis for a dangerous and large nuclear weapons arsenal that could rapidly add to the regime’s growing missile stocks. “Israel’s main goal is to inflict maximum damage on the Iranian nuclear and missile programs and the military-industrial infrastructure supporting them,” says Michael Eisenstadt, author of “Attacking Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Action.” Israel’s Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi recently pointed out that the Israeli leadership recognizes that historical data suggest an air campaign alone cannot dismantle a dispersed, hardened and buried nuclear weapons program. It suggests his country’s intent may be, in part, to impose sufficient costs on Iran to induce a return to negotiations under more favorable terms. Tehran, Eisenstadt says, will be in even greater need of post-conflict sanctions relief to preserve regime stability and carry out reconstruction.

One unanswered question is what will occur next – did the recent strike trigger an escalation or will Iran decide it has no choice but to sit down for talks with Israel. If Iran won’t negotiate, Israel’s “mowing the grass” efforts alone may not prove sufficient to stabilize the threat should Iran decide to rebuild its nuclear program. “Three distinct scenarios are possible: a tenuous ceasefire, likely followed by renewed Iranian efforts to rebuild its nuclear and missile programs, with Israel taking steps to disrupt these efforts; renewed nuclear negotiations as a result of Iranian military exhaustion, fear of domestic unrest, and/or fear of U.S. military intervention; or regime collapse,” says Eisenstadt. Although regime collapse is unlikely, events are unfolding among Iran’s citizenry that suggest the populace is not fully supportive of regime policies.

Military experts in Washington point out that Israel’s latest air campaign appears to have severely damaged Iran’s nuclear weapons program, with missile salvos aimed precisely at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command centers, missile systems, nuclear facilities, and state broadcasting facilities, among other critical infrastructure. “Either Tehran accepts a ceasefire in the next couple days, or Israel will put all military options on the table, including energy infrastructure, political leadership, and military bases,” says Palti. Israel is prepared to conduct strikes on oil and natural gas sites, regime focal points in the provinces, and senior leadership, he adds, in an attempt to change Iran’s behavior across the region. One military analyst suggests that the Trump Administration, in an attempt to draw the conflict to a close, is considering backing a strike on Iran’s most fortified nuclear site, the Fordow enrichment plant.

In recent days Iran has quietly approached its Arab neighbors suggesting it may be preparing to halt hostilities and is willing to negotiate if Israel agrees to cease aggressive action toward Iran. Officials in Tehran appear to be concluding that if it refuses to negotiate, Washington will be drawn into the conflict – a war it is not prepared to fight right now. Regime survival is at the center of a decision by Iran’s leadership. Since last spring, Israeli military leaders have expressed increased confidence that it could face off with Iran’s network of terrorist and nonstate actors, defend against future ballistic missile strikes and effectively attack inside Iran. Time is growing short for the regime to decide on a course of action that will guarantee regime survival. With domestic pressure rising inside the country it is a rare diplomatic opening that, hopefully, Iran will accept. Washington also needs to convince Israel that an immediate truce followed by negotiations could compel Iran to shutter its nuclear program, halt missile production, disassemble its proxy network. US priorities in the region this week are centered on protecting American personnel and preventing the expansion of the conflict. According to one analyst, “It is time to assess whether US red lines have already been crossed.” The US Embassy branch in Tel Aviv was damaged by an Iranian ballistic missile, and Iran sent drones on suicide missions in attempts to destroy the US Consulate in Erbil, Iraq and kill US service members at al-Asad Air Base. One more misstep by any party involved in the conflict could lead to widespread disaster. The options are narrowing for Iran.

Photo: Pixabay

Quick Analysis

North Korea’s Growing Nuclear Threat

The Congressional Research Service has released a major new report on North Koreas’ nuclear weapons and missile programs. We present that report for you in two parts. Overview North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. The country’s ballistic missile testing, military parades, and policy statements suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may wish to examine U.S. policy toward North Korea. U.S. policy as well as UN resolutions call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs. In recent years, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has repeatedly rejected “denuclearization” talks. According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2025 annual threat assessment (ATA), Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as a “guarantor of regime security.” In response, the United States and South Korea have conducted joint military drills and exercises, and established bilateral consultative mechanisms focused on strengthening extended deterrence such as the Nuclear Consultative Group to “discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat the DPRK poses to the global nonproliferation regime.” The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review said, “Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.” It maintains that U.S. nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in deterring “rapid strategic attacks” by North Korea in East Asia. Nuclear Doctrine and Plans Kim Jong Un said at the 2016 Workers’ Party Congress that “nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army [Kim Jong Un] to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.” At the 8th North Korean Workers Party Congress in January 2021, Kim announced a Five-Year Defense Plan that said the country would field a new nuclear-capable submarine, develop its tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a single missile, and improve its ICBMs’ accuracy, among other goals. The plan includes development of an ICBM with a range of 15,000 km for “preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike,” and ground based and sea-based solid-fueled ICBMs. Some analysts predict an increase in missile testing this year in order to meet these goals by 2026. The Korea People’s Assembly adopted a new law in September 2022 that reportedly expands the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to include possible first use in situations that threaten the regime’s survival. In September 2023, Kim promised to boost nuclear weapons production “exponentially” and diversify nuclear strike options. Nuclear Testing North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield. North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3, 2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile. In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022. A recent U.S. Department of Defense report said that “North Korea has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.” Nuclear Material Production North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons. Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build. North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is also operating centrifuge uranium enrichment plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at Kangson. In March 2025, the IAEA reported construction and operations at the Yongbyon uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, “undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and Yongbyon,” and activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory plant and Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor site. Spent fuel from that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory to extract plutonium for weapons. The IAEA also reported ongoing uranium mining, milling, and concentration activities at Pyongsan. The report concludes tomorrow Illustration: Pixabay

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