Month: May 2025

The U.S. Office of National Intelligence has released a report on the “wealth and corrupt activities of the Chinese Communist Party. This is an Executive Summary.

Corruption within China is primarily due to structural features that centralize power,  eschew independent checks or accountability—especially at the provincial level—and  produce perverse incentives for political advancement and financial enrichment. These  features of China’s bureaucratic system entrench incentives for corruption or obstruct  efforts to reform the system in numerous ways. For example: 

• The CDI organizations primarily responsible for investigating misbehaviors are  political organizations that work directly for their Party committees and lack  independent external oversight, allowing them to pursue anti-corruption cases in  often arbitrary ways. The CCP is loath to allow external oversight and instead  prioritizes self-rectification, probably fearing independent authorities would 

undermine central control, limiting accountability and any prospects for sweeping  reforms. 

• Centrally directed economic growth targets for local governments—which must be  achieved for career advancement—but decentralized decision-making at  provincial and other local levels of government allow significant flexibility in policy  implementation. This structure effectively encourages provincial and local leaders  to take illicit actions for personal and professional gain. 

• Membership in elite organizations such as the National People’s Congress (NPC)  is coveted as a symbol of power and authority, and provides access to sensitive  government documents. Potential benefits of NPC membership incentivize  individuals to pay high costs to join, often through bribes, and to accept bribes  while a member, or even upon completion of service, to facilitate business deals. 

Senior-level Corruption 

Specific instances of corruption among more senior CCP leaders are particularly  difficult to determine from the outside, despite indications that corruption remains  widespread. One academic study of criminal corruption cases in China found that  corruption at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy was very high and, of those charged with  a crime, more than 80 percent of the charges involved bribery. 

Pervasive government censorship and the absence of rules regarding public  disclosures of leader finances contribute to a lack of transparency regarding personal  wealth in China. Even so, journalistic research published in 2012 identified that the  families of senior leaders, including then-Premier Wen Jiabao and then-incoming President  Xi Jinping, had amassed significant wealth.  

• Wen’s family—such as his mother, wife, son, and siblings—controlled assets of at  least $2.7 billion in 2012. Similarly, Xi’s siblings, nieces, and nephews held assets  worth over $1 billion in business investments and real estate.  

• This research did not identify investments specifically linked to the leaders  themselves, nor did it uncover any direct influence from the leaders contributing to  a growth in family investments. However, their senior-level positions would have  granted access to privileged information and both private and state-owned  enterprise actions could have advantaged family holdings due to their connections  to persons with political power. Following publication of this research, China tightened information controls and limited access to many foreign news  organizations, which continues to challenge public research on issues of senior  leader corruption or personal wealth. 

• Xi may have urged family members to divest holdings as he came into power.  However, industry research provides evidence that, as of 2024, Xi’s family retains  millions in business interests and financial investments. While the does not link the investments directly to Xi, it is possible that these holdings are  managed indirectly on Xi’s behalf. 

Open-source research shows corruption cases within the CCP Central Committee  span leading officials overseeing a range of portfolios and projects.  

• In 2020, Zhang Wei, a Chinese businessman, was arrested on charges of  organizing, leading, and participating in organized crime; illegal detention; and  illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. He was also found guilty in 2021 of  illegally absorbing public deposits. 

• Chen Gang, a former member of the Leading Party Members Group of the China  Association for Science and Technology, was accused in 2019 of accepting over  $18 million in bribes—at least some of which was likely associated with his role in  overseeing citywide construction projects for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  

• In April 2024, Yao Qian, Director of the China Securities Regulatory Commission  (CRSC) Department of Technology Supervision, was investigated for “serious  violations of discipline and law,” possibly for his role in China’s Central Bank  

Digital Currency initiative. The CCDI has investigated at least 16 individuals within  the CRSC, with six of those investigations occurring in 2024.  

The anticorruption campaign has targeted rampant leadership corruption and has  not shied away from purging high-level officials within the ranks of the People’s Liberation  Army (PLA)—which have included a culture of pay-for-promotion that continues even a  decade after the anticorruption campaign’s launch. In 2024, Xi stressed during a speech to  military commanders that “the barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those who  are loyal and dependable to the Party,” further emphasizing his commitment to Party loyalty  and expectations of the same from the military, especially. His focus on corruption in the  PLA may also reflect concerns that corrupt practices will prevent the military from acquiring  the capabilities and readiness he has directed it to achieve by 2027, in preparation for a  potential conflict over Taiwan.  

• In 2023, China removed General Li Shangfu, then-Minister of National Defense,  investigating both Li and his predecessor after arresting the commander of the PLA  Rocket Force (PLARF) and at least nine other current or former PLARF personnel.  

• In 2024, Beijing launched an investigation of Admiral Miao Hua, then-director of the  Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department and in charge of political  loyalty within China’s armed forces. 

• Both Li and Miao were accused of Party discipline violations, and both were  considered protegees of Xi, demonstrating the seriousness of the CCP’s concerns  regarding loyalty and effectiveness—particularly within the PLA—and the scope of  the regime’s approach to corruption.

Corruption is an endemic feature of and challenge for China, enabled by a political  system with power highly centralized in the hands of the CCP, a CCP-centric concept of the  rule of law, a lack of independent checks on public officials, and limited transparency.  President Xi Jinping launched a sweeping campaign to address persistent corruption in  China in 2012, and in the ensuing years the campaign has investigated—and found guilty— nearly five million officials at all levels of government. Corruption in China often involves  money in the form of different types of bribery or graft, and open-source research has  demonstrated that some officials and their families have amassed significant wealth due to  their positions and connections. However, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign more deeply  reflects a party-directed securitization, or a targeting of political indiscipline and ideological  impurity, particularly at the highest levels of government, in an effort to preserve the CCP’s  domestic control and legitimacy. 

A lack of transparency within China, pervasive government censorship, and the  absence of rules regarding disclosures of leaders’ finances challenges public research on  issues of corruption or leaders’ personal wealth. The powerful Central and regional  Commissions for Discipline Inspection (CDI) are the lead organizations for enforcing anti corruption in China and operate at all levels of government. These organizations publish  some data that helps to illuminate the scope of anti-corruption investigations in China and  also provide indications of the extent of corruption overall. 

Corruption and Anti-Corruption 

Academic studies show corruption has been prevalent in China since its founding,  with particular intensification over the years of sharp economic growth in the 1980s and  1990s. Many academics and observers claim corruption since 2000 is so widespread that  it undermines the regime’s legitimacy. 

Consistent with this analysis, when Xi came to power in 2012, he launched a  sweeping anti-corruption campaign, vowing to take a “zero tolerance” approach targeting  “flies” (low-level cadres) and “tigers” (senior officials) alike. His campaign has also  targeted officials at department and bureau levels, as well as county and division levels.  From 2012 through 2022, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the  National Supervisory Commission investigated nearly five million people within the  government and CCP, finding 4.7 million officials guilty. In his words, Xi intended to make  government officials “unable and unwilling to be corrupt.”  

Xi uses the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate rampant corruption that  undermines Party legitimacy and control and, in select cases, to target his political rivals.  Xi has linked rooting out corruption with internal Party discipline and ideological  commitment, viewed as critical to China’s stability and ability to achieve its long-term

ambitions. Corruption in China is framed as a political crime and a sign of disloyalty and  ideological impurity, highlighting its importance to the Party and serving as a warning  against any internal disobedience. Government propaganda highlights the CCP’s  commitment and self-sacrifice and promotes a narrative characterizing corrupt officials as  political enemies of the state. Purged officials, particularly at higher and more visible levels  of government, are often first publicly accused of serious violations of Party discipline. In  2021 the CCDI described anti-corruption as “a severe political struggle” that “undermined  the Party’s leadership and unity.” In 2024, the campaign targeted more than 50 senior  government officials. 

Although Xi has not used the campaign primarily to target his political rivals, a drive  to eliminate competing power centers factored significantly into decisions made in the  initial phases of the campaign. Early in Xi’s tenure, senior officials with ties to his  predecessors were targeted with investigations and arrests. However, academic analysis  of anti-corruption investigations over its 10-year span has not identified a focus on officials  with specific factional ties or backgrounds, indicating that the campaign has broadly sought to root out corruption in all levels of government where it exists. More significantly, political  connections to high-ranking officials have not protected officials from prosecution,  including those with close personal ties to Xi himself; the anti-corruption campaign has  purged top officials considered loyal to Xi and who had risen under his patronage.  

The level of corruption in China almost certainly varies based on the region and level  of government. One scholarly study focusing on one city found that 8- to 65-percent of  officials—depending on the official’s rank—received an unofficial income from bribery or  graft; a separate study and a survey of public perceptions both estimated that  approximately half of Chinese officials have engaged in corruption, especially at the local  levels. These analyses of corruption concluded that bribery could increase an official’s  legal earnings four to six times, with higher echelons able to earn more through graft and  bribery than those at lower levels of the government, commensurate with their level of  access and authority. The studies collectively demonstrate the endemic nature and  widespread perception of corruption within the party-state. 

The report concludes tomorrow

Photo: Chinese Government

The U.S. Space Force has released an internal “Doctrine Document 1,” which is a statement aimed at its servicemembers, known as “Guardians.” It defines the key role it plays in defending America. We provide a brief look at key points.

The Space Force, codifies why we exist as a Service, who we are as Guardians, and how we employ spacepower to drive the success of the joint force. To ensure unity of effort, it is essential that each of us fully internalizes these concepts and embodiesthem as we engage with the entirety of the joint force, our allies, and partners.

At the heart of this publication are six undeniable truths that I believe encapsulate our purpose.Space Force capabilities are critical to the joint force and the American way of life. Space has never been more vital to our national security or to our prosperity.

At least half of the United States’ critical infrastructure depends on space, and the joint force is sized with the assumption that military spacepower provides its backbone. In modern warfare, without space, kill chains do not close, operations are less synchronized, indications and warnings are constrained, and we lose.

The Space Force must defend its capabilities, or the joint force will be unable to project power. Space matters, and we must be prepared to defend it. Our adversaries understand the importance of spacepower and are ready and willing to take it from us.

Our mission is to secure our Nation’s interests in, from, and to space. Space is our responsibility, and Guardians must contest and control the domain to ensure freedom of action.

The Space Force must protect the joint / combined force from space-enabled targeting, or the joint / combined force will be unable to meet military objectives. Because space also matters to our adversaries, we must be ready to deny hostile spacepower. Adversary space capabilities allow them to hold our forces at risk. Our Sister-service airborne, maritime, and land-based capabilities cannot affect the battlefield if they are targeted over the horizon before they even reach theater.

The joint force depends on Guardians to break these kill chains.

Space is a warfighting domain, not a collection of supporting activities. In conflict, space will be a contested environment. We are the military Service dedicated to fighting in it. We do not merely provide support functions—we also employ military force to achieve space superiority in order to ensure our freedom of maneuver.

The Space Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping critical space capabilities but is also responsible for performance of warfighting operations as an integral part of the joint force. It is our job to organize, train, and equip space forces, but we are also responsible for conducting warfighting operations in space. Space Force units of action align under Service components, where they operate under the authority of combatant commanders using Service-developed tactics and doctrine. Guardians are, and always will be, warfighters.

Guardians are uniquely and specifically trained, educated, and experienced in warfighting activities in, from, and to the space domain. Guardians are the only warfighters with the dedicated career-long training, education, and experience specifically designed to achieve space superiority. Guardians are preeminent space warfighters with the knowledge and expertise necessary to achieve US military objectives in the domain.

If you want to win a war in space, you must have Guardians driving that part of the campaign. Our ability to adapt to and outpace emerging threats will be instrumental in preserving our superiority in space during this era of strategic competition. We must evolve, take risks, and solve problems with urgency. Space is the linchpin in modern warfare, and the capabilities that the Space Force provides form the backbone of the joint force.

Our success or failure hinges entirely upon the performance of Guardians. At every level in any role, it is our responsibility to sharpen our readiness and to prepare for the challenges before us.

Time and again, Guardians have demonstrated the confidence and skills necessary to overcome any obstacle, and it is Guardians who will ensure the Space Force answers our Nation’s call.

U.S. Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, recently told  congressional leaders about the indispensable role of special operations forces (SOF) and rally bipartisan support for their growing mission at the Congressional SOF Caucus event on Capitol Hill. 

Overview Special Operations Forces are those active duty and reserve component forces of the military services designated by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and specifically selected, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Special operations frequently require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. SOF often conducts special operations in hostile, politically, and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a high degree of risk.

Fenton highlighted the unprecedented demand on SOF, driven by escalating threats from state and non-state actors alike, during his remarks to the caucus co-chaired by Representatives Richard Hudson, Kathy Castor and Scott Peters.

“The demand from your SOF is higher than it’s ever been,” Fenton said. “Crisis response missions are up 170% in three years, and deterrence taskings have risen 35% in two.” 

Hudson’s focus on resources echoed a recurring theme of the evening. Castor, a co-chair from Tampa, Florida — home to Socom headquarters — pointed to the disparity between SOF’s outsized contributions and its modest share of the Defense Department’s resources. 

“You carry the load on the most sophisticated missions out there with just 2% of the defense budget,” she said. 

Castor pressed for modernizing the command’s aging facilities at MacDill Air Force Base, contrasting those with U.S. Central Command’s state-of-the-art headquarters nearby.  

“It’s time for that headquarters to live up to what we ask of the men and women who serve,” she urged, calling for bipartisan backing to ensure SOF’s infrastructure matches its mission. 

The critical value of SOF was a cornerstone of the discussion. Peters, representing San Diego’s Naval Special Warfare community, cited a recent bipartisan win — securing $310 million to address sewage flows impacting SEAL training waters — as proof of the caucus’ impact. He stressed SOF’s role in deterrence and crisis response amid threats from China, Russia, Iran and terrorist groups. 

Fenton elaborated on SOF’s unique adaptability, describing the current era as “a SOF renaissance” tailor-made for converging challenges like unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. He cited recent successes, including eliminating hundreds of terrorists and rescuing Americans abroad.  

“We’ve been called out 14 times in three years on short notice to be somewhere in the world,” he said.  

He urged sustained investment in scalable capabilities to keep pace with adversaries exploiting new technologies. 

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Colby Jenkins, a combat veteran and former Green Beret, emphasized SOF’s relational edge. He praised the caucus for supporting families and empowering Socom as a service-like entity.  

“That’s where we bring value — with relationships of trust that span decades,” Jenkins said. 

Fenton also called for deeper ties between Socom and Congress to address installation needs and family support. He lauded the caucus’ role in bridging gaps for members without SOF bases in their districts, ensuring broad awareness of the community’s challenges.  

“You watch over our families — we couldn’t do what we do without them,” he noted. 

Fenton expressed confidence in SOF’s readiness, bolstered by the caucus’ commitment, highlighting the need for bipartisan resolve to equip operators for an uncertain future. 

“SOF readiness is important now more than ever. “[Our] job [is] to … make sure that you’re getting the resources you need, the training you need and support you need,” Hudson said. 

List of Special Forces:

• U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets)
  The quiet professionals. Masters of unconventional warfare.
• Delta Force (CAG)
  The Army’s elite counter-terrorism experts.
• 75th Ranger Regiment
  Army Rangers lead the way.
• 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
  The Night Stalkers – elite helicopter flyers
• Intelligence Support Activity
  Top secret intelligence gatherers
• Navy SEALs
  America’s renowned naval commandos
• SEAL Team Six
  The US Navy’s secretive special mission unit, otherwise known as DEVGRU
• Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman (SWCC)
  Elite sailors who operate a range of surface boats
• US Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
  Marine SOF under a new command structure
• Force Recon
  Elite Reconnaissance Marines who carry out deep reconnaissance operations
• Division Recon
  Highly trained Recon Marines
• Special Operations Squadrons
  Operators of AC-130 Gunships and other specialized planes and helicopters

• Special Tactics Teams
  Combat Controllers, Pararescuemen, TACPs and Special Operations Weather Teams
• Deployable Operations Group
  Coast Guard Specialized ForcesCIA Special Activities Division
  Central Intelligence Agency Special Operations Group

Army Maj. Wes Shinego provided information for this report

Photo: U.S. Army photo by SGT. Marcus Butler

U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command’s most senior leader pointed out three topics that have “direct implications for homeland defense” during a Senate Armed Services hearing.

 Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot told the committee that growing cooperation between America’s global adversaries, evolving technologies in the hands of those competitors and the ongoing threat of non-state actors continuing to target the homeland all present real-world challenges for Northcom and NORAD.

Guillot said China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are cooperating together to challenge the U.S. 

“While their cooperation does not approach the level of complete integration demonstrated by the United States and Canada, their transfer of weapons, military technology and basing access is a cause for significant concern,” Guillot told the committee.  

Guillot also said that associated risks to North America have continued to grow due to the level of incursions by Russian bomber aircraft into Alaskan and Canadian air defense zones having returned to levels not seen since before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 

” Russian Navy surface and subsurface vessels conducted out-of-area deployments off both U.S. coasts, including in the vicinity of Alaska,” Guillot added. 

On the topic of evolving technologies, Guillot said that rapid technological advancements have forced Northcom and NORAD to hurriedly adjust their defense posture. 

“Small, uncrewed aircraft systems … proliferate the open market; and in the hands of malign actors, pose a growing threat to safety and security,” Guillot said. 

As an example of this, Guillot said there were 350 UAS detections over a total 100 different U.S. military installations reported last year.

 He said that roughly just half of U.S. installations fall under U.S. Code Section 130i, meaning they are considered “covered” installations and are allowed to defend themselves from UAS incursions.  

There are currently nine criteria that can qualify a base as being eligible for “covered” status, with nuclear facilities, missile defense bases and test facilities being among them, Guillot explained. 

“My request and proposal would be, as we look at 130i again, … to expand coverage to all military installations and not just those that are covered,” Guillot said, adding that he would like to see the range of self-defense extend beyond installation boundaries so that threats can be dealt with before reaching those boundaries.

Addressing the threat that non-state actors pose to the homeland, Guillot said radical Islamic terrorist groups have rejuvenated and are inspiring lone-wolf attacks such as the New Year’s Day attack in New Orleans last month. 

Guillot also described how Mexico-based, transnational criminal cartels are a threat to U.S. territorial integrity and the safety of U.S. citizens. 

“With that strategic backdrop, homeland defense is our commands’ top priority and essential task, and in mindset and action, nobody waits on NORAD or Northcom,” Guillot said before proceeding to list numerous examples of how both commands have been addressing the challenges he listed. 

Guillot explained that, over the past 12 months, NORAD and Northcom have intercepted joint Chinese and Russian bombers off the coast of Alaska, detected and assessed numerous North Korean missile launches and tracked Russian surface vessels off both coasts.  

He said they have also supported natural disaster victims throughout the country and worked to counter transnational criminal networks at the border through the deployment of troops and “unique military capabilities” such as airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. 

Guillot wrapped up his remarks by letting the committee know he appreciates the Defense Department and Congress’ support for fielding all domain capabilities, with airborne moving target indicator satellites and an integrated undersea surveillance system among them. 

“Defending our borders, establishing a continental missile shield, protecting critical infrastructure and force projection capability, and safeguarding our citizens will require the best our nations have to offer,” Guillot said. 

“And I’m grateful to the committee for your ongoing support of NORAD and Northcom’s vital missions,” he added. “We have the watch.” 

Reporting by Matthew Olay

Photo:TYNDALL AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. – (U.S. Air Force photo by Maj. Andrew Scott)

Among the most contentious disputes of both the first and second Trump terms has been the role of the courts.

Democrats have attempted to restrain presidential policies they disapprove of not just through normal political and legislative means, but unconventionally, through the court systems. In particular, they have succeeded in “gaming the system” through judge-shopping, ensuring that a judge known to be sympathetic gets the particular case.  

The issues frequently revolve on somewhat strained interpretations of the day-to-day functions of the executive branch.

In response, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) has introduced the “Restraining Judicial Insurrectionists Act of 2025,” which establishes a three-judge panel to swiftly review injunctions or declaratory relief against the President of the United States and the Executive Branch, with quick appeal to the Supreme Court. This legislation comes in the wake of several decisions by district court judges usurping the role of the Chief Executive from President Donald Trump and attempting to thwart the will of the American people who elected him. 

  According to a release from Senator Lee, the bill would stop blanket injunctions from sabotaging President Trump’s legitimate constitutional authority as Commander in Chief

 “America’s government cannot function if the legitimate orders of our Commander in Chief can be overridden at the whim of a single district court judge,” said Senator Lee. “They have presumed to run the military, the civil service, foreign aid, and HR departments across the Executive Branch—blatantly unconstitutional overreach. This legislation will create a judicial panel to expedite Supreme Court review of these blanket injunctions, preventing unelected radicals in robes from sabotaging the separation of powers.”

The bill amends 28 USC 2284 to state that any action commenced against the executive seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against the Executive will go to a three-judge district court.

Next, it requires that upon filing any covered action, the district judge who received the complaint and/or motion for preliminary injunction will refer the matter to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice will then be required to select three judges in active service to preside over the case.

Additionally, the bill requires that a majority of the judges must agree to issue any form of relief, preliminary or permanent.

Finally, because this is a three-judge district court, all orders are directly appealable to the Supreme Court without discretion—so they must take up the case. 

A companion bill, The “H. Rept. 119-40 – NO ROGUE RULINGS ACT OF 2025.” Has been introduced in the House of Representatives. Similar to Senator Lee’s proposed legislation, The Rogue Rulings measure states that “no United States district court shall issue any order providing for injunctive relief, except in the case of such an order that is applicable only to limit the actions of a party to the case before such district court with respect to the party seeking injunctive relief from such district court and non-parties represented by such a party acting in a representative capacity pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

It also states that “If a case is brought by two or more States located in different circuits challenging an action by the executive branch, that case shall be referred to a three-judge panel selected pursuant to section 2284, except that the selection of judges shall be random, and not by the chief judge of the circuit. The three-judge panel may issue an injunction that would otherwise be prohibited … and shall consider the interest of justice, the risk of irreparable harm to non-parties, and the preservation of the constitutional separation of powers in determining whether to issue such an order…An appeal of an order granting or denying injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (b) may lie to the circuit embracing the district or to the Supreme Court, at the preference of the party.”

While Congress cannot regulate the activities of the United States Supreme Court, which is a co-equal branch, it does have the power to direct the jurisdiction of lower federal courts. As noted by Justia district courts “subject to “exceptions and regulations” prescribed by Congress, and the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is subject to congressional prescription. Additionally, Congress has power to regulate modes and practices of proceeding on the part of the inferior federal courts. Whether there are limitations to the exercise of these congressional powers, and what the limitations may be, are matters that have vexed scholarly and judicial interpretation over the years, inasmuch as congressional displeasure with judicial decisions has sometimes led to successful efforts to “curb” the courts and more frequently to proposed but unsuccessful curbs. Supreme Court holdings establish clearly the breadth of congressional power, and numerous dicta assert an even broader power, but that Congress may through the exercise of its powers vitiate and overturn constitutional decisions and restrain the exercise of constitutional rights is an assertion often made but not sustained by any decision of the Court.

Illustration: Pixabay

Nearly half of Russia’s regional leaders are implementing a new policy aimed at increasing the country’s birthrate by paying underage girls to become pregnant earlier than planned. In an attempt to reverse Russia’s declining fertility rate, officials are pushing the idea that it is these girls’ duty to the country to get pregnant, even if it is outside of marriage. The Kremlin is also restricting access to abortions. Earlier this year, The Moscow Times started reporting on the declining demographic numbers last fall.  “Each year, Russia sees more than half a million more deaths than births, meaning that any growth would come from immigration, which faces unpopularity among a rising tide of xenophobia in Russia,” says Paul Goble of the Jamestown Foundation. Last week infox.ru announced a new Kremlin program that called for adopting “programs to give one-time bonuses as large as 150,000 rubles ($1,600) to underage girls who get pregnant and carry their babies to term.”

Boosting the birthrate is cast as supporting Russia’s national security. Putin’s war in Ukraine has increased the urgency and cost of changing the long-term demographic in population decline at its roots. The government is boosting incomes and attempting to improve economic prospects for these young teenage girls amid the prohibitively high cost of the war in Ukraine. Given that Russians typically begin families later than non-Russian ethnic groups in the country, it may exacerbate other issues for Putin.

Not everyone in Russia supports the policy change despite the acceleration in the decline. The country’s moral leadership, demographers, and some senior officials argue that the programs will fail to increase the birthrate while undermining traditional Russian values. Many regional leaders say they can’t afford the cost of the underage pregnancy program. Vechernyaya Moskva reported last month that “opposition to this policy has spread to Moscow. Leaders with moral authority in the Duma, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the media view state support for the births of children outside of marriage as undermining ‘traditional’ values,” says Goble.

 The declining population is likely to impact the Russian economy and Putin’s military plans, according to the Nezavisimaya Gazeta last week. As the Kremlin searches for ways to reverse the decline, it needs to take in consideration avoiding financial costs or making fundamental changes to society. The underage pregnancy programs, which now total 41 across the country, follow the Kremlin’s implicit and explicit promotion of the strategy and represent a reversal of earlier programs to discourage teenage girls from getting pregnant. Russian demographers see the move as one of desperation that will fail. 

At least two ministers, among other high-ranking Russian officials, oppose the program on moral financial grounds. They argue the birthrate will not increase as the money will go to young girls already pregnant out of wedlock rather than those interested in becoming underage mothers. On April 11, The Moscow Times reported that to avoid Putin’s wrath some officials are working behind closed doors to reverse the policy.

Russia faced an unprecedented low in recorded births in 2024 since 1999 of only 1.222 million births. That number will not sustain the country’s economy, military, and law enforcement. Given the demographic environment, analysts in Washington believe it is unlikely the Kremlin will close the program. Rising opposition to it also makes it unlikely that the program will spread nationwide. “The program is likely to continue, although in fewer places and with less money, as yet another example of how the continued existence of Russian federal structures matter despite Putin’s attempts to gut federalism of its more familiar meanings,” says Goble.   

Russia’s ethnic makeup may also impact the longevity of the teenage pregnancy program. Putin is concerned as the birthrates in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus, which were historically high, are also declining. Moscow can’t depend on the region to make up for declines in other areas of the country. Analysts in Washington point out that Moscow’s earlier maternal capital program had the unintended consequence of disproportionately boosting the birthrate of groups the Kremlin was less interested in growing. Paying teenagers may emerge quickly as yet another major political issue destabilizing Putin’s regime.

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay