Month: May 2024

President Putin is using more than one pathway to enter Europe and undermine the West. While most of the world watches the conflict he initiated in Ukraine, the Russian government is actively pursuing a second front in a little noticed campaign in Cyprus. Although the corrupt Cypriot government ended its issuance of “golden passports” in 2020, Russian intelligence is functioning quietly there to transform this EU country into a Russian beachhead of illicit economic activity aimed at penetrating the capitalist West, according to Paul Goble of the Jamestown Foundation.

Cyprus is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor does it receive as much attention as those countries who are member states. That adds to its allure as a prime location for Russia to attempt to gain a European foothold. Last week a NATO report, cited in the European Daily Monitor, noted that Russian intelligence agents have been plotting to destroy European infrastructure across the continent to disrupt states supporting Ukraine. It further suggests that Putin’s immediate goal is to lay the framework for a future move against the security organization’s members. Hungary, in particular, is another country garnering Moscow’s attention as it opposes the Western response to Russian aggression.  

Russia is focusing its intelligence efforts on other European, non-NATO member countries in addition to Cyprus, including Austria, Malta, and Ireland. The NATO report suggests that Moscow has had success in disseminating the Russian political narrative in these states to advance its campaign against the West. The island of Cyprus is proving to be a good target for Moscow as it is an ethnically divided island that is part of the EU since 2004. Northern Cyprus, officially called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), is a de facto state that is only recognized by Turkey. The division precludes it from joining NATO. As Goble suggests, “it offers Russia troubled waters in which to fish.” Over the last 20 years, he points out, Cyprus’ challenges have opened it to a massive influx of Russian citizens, who now comprise approximately 10 percent of the island state’s population. Over 2,900 residents are Russians who entered until the “golden passport” program that allowed wealthy or well-connected Russians to move to Cyprus. It also provided them with documentation to travel freely throughout Europe!

Although less visible on the world’s radar than the war in Ukraine, Moscow is also being helped by Cyprus’ banks opposition to seizing Russian assets and its support in evading Western sanctions. Russia has placed tens of billions of US Dollars there for money laundering. It has been more than two years since a single Russian “diplomat” has been deported and, in fact, the Embassy has grown to over 300 staffers on this tiny island state of only 1.2 million people. The Russian embassy in Nicosia has advanced communications antennae on its roof and opened a consulate on the northern end of the island. Moscow’s Ambassador, Mura Zyazikov, is a lieutenant general in the FSB with no diplomatic experience.  The FSB, SVR (Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service), and GRU are actively using the island as a base of operations against NATO Member states, Israel, and other Western allies.

Moscow backs pro-Russian political parties who in turn influence Cypriot decisions on education, language, and other issues.  “Dmitry Khmelnitsky of the Dossier Center says that its findings should be of concern not only to Cyprus but to the West as a whole. Those who ignore what Moscow is doing because Cyprus does not follow the EU sanctions regime are missing something critical,” says Goble. “Cyprus does not seek to get rid of Russian agents and does not interfere with their work,”  Khmelnitsky concludes, “despite the fact that what the Kremlin is doing is so clearly visible.” This has an impact not only on the small island but on the EU, NATO, and the West in general.   

Earlier this year the Moscow Times reported that when the FBI became more interested in Russian business and oligarchs in Cyprus, at least 10 of the major Russian businesses operating there left. Despite the government of Cyprus’ vow to implement plans for new sanctions against Russia, it continues to ignore Putin’s atrocities in Ukraine and to shield the wealth of the 50,000 wealthy Russian citizens and oligarchs residing there. 

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

There is a coming conflict with Taiwan. What remains uncertain is the nature of that conflict. A newly released report this week by the Global Taiwan Institute’s (GTI) John Dotson argues that political warfare is a key component of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) attempt to undermine and achieve annexation of  Taiwan. The CCP’s goal, he says, is to force the subjugation of the island’s citizens and democratic society and place it under “full CCP political Control.” Chinese directed propaganda and disinformation, elite cooption, political subversion, and coercive military and economic actions all are connected by a prominent link – they are actions intended for psychological effect. They are also methods of political warfare in an ongoing, persistent, and multi-faceted campaign against Taiwan. 

Information warfare used by Beijing against Taipei manipulates the news to change the attitudes of the population. Is it working? Dotson says that China is successfully exercising influence of “content and editorial coverage in traditional media outlets such as newspapers and television news channels, largely by leveraging influence through local proxy figures—in particular, wealthy businesspersons who have extensive financial equities in China.” He suggests that Beijing employs a “pink model” to push pro-CCP content into social media news feeds, not unlike what China does inside the United States. Using algorithmic targeting, Beijing is able to attack selected demographic targets who are more vulnerable to disinformation. Its goal is to further sow confusion and reduce cognitive resistance to pro-CCP’s narratives. Encouraging a population to believe false information by reducing a group’s opposition to it is a common practice among intelligence agencies and politicians alike. First, a population is provided with several scenarios that are easily accepted as true. In a simple example, one might read that at noon the sun is high in the sky, the clock says 12:00 pm, and many people are eating lunch. These points are easily accepted as true.  The human brain at this point becomes more susceptible to accepting new information that may be false as it is programmed to let its guard done. The CCP follows by planting real information among false facts to make it easier to accept and digest. It doesn’t stop at disinformation, Beijing is also leveraging its toolkit in a related field, “legal warfare (法律戰), to promote its interpretation of international law and diplomatic practice.

Yet another major category of concern in the CCP’s political warfare against Taiwan is known as “gray zone operations.” These are more closely related to military actions and include activities such as the aerial and maritime encroachment of Taiwan’s territory. The goal is to erode the concept of sovereignty and security. The United States is experiencing “gray zone” operations on our own southern border. In Taiwan, these include China’s overflight of Taiwan’s airspace by military aircraft. These events are increasing in both number and intensity as they grow close to the island itself. Simultaneously, China’s PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), through its coast guard “law enforcement” operations are challenging Taipei’s outer islands. Dotson points out that the “paramount objective in such operations is the intended psychological effect on Taiwan’s population.”

Another related area according to the GTI report is increasing economic coercion. China is attempting to deny Taiwan market access, ban its imports, and limit politically-oriented trade and investment opportunities. The intent is to “punish groups within Taiwan for developments to which Beijing objects, to isolate Taiwan internationally, and to pressure other countries and international companies to conform to Beijing’s preferred policies on Taiwan,” says Dotson. To date, Taiwan has suffered from attempts to ban Taiwan’s export of agricultural products. Beijing has also punished countries who willingly import from Taiwan and have close relations with Taipei.

Perhaps one of the most misunderstood areas of China’s political warfare campaign against Taiwan revolves around its “united front work.” This embraces a range of measures that Dotson says include both financial and psychological cooption and include the use of front organizations and political subversion. In Taiwan, China is coopting business and political elites, funding and manipulating local organizations (temple societies) and offering support to fringe political parties that can be used to destabilize Taiwan and spread the CCP’s propaganda.

Western militaries analyze the likelihood of kinetic warfare but spend less time on the impacts of political warfare. The free world cannot overlook what is happening in Taiwan and needs to recognize that Chinese political warfare extends across the globe. Beijing may not need to physically capture the island by force if it wins using a clandestine political warfare model of conflict. Then the question becomes, “Who is next?”

Daria Novak served in the U.S. State Dept.

Illustration: Pixabay

President Biden has called two key U.S. allies, India and Japan, “xenophobic.”  As noted in a Hill report “Biden grouped Japan and India alongside China and Russia as ‘xenophobic countries,’ claiming being less open to immigrants has caused the countries’ economies to struggle since the COVID-19 pandemic.”

The comment comes at a time when both of those nations are essential to American goals in the Indo-Pacific, including countering China’s massive arms buildup, North Korea’s growing nuclear prowess, and Russia’s increased presence in the region.

China now has a larger fleet than the United States, and has powerful assistance from Russia. The U.S. State Department warns that “Across much of the Indo-Pacific region, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using military and economic coercion to bully its neighbors, advance unlawful maritime claims, threaten maritime shipping lanes, and destabilize territory along the periphery of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  This predatory conduct increases the risk of miscalculation and conflict.”

Alexey Muraviev, writing for the Asia Times notes that “China is not the only potentially adversarial maritime power that is flexing its muscles in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia is becoming a cause for concern, too, even though the 2023 strategic review did not mention it….Between 2022 and October 2023, for instance, it commissioned eight new warships and auxiliaries, including four nuclear-powered and conventional submarines. On December 11, two new nuclear-powered submarines formally joined the fleet, in addition to the conventional RFS Mozhaisk submarine, which entered service last month.”

Biden making a comment that directly and clearly harms both U.S. interests and those of key allies is hardly surprising, as evidenced by his bizarre actions regarding Israel.

The Department of Defense states that “ Japan is growing and taking leadership roles that not only benefit people in the Indo-Pacific, but the global community, said Grace Park, the director for Japan policy at the Defense Department’s Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Office said…  Japan, the fourth largest economy in the world, has taken a greater security role in the past decade, Park said. Japanese leaders are reorganizing the self-defense forces in the country, fielding new military capabilities, increasing the amount spent on self-defense and more. “I believe that the United States has gained a lot from this alliance relationship,” she said.  

It will soon play an even more significant role. The Department of Defense reports that “The U.S., Australia and the United Kingdom, members of the AUKUS partnership, are considering cooperation with Japan on advanced capabilities projects. …Japan was considered because of its strengths and its close defense partnership with all three countries, said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, who held a press conference today. 

Japan is playing a larger role in other essential American alliances, as well. As reported in the American Military News, “The Philippines and the United States are considering the expansion of their annual “Balikatan” (shoulder-to-shoulder) military exercises carried out under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States,  to include Japan.  

As this column has previously reported, India’s population, military strength, and strategic geographical location render it one of the world’s most important nations.  The Pentagon notes that “Over the past decade, the U.S.-India defense relationship has become indispensable in promoting peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region.”

Since the start of his Administration, President Biden has consistently engaged in policies and actions that have emboldened America’s adversaries and alienating and worried allies. The consistency of his inexplicable course of action is now clear, and the U.S. citizenry deserves an immediate explanation.

The highly partisan U.S. media has, until the current holdup of aid to Israel, turned a blind eye to Biden’s destructive foreign policies, allowing him to progress from one disaster to another.

Illustration: Pixabay

When students, trained and equipped by Hamas and its financial backers, occupy campuses and threaten Jews and anyone who disagrees with them, it is neither a peaceful protest nor an exercise of free speech. It is a terrorist attack. Those students are not peaceful protestors. They are terrorists in training. 

It has been reported that many of those arrested are not even students, but individuals with ties to terrorists or anti-American activities. Their mission is not to protest, not to persuade, but to force institutions to bend to their will. Their targets are two-fold: First, in adherence to Hamas’ anti-Semitism, an attack on not just Israelis but Jews everywhere. Second, to weaken America’s influence in the crucial Middle Eastern region.

But students do make up the majority of those involved. The blatant ignorance of so many protestors did not occur spontaneously or recently. Years of preparation went into it.  Radical extremists infiltrated the educational system, from kindergarten through graduate school, for decades with the purpose of destroying pride in America and imposing a leftist agenda.

On-air interviews of involved students have been revealing.  Beyond chanted slogans, the students appear to have little knowledge of the actual dynamics of the Middle Eastern conflict that they appear to be so passionate about.

What did come clearly though was a hair trigger response to condemn America and American institutions. That is the intentional result of many years of academic indoctrination. 

History has been taught through the prism of anti-Americanism. The extraordinary accomplishments in human freedom, the enormous good done by the nation have been obscured, while faults, even though they were corrected, are magnified.

The Federalist notes that “America’s academic leaders seem powerless only because they’ve spent decades promoting the ideologies now on such brutal and ugly display… many administrators claim to be stunned. Yet those of us who’ve been following the disastrous decline of American higher education have been warning for years about the inevitable. America’s academic leaders seem powerless only because they’ve spent decades promoting the ideologies now on such brutal and ugly display. Years ago, America’s most prestigious academics made a conscious choice to elevate indoctrination over education. Training activists became their highest goal. Radical ideologies that began in Ethnic and Gender Studies swallowed once-proud social science and humanities disciplines. Their influence surged into administration, as new DEI offices redefined diversity, equity, and inclusion to mean their opposites, then spread their toxin throughout university operations. Wildly generous foreign money — with Qatar and China in the lead — anchored this noxious brew in place.

The American Enterprise Institute found that “The 1619 Project and its companion resources have spread to thousands of schools (and counting) in all 50 states, priming students to reject America’s founding principles and even literally black out the Declaration of Independence. Meanwhile, tales of politically radical K–12 instruction seem to break into the news almost daily.”

The Discovery Institute notes that “ teacher unions, rather than modeling positive social behavior, instead promote indoctrination of students on partisan political viewpoints…. Today, leaders holding high government offices at the federal and state levels are quickly exploiting an underlying principle: The less educated our citizens are regarding civics, the more pliable they are to the acceptance of radical philosophies and agenda, and the more government power can grow. The end result will be a loss of the American Dream — life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Don’t believe this? Take a look at the citizens of today’s socialist and communist countries around the world. According to Ben Shapiro, “while advocates of Marxism today disown the Stalinists and the Maoists and the Castro regime and Venezuela and North Korea, all of those nations thought they were fulfilling Marx’s dream, too.”

A Manhattan Institute review reports that “Results of a representative survey of more than 1,500 Americans aged 18 to 20 suggest that Critical Race Theory (CRT) and radical gender ideology, together known as Critical Social Justice (CSJ), is widespread in American schools. Ninety-three percent of American 18- to 20-year-olds said that they had heard about at least one of eight CSJ concepts from a teacher or other adult at school, including “white privilege,” “systemic racism,” “patriarchy,” or the idea that gender is a choice unrelated to biological sex. Additionally, 90% of respondents had heard about at least one CRT concept and 74% about at least one radical gender concept.

The campus protests are a window of what’s in store for the nation if the influence of anti-American educators continue.

The Beige Book is a Federal Reserve System publication about current economic conditions across the 12 Federal Reserve Districts. It characterizes regional economic conditions and prospects based on a variety of mostly qualitative information, gathered directly from each District’s sources. The latest edition has just been released. We present key portions of the summary here.

Overall Economic Activity

Overall economic activity expanded slightly, on balance, since late February. Ten out of twelve Districts experienced either slight or modest economic growth—up from eight in the previous report, while the other two reported no changes in activity. Consumer spending barely increased overall, but reports were quite mixed across Districts and spending categories. Several reports mentioned weakness in discretionary spending, as consumers’ price sensitivity remained elevated. Auto spending was buoyed notably in some Districts by improved inventories and dealer incentives, but sales remained sluggish in other Districts. Tourism activity increased modestly, on average, but reports varied widely. Manufacturing activity declined slightly, as only three Districts reported growth in that sector. Contacts reported slight increases in nonfinancial services activity, on average, and bank lending was roughly flat overall. Residential construction increased a little, on average, and home sales strengthened in most Districts. In contrast, nonresidential construction was flat, and commercial real estate leasing fell slightly. The economic outlook among contacts was cautiously optimistic, on balance.

Labor Markets

Employment rose at a slight pace overall, with nine Districts reporting very slow to modest increases, and the remaining three Districts reporting no changes in employment. Most Districts noted increases in labor supply and in the quality of job applicants. Several Districts reported improved retention of employees, and others pointed to staff reductions at some firms. Despite the improvements in labor supply, many Districts described persistent shortages of qualified applicants for certain positions, including machinists, trades workers, and hospitality workers. Wages grew at a moderate pace in eight Districts, with the remaining four noting only slight to modest wage increases. Multiple Districts said that annual wage growth rates had recently returned to their historical averages. On balance, contacts expected that labor demand and supply would remain relatively stable, with modest further job gains and continued moderation of wage growth back to pre-pandemic levels.

Prices

Price increases were modest, on average, running at about the same pace as in the last report. Disruptions in the Red Sea and the collapse of Baltimore’s Key Bridge caused some shipping delays but so far did not lead to widespread price increases. Movements in raw materials prices were mixed, but six Districts noted moderate increases in energy prices. Contacts in several Districts reported sharp increases in insurance rates, for both businesses and homeowners. Another frequent comment was that firms’ ability to pass cost increases on to consumers had weakened considerably in recent months, resulting in smaller profit margins. Inflation also caused strain at nonprofit entities, resulting in service reductions in some cases. On balance, contacts expected that inflation would hold steady at a slow pace moving forward. At the same time, contacts in a few Districts—mostly manufacturers—perceived upside risks to near-term inflation in both input prices and output prices.

Highlights by Federal Reserve District

Boston

Business activity expanded at a modest pace in recent weeks, and prices rose slightly. Employment was flat overall, but one retailer reported significant layoffs. Convention and tourism activity grew at a robust pace. Home sales increased on a year-over-year basis, marking a turnaround. The outlook ranged from cautiously optimistic to bullish.

New York

On balance, regional economic activity remained flat. Labor market conditions were solid and continued to normalize as labor supply and labor demand came into better balance. Consumer spending was unchanged after a weak first quarter. Housing markets strengthened, with the spring selling season picking up beyond the seasonal norm. The pace of selling price increases remained modest.

Philadelphia

On balance, business activity was flat in the current Beige Book period—after declining slightly last period. Employment edged up, despite staffing and recruitment efforts slowing to a crawl. Wage and price inflation continue to moderate; however, housing affordability continues to be a concern. Overall, the outlook is positive, as firms remained optimistic about expectations for future growth.

Cleveland

District business activity increased modestly, as did employment. Firms anticipated greater ease filling open positions, including those that have been particularly challenging, because of increased labor availability. Wage pressures continued to normalize, and some contacts reduced starting wages for new roles. Cost and price pressures changed little.

Richmond

The regional economy grew at slight pace since our previous report. Consumer spending on retail goods was mixed but spending on travel and tourism was up slightly. Fifth District port activity slowed and was impacted by the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge. Employment growth slowed from a moderate to a modest rate in recent weeks, but wages continued to grow moderately. Price growth also remained moderate.

Atlanta

The Sixth District economy grew modestly. Labor markets continued to stabilize; wage pressures eased. Many nonlabor costs moderated. Retail sales were steady, but consumers remained price conscious. Tourism remained robust. Commercial real estate conditions slowed. Transportation activity was mixed. Manufacturing grew slightly. Loan demand was flat. Energy activity improved.

Chicago

Economic activity increased slightly. Employment increased modestly; business and consumer spending rose slightly; nonbusiness contacts saw no change in activity; and manufacturing and construction and real estate activity were flat. Prices and wages rose moderately, while financial conditions were stable. Prospects for 2024 farm income were unchanged.

St. Louis

Economic activity has continued to increase slightly since our previous report. Prices have increased modestly, as contacts are broadly feeling the pressures of increases in both labor and non-labor costs. The outlook was neutral to slightly optimistic, which is generally unchanged from our previous report, but better than one year ago.

Minneapolis

District economic activity grew slightly. Employment grew some, but labor demand was softer. Wage pressures were present but continued to ease, while price pressures ticked up. Consumer spending was mostly flat, and manufacturing slowed modestly. Commercial and residential construction improved slightly. Agricultural conditions were steady at low levels.

Kansas City

The District economy expanded modestly. Demand for auto loans and residential mortgages rose as borrowing rates declined. Demand for HELOC also increased as a means to consolidate or refinance household debt. Job gains were modest even as worker availability improved slightly.

Dallas

The Eleventh District economy expanded modestly. While activity in services and housing grew, manufacturing output, retail sales, and loan demand declined slightly. Employment growth slowed as wages, input costs, and selling prices grew at a moderate pace. Overall, Texas firms noted an uptick in uncertainty.

San Francisco

Economic activity continued to grow at a slight pace, employment levels were little changed, and prices and wages rose slightly. Retail sales were unchanged, and demand for services grew modestly. Demand for manufactured products changed little, and conditions in agriculture were mixed. Real estate activity was slightly down. Financial sector conditions were largely unchanged.

Note: This report was prepared at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston based on information collected on or before April 8, 2024. This document summarizes comments received from contacts outside the Federal Reserve System and is not a commentary on the views of Federal Reserve officials.

We conclude our summary of the urgent recommendation of the Congressional Committee on the nation’s Strategic Posture

NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

 The Commission recommends:   The United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure U.S. access to and operations in space.   The United States and its Allies take steps to ensure they are at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) – to avoid strategic surprise and potentially enhance the U.S. strategic posture.   The United States prioritize funding and accelerate long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned. x America’s Strategic Posture   The United States develop and field homeland IAMD that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.4   The Secretary of Defense direct research, development, test and evaluation into advanced IAMD capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on sensor architectures, integrated command and control, interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, and area or point defenses. The DOD should urgently pursue deployment of any capabilities that prove feasible.   The Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments transfer operations and sustainment responsibility for missile defense to the appropriate Military Departments by 1 October 2024. This will allow the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to focus on research, development, prototyping and testing.

ALLIES AND PARTNERS

The Commission believes it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain, strengthen, and when appropriate, expand its network of alliances and partnerships. These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets. Withdrawing from U.S. alliances and partnerships would directly benefit adversaries, invite aggression that the United States might later have to reverse, and ultimately decrease American, allied, and partner security and economic prosperity. Further, the Commission believes that our defense and the defense of the current international order is strengthened when Allies can directly contribute to the broader strategic posture, and the United States should seek to incorporate those contributions as much as possible.   The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations.

RISK REDUCTION

The Commission believes it is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces.   The Commission recommends that a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S. nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. The Commission recommends that once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security.   The Commission recommends that the United States continue to explore nuclear arms control opportunities and conduct research into potential verification technologies in order to support or enable future negotiations in the U.S. national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types, should the geopolitical environment change.   Where formal nuclear arms control agreements are not possible, the Commission recommends pursuing nuclear risk reduction measures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty and the chances for misperception and miscalculation.

The 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that the United States was at “a moment of opportunity, . . .but also a moment of urgency” – because the security environment had improved and the threat of nuclear proliferation was the principal concern. Since 2009, the security environment has dramatically worsened and new existential threats have emerged. This Commission concludes that the United States now faces a highstakes challenge that requires urgent action. Nevertheless, the Commission has not seen the U.S. government demonstrate the urgency and creativity required to meet the challenge. Nothing other than synchronized steps taken by the Executive and Legislative Branches will craft the strategy and build the posture the nation requires. The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now.

Photo: An Air Force Global Strike Command unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during a test at Vandenberg Space Force Base (DoD)

As we noted in Part 1, the dramatically deteriorating national security picture for the United States and its allies prompted a review of “America’s Strategic Posture.” We present Part 2, reviewing key strategic points.  

STRATEGY

To achieve the most effective strategy for stability in light of the 2027-2035 threat environment, the Commission identifies three necessary changes: ` The United States must develop and effectively implement a truly integrated, whole-of-government strategy to address the 2027-2035 threat environment. The objectives of U.S. strategy must include effective deterrence and defeat of simultaneous Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia using conventional forces. If the United States and its Allies and partners do not field sufficient conventional forces to achieve this objective, U.S. strategy would need to be altered to increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or counter opportunistic or collaborative aggression in the other theater. ` The size and composition of the nuclear force must account for the possibility of combined aggression from Russia and China. U.S. strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included” threat. The United States needs a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries.   The Commission recommends the United States maintain a nuclear strategy consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), based on six fundamental tenets—assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance, calculated ambiguity in declaratory policy, hedge against risk—and apply these tenets to address the 2027-2035 threat.

STRATEGIC POSTURE

 In the context of a strategic posture deploying both conventional and nuclear capability, the Commission believes the traditional role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy remains valid and of continuing importance: deterrence of adversaries; assurance of Allies; achieving U.S. objectives should deterrence fail; and hedging against adverse events.   The Commission recommends fully and urgently executing the U.S. nuclear modernization Program of Record (POR), which includes replacement of all U.S. nuclear delivery systems, modernization of their warheads, comprehensive modernization of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), and recapitalizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure at the DOD and DOE/NNSA.   The current modernization program should be supplemented to ensure U.S. nuclear strategy remains effective in a two-nuclear-peer environment.   Comprehensive risk-mitigating actions across U.S. nuclear forces must be executed to ensure that delays in modernization programs or early age-out of currently deployed systems do not result in militarily significant shortfalls in deployed nuclear capability.   The U.S. strategic nuclear force posture should be modified to: ` Address the larger number of targets due to the growing Chinese nuclear threat. ` Address the possibility that China will field large-scale, counterforce-capable missile forces that pose a threat to U.S. strategic nuclear forces on par with the threat Russia poses to those forces today. ` Assure the United States continues to avoid reliance on executing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch under attack to retain an effective deterrent. ` Account for advances in Russian and Chinese integrated air and missile defenses (IAMD).   The U.S. theater nuclear force posture should be urgently modified to: ` Provide the President a range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter or counter Russian or Chinese limited nuclear use in theater. ` Address the need for U.S. theater nuclear forces deployed or based in the Asia-Pacific theater. ` Compensate for any shortfall in U.S. and allied non-nuclear capabilities in a sequential or simultaneous two-theater conflict against Russia and China. ` Address advances in Russian and Chinese IAMD.

NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE INFRASTRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The Commission recommends the DOD and DOE/NNSA strategic infrastructure be expanded to have sufficient capacity to: ` Meet the capability and schedule requirements of the current nuclear modernization POR and the requirements of the force posture modifications recommended by the Commission in time to address the two-peer threat. ` Provide an effective hedge against four forms of risk: technical failure of a warhead or delivery system, programmatic delays, operational loss of delivery systems, and further deterioration of the geopolitical environment. ` Flex to respond to emerging requirements in a timely fashion.   To support the proposed strategy, the Commission recommends Congress fund an overhaul and expansion of the capacity of the U.S. nuclear weapons defense industrial base and the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including weapons science, design, and production infrastructure. Specifically: ` Congress should fund the full range of NNSA’s recapitalization efforts, such as pit production and all operations related to critical materials. ` Congress should forge and sustain bipartisan consensus and year-to-year funding stability to enable the defense industry to respond to innovative DOD contracting approaches and invest with more certainty. ` Congress should enact annual DOD and DOE authorization and appropriation bills before the beginning of each fiscal year. ` Congress should place the purview of all “050” programs (President’s Budget line item for “national security”) that are in NNSA under Defense appropriations subcommittees (House Appropriations Committee-Defense (HAC-D), Senate Appropriations Committee Defense (SAC-D). ` Cabinet Secretaries, working with states and union leaders, should establish and increase the technical education and vocational training programs required to create the nation’s necessary skilled-trades workforce for the nuclear enterprise.   The Commission recommends a number of specific actions to expand the capacity and effectiveness of the nation’s infrastructure and supply chain for its strategic capabilities.

The Report concludes tomorrow

Photo: Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, speaks with members from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as well as industry leaders at the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters on Peterson Space Force Base, Colo.(DoD)

The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

As 2023 drew to a close, the dramatically deteriorating national security picture for the United States and its allies prompted a review of “America’s Strategic Posture.” A committee chaired by Madelyn Creedon and Jon Kyl issued a sobering analysis. We present a summary of this vital analysis.

The militarily troubling and increasingly aggressive behaviors of Russia and China over the past decade led Congress to direct a review of the strategic posture of the United States, including nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure.

China’s rapid military build-up, including the unprecedented growth of its nuclear forces, Russia’s diversification and expansion of its theater-based nuclear systems, the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion in February 2022, have all fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape. As a result of China’s and Russia’s growing competition with the United States and its Allies and partners, and the increasing risk of military conflict with one or both, as well as concerns about whether the United States would be prepared to deter two nuclear peers, Congress determined it was time for a new look at U.S. strategic policy, strategy, and force structure.

The new global environment is fundamentally different than anything experienced in the past, even in the darkest days of the Cold War. Today the United States is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international status quo, by force, if necessary: a situation which the United States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared. While the risk of a major nuclear conflict remains low, the risk of military conflict with either or both Russia and China, while not inevitable, has grown, and with it the risk of nuclear use, possibly against the U.S. homeland.

The United States faces a strategic challenge requiring urgent action. Given current threat trajectories, our nation will soon encounter a fundamentally different global setting than it has ever experienced: we will face a world where two nations possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own. In addition, the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared, unless its leaders make decisions now to adjust the U.S. strategic posture.

America’s defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia. Decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared to address the threats from these two nucleararmed adversaries arising during the 2027-2035 timeframe. Moreover, these threats are such that the United States and its Allies and partners must be ready to deter and defeat both adversaries simultaneously.

The evidence demonstrates that the U.S.-led international order and the values it upholds are at risk from the Chinese and Russian authoritarian regimes. The risk of military conflict with those major powers has grown and carries the potential for nuclear war. Therefore, the Commission reached the unanimous, non-partisan conclusion that today’s strategic outlook requires an urgent national focus and a series of concerted actions not currently planned. In sum, we find that the United States lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the looming twonuclear-peer threat environment and lacks the force structure such a strategy will require.

In reaching that overall conclusion, we make clear that the fundamentals of America’s deterrence strategy remain sound, but the application of that strategy must change to address the 2027-2035 threat environment. Those changes drive necessary adjustments to the posture of U.S. nuclear capabilities – in size and/or composition. A full spectrum of non-nuclear capabilities is also essential to the nation’s strategic posture. Such adjustments, in turn, drive the need to strengthen and expand the capacity of the infrastructure required to sustain and enhance U.S. strategic capabilities. In addition, Allies and partners are central to our findings regarding strategy and posture. We also emphasize the need for robust risk reduction efforts as fundamental to the U.S. approach in the new threat environment.

The Report continues tomorrow

Photo: The lead ground-based Interceptor is launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., March 25, 2019, in the first salvo engagement test of a threat-representative intercontinental ballistic missile target. The test’s two interceptors successfully intercepted a target launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. (DoD)