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Quick Analysis

Think You Know China?

True or false… take the quiz!

1)China claims near Arctic nation status although it is 900 miles from the region. It has observer status on the Arctic Council and owns more modern icebreakers than the United States.

2) China’s New York and San Francisco consulates are major hubs for its US espionage operations. China has infiltrated NY City government, with an NYPD officer charged in September with serving as a “secret agent” for China.

3) China’s navy (PLAN) is the largest in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines, including over 130 major surface combatants. The PLAN openly sails its uninvited warships through US territorial waters. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. 

4) China’s army (PLA) is the largest standing ground force in the world and is transitioning into a modern, mobile, and lethal ground force by fielding upgraded combat systems and communications equipment and enhancing its ability to conduct and manage complex combined-arms and joint operations. China has a large, and effective, cyber warfare force than can effectively challenge that of the United States and the West, in some areas, surpass it.

5) China’s air force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,500 total aircraft and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. China flew a spacecraft to the dark side of the moon before any other nation.

6) China has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The US fields one type of conventional GLBM with a maximum range of 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.

7) Chinese consulates in more than two dozen American cities are aiding undercover Chinese Communist Party soldiers posing as university students to engage in spying.

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8) The PRC conducts influence operations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic objectives by targeting cultural institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy communities in the United States, other countries, and international institutions. These include K-12 propaganda operations in over 500 US public schools, often funded through the CCP’s Confucius Institutes in the United States.

9) China funds research professors at Ivy League universities in return for providing China sensitive scientific information and advanced technology, with one Harvard University professor alone receiving more than $1.5 million.

10) In 2019, China announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.2 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases.

If you answered “yes” to all ten questions you sadly earned a perfect score. The Pentagon now acknowledges that China has surpassed the United States in many military areas and that it is likely to continue to advance rapidly to meet its long-term goal of becoming a hegemonic superpower by 2049. China is emerging as an aggressive, non-democratic, nation-state fomenting unrest in American cities, engaging in the theft of intellectual property from the West, and refusing to cooperate with international health researchers to stop the Covid-19 virus. It is challenging international oceanic commerce in the South and East China Seas and commercial air traffic flying in international air space above the region. 

China pollutes the world physically, overfishes the oceans far from its shores, and severely abuses its own minority populations. China and the CCP leadership simply refuse to play by the modern nation-state system provided for in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. They flaunt the norms of the international rules-based system that has provided unprecedented political stability and economic prosperity to much of the world for centuries. It must end.

China’s leadership may be descendant from an ancient Han culture, but President Xi Jinping and the CCP are more Marxist/Leninist today in their doctrine of total war and global domination. Their grand strategy: overthrow the United States and rebuild the western world in Beijing’s autocratic image. It is a chilling revelation to those who love freedom and democracy. There is no more lag time. China called “check,” now the west must move before it is “checkmate.”

DARIA NOVAK served in the United States State Department during the Reagan Administration, and currently is on the Board of the American Analysis of News and Media Inc., which publishes usagovpolicy.com and the New York Analysis of Policy and Government.  Each Friday, she presents key updates on China.

Illustration: Pixabay

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China Military’s Enormous Threat

Nineteen years ago this week the US suffered a defining event in its modern history. Known since that day simply as “9-11,” the American people have managed skillfully to balance the country’s emerging critical need for national security with the systemic requirement for individual freedom. China and the CCP leadership do not understand the key importance of this relationship nor do they seek it at home or abroad. Advances in computer technology during the last few years have enabled the Communist Party leadership to move further toward complete tyranny over the country’s domestic population and increased military aggression overseas. Using the latest developments in big data analytics and nascent editions of AI technology, Beijing is pushing the modernization of its military in ways that today threaten the entire world.

President Xi Jinping announced that there is a modernization plan for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enhance its capabilities to put China on par with the most advanced Western nations. At issue for the West and China’s neighbors, is Beijing’s end goal of hegemonic power and the methods it intends to employ to achieve it. Using publicly available data RAND Corporation wove together a picture of China’s broadly outlined national defense big data (国防大数据) plan. What it reveals should give China’s Asian neighbors and the world cause for immediate alarm. The Chinese definition of “national defense” big data collection by its military is all-encompassing. Its two defining characteristics are supersecrecy and supercomplexity.

The recently released RAND study reports that other key characteristics of China’s informationized military plan “go beyond those of general big data” that normally include high velocity, high variety, high volume, and high value computing. The country also is incorporating the 6S characteristics of supercomplexity, supersecrecy, speedy deployment, safety, a strong degree of confrontation, and strong timeliness. What that means to the world in common vernacular is that China intends to own the warfighting domain and possess the capacity to win both a localized war and one against a superpower. If the CCP leadership decide to forcibly conquer Taiwan or take control of the South and East China Seas, having an information advantage could be the deciding factor in a modern, fast-changing battlespace that incorporates information warfare. If it faces off with the United States it will need to control the information domain to achieve parity or potentially win.

First reported three years ago in the People’s Liberation Army Daily, Li Daguang, of China’s National Defense University’s Military Logistics and Military Science and Technology Equipment Teaching and Research Department, said that for China big data is the single most significant point of focus in great power struggles and that “data sovereignty” is being treated as equally critical to land, sea, air and space sovereignty. The goal of offensive data includes the destruction of the information infrastructure of an adversary. 

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The PLA Academy of Military Science’s Information Resources Center considers national defense big data to be a critical resource that will play a decisive role in joint operations. This is an area where American military analysts in past years considered China to be behind the West. PLA scholars claim that a futuristic “digitized officer” won’t fully replace humans, but will be more capable and faster at accomplishing many critical tasks. C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), cybersecurity, modeling and logistics are only a few of the research areas the PLA is concentrating its resources on in the next decade. Other programs are centered around an effort to train and recruit the personnel to handle the R&D effort.  

One question Western military strategists are asking in 2020 is what are China’s operational plans for their advanced big data capabilities in the future? And, is this intermediate step enough to create the needed linkage necessary for effective future artificial intelligence efforts. The RAND report suggests that there is a wide range of possibilities that all dramatically enhance the country’s technical warfighting capabilities.
The PLAN aims to use pictures from remote sensors to “create an image database on which to train deep learning algorithms to differentiate between different types of warships, then use those algorithms to build a multi-sensor warship detection platform.” This would provide the PLAN a capability to identify medium-sized warships with 95 percent accuracy. Another project aims to identify soil, water, rock, or synthetic objects with only a 5% error rate. Yet another seeks to ID and target communications sources on land and underseas to employ limited acoustical imaging to identify underwater targets. A 2017 Political Work Studies journal suggests that China also intends to use these advanced computer technologies in the ideological education of its military personnel and to track a soldier’s actions and thoughts. These represent an annotated list of a large data set of possible technology advances. It may be 2020 but it sounds a lot more like George Orwell’s 1984!

DARIA NOVAK served in the United States State Department during the Reagan Administration, and currently is on the Board of the American Analysis of News and Media Inc., which publishes usagovpolicy.com and the New York Analysis of Policy and Government.  Each Friday, she presents key updates on China.

Illustration: Pixabay

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The Chinese Long-Game

No government poses more of a challenge to the international order–America, especially–than China. Yet coverage of the world’s most populous, and threatening, nation is largely inadequate in the major media. To address that, the New York Analysis of Policy and Government will feature vital articles each Friday on China. They are written by Daria Novak, who had significant experience as a member of the U.S. State Department during some of the most critical periods in that country’s recent history.

China is a land filled with contradictory signals that continue to befuddle American foreign policymakers. In recent decades Washington has courted Beijing as if it is a friend and, at the same time, feared it as a strategic foe. Once a great dynastic power able to conquer immense swaths of Asian territory, by the early 20th century China was a weak and divided country unable grow enough grain to feed its own population. Mao and the leaders that followed him after 1948 promised to return China to its rightful place at the center of the world. 

Over the last few decades the nation-state has grown stronger, bolder, and made enormous strides toward becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia. It can challenge the US Navy on the high seas. This is the China the United States faces today. The broader strategic military question facing Washington is “What are China’s leaders willing to do to turn it into reality and when?”

Less than 40 years ago three out of four Chinese missiles failed to reach their target and half of the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) planes were grounded due to a lack of spare parts or trained pilots. That same September China’s military General Staff Department (GSD) held a month-long meeting to develop a strategy to counter a Soviet attack. Moscow, at that time, was the untrusted one.

Only twenty years ago American intelligence discovered Xianyou, a Chinese short-range missile base 220 miles off the Taiwan coast. It allowed Beijing to target all of the island’s major military installations and also held tunnels large enough to store the missiles and a brigade-size force with over a dozen truck launchers and 97 CSS-7 mobile missiles. 

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By November 2007 China already had deployed between 990 and 1,070 of the CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles near Taiwan, according to the US Department of Defense. And for the first time, last April, the Defense Department’s Report to Congress on China’s military power included a section on China’s Arctic policy, with information about Beijing’s overall presence in the region, its new double-hulled ice breakers, and its possible deployment of nuclear submarines to the area.   

Only two weeks ago, in its 39th space launch of the year, China put its Long March 5 heavy lift rocket carrying a “new era of communications equipment” into space. BeiDou, the country’s satellite navigation system, has now surpassed the number of GPS satellites in space. It may also contain elements of an offensive, space-based weapons system. 

China has invested billions in modernizing its military and has come a long way in a short time. It may only need another 10-15 years to surpass the overall military strength of the United States, according to some intelligence analysts in Washington. Does China’s military buildup and use of advanced technology mean it will use it more often to project power? Some in the US intelligence community say we already are seeing those results in the expansion of China’s reach from the South China Sea to the Arctic Circle some 900 miles distant from its shores. Beijing even created a new name for its northern policy — The Polar Silk Route and a new ID for China – as a “Near Arctic” nation. Washington has ignored China’s reach for too long. Beijing’s policymakers continue working toward the complete strategic transformation of its military from a large standing army to one based on advanced information technologies and integrated joint operations. China is playing the long game to win. No other option is a possibility for the communist leadership. 

Illustration: Chin’a Great Seal (China Official Site)

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China and the U.S.: Military and Economic Rivalry Analyzed, Part 4

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2017 “Report to Congress.” The Commission’s analysis reveals that Beijing’s meteoric economic rise in recent years is beginning to show some strain and  increasing debt. Of particular concern to Americans is the vast deficit the U.S. has in its trade relations, some of which has been generated by China’s unfair trade practices.  Perhaps the most worrisome aspect is Beijing’s continued massive growth in military power, and the aggressive nature of Chinese relations with nations within its region.  We have excerpted the key findings of the Report, and present them in four parts without comment. 

 

CHINA’S DOMESTIC INFORMATION CONTROLS, GLOBAL MEDIA INFLUENCE, AND CYBER DIPLOMACY

In 2017, the CCP tightened its control over media and online content. Authorities shut down independent media, penalized companies for disseminating news content without authorization, and eroded the privacy of Internet users in China by forcing them to connect their online profiles to their real names. As a result of a crackdown on “unauthorized” virtual private networks (VPNs), many popular VPN apps have been removed from online stores, and some VPN distributors based in China have been prosecuted and harassed by the state. VPNs have historically been one of the only reliable methods of circumventing China’s censorship of the Internet; this censorship functions as a “tax” by forcing users to spend more time and money to access blocked content. The Chinese government’s nascent “social credit” program, which relies on accumulated user data to build comprehensive profiles of Chinese citizens, is set to usher in a period of pervasive personal surveillance and social engineering. Multinational corporations with operations in China also have become unsettled by the tightening information controls, which many said negatively impact their business.

Amid the crackdown on independent media, and as journalists increasingly fear the repercussions of pursuing sensitive stories, investigative reporting in China has gradually diminished. Foreign journalists and their local assistants in China now face more restrictions and harassment than at any other time in recent history. The Chinese government also delays or denies visas from foreign journalists; in at least one case in 2016, Chinese authorities held up a visa for a foreign journalist until they were satisfied that another recent hire by the same press agency would not be covering human rights. Foreign correspondents also are increasingly being summoned by local authorities for informal interrogations.

Meanwhile, Beijing has rapidly expanded its overseas media influence by growing its overseas press corps and by exerting pressure on foreign publications both indirectly and directly. In April, the Chinese government also launched a major international media campaign to discredit a Chinese whistleblower living in the United States. In August, the Turkish foreign minister vowed to eliminate anti-China media reports in that country. Chinese authorities also (ultimately unsuccessfully) pressured Cambridge University Press to censor several of its academic publications. At the same time, China’s influence over Hollywood and the U.S. entertainment industry has grown.

The Chinese government has been promoting its views of “Internet sovereignty,” including in international fora, to legitimize its monitoring and control the Internet in China. This concept entails that a government has the right to monitor and control the networks in its territory and the content that Internet users there access and transmit. Beijing also advocates for a “multilateral” system of Internet governance in which national governments are the main actors. These views sharply contrast with longstanding U.S. support for the “multistakeholder” model, in which governmental, industry, academic, and other nonstate organizations have an equal role in the management of the Internet.
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CHINA’S HIGH TECH DEVELOPMENT

The Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term industrial strategy to ensure its global dominance in computing, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), nanotechnology, and biotechnology. This strategy is laid out in the 13th Five-Year Plan, and the Made in China 2025 and Internet Plus initiatives and continues China’s state-directed approach over the last six decades to build internationally competitive domestic firms. Beijing’s ultimate goal is for domestic companies to replace foreign companies as designers and manufacturers of key technology and products first at home, then abroad. It utilizes state funding, regulations, China-specific standards, localization targets, government procurement, foreign investment restrictions, recruitment of foreign talent, close integration of civilian and military technology development, and, in some cases, industrial espionage.

China is also leveraging the openness of the United States and other market-based economies to gain access to advanced research and data, recruit a globally talented workforce, acquire and invest in leading edge firms, and freely sell their products and services abroad. The scale and volume of government resources directed toward these sectors undermines the ability of foreign firms to fairly compete in China’s market and creates distorted global and domestic market conditions and rampant overproduction and overcapacity. In addition, China’s high market access barriers for foreign firms, localization targets, and China specific standards further restrict foreign competition’s access to China’s rapidly growing market, a major loss of market and job opportunities.

The United States remains a global technological and innovation leader in many cutting-edge, dual-use technologies due to its world-renowned universities, innovation ecosystem, federal funding of basic research and development (R&D), and recruitment of the world’s brightest minds. But falling and inconsistent federal R&D spending, reduced openness to global talent, and lack of interagency coordination are undermining these drivers of U.S. innovation to China’s advantage. Loss of global leadership in these key high-value-added, dual-use sectors is detrimental to U.S. long-term economic growth, weakening U.S. firms’ competitive edge, and reducing the capabilities, capacity, and resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base.

 

 

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China and the U.S.: Military and Economic Rivalry Analyzed, Part 3

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2017 “Report to Congress.” The Commission’s analysis reveals that Beijing’s meteoric economic rise in recent years is beginning to show some strain and  increasing debt. Of particular concern to Americans is the vast deficit the U.S. has in its trade relations, some of which has been generated by China’s unfair trade practices.  Perhaps the most worrisome aspect is Beijing’s continued massive growth in military power, and the aggressive nature of Chinese relations with nations within its region.  We have excerpted the key findings of the Report, and present them in four parts without comment. 

CHINA AND THE WORLD

China and continental Southeast Asia

China’s relations with Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand are driven by two broad goals: taking advantage of Southeast Asia’s economic potential and balancing the region’s geopolitical opportunities against its security vulnerabilities. In pursuit of these goals, China has leveraged its economic importance to Southeast Asia and capitalized on regional countries’ infrastructure needs. China has also forged ties with key regional political groups, particularly in Burma where China has supported different sides of Burma’s ethnic conflict.

Economically, the region boasts some of the highest growth rates in the world as well as valuable mineral and agricultural resources, such as Burma’s $31 billion jade trade. China uses a number of tactics to exploit the region—including trade links, infrastructure projects, and assistance packages—in a way that benefits China’s economic interests. For example, Chinese infrastructure projects in the region will help give Chinese exporters a competitive edge in regional markets and ameliorate excess capacity in China’s construction sector. Chinese firms have also invested in plantations and mineral extraction projects that have harmed host countries, including jade smuggling in Burma and pesticide-heavy plantations in Laos that have left thousands of workers sick.

Geopolitically, China desires stability and leverage along its 1,370 mile border with Burma where fighting between ethnic armed groups and Burma’s army has claimed the lives of Chinese citizens. China sees an opportunity to bypass its energy supply vulnerabilities in the Strait of Malacca by establishing transportation corridors through Burma and has built oil and natural gas pipelines connecting China to Burma’s Indian Ocean coast, where China seeks to control a key port. China has used regional countries’ membership in the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage—China’s financial support and close relationship with Cambodia has been pivotal to preventing joint ASEAN opposition to China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. Finally, following the coup in Thailand, China has sought to move closer to the U.S. treaty ally, and has exceeded the United States in arms sales to Thailand, although the degree to which Thai-China ties have improved is uncertain.

Geopolitically, China desires stability and leverage along its 1,370 mile border with Burma where fighting between ethnic armed groups and Burma’s army has claimed the lives of Chinese citizens. China sees an opportunity to bypass its energy supply vulnerabilities in the Strait of Malacca by establishing transportation corridors through Burma and has built oil and natural gas pipelines connecting China to Burma’s Indian Ocean coast, where China seeks to control a key port. China has used regional countries’ membership in the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage—China’s financial support and close relationship with Cambodia has been pivotal to preventing joint ASEAN opposition to China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. Finally, following the coup in Thailand, China has sought to move closer to the U.S. treaty ally, and has exceeded the United States in arms sales to Thailand, although the degree to which Thai-China ties have improved is uncertain.

China and Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia—encompassing China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea—is the locus of some of the most pressing security challenges in Asia. Two of these countries—Japan and South Korea—are U.S. treaty allies. North Korea, on the other hand, is highly antagonistic to the United States and a threat to global peace and security.

Although Beijing increasingly is frustrated and concerned by Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear testing and escalatory rhetoric, China is North Korea’s top trading partner, most reliable supporter, and treaty ally. China is necessarily a key player in any significant international effort to manage the North Korean threat, and took some steps to strengthen international sanctions against North Korea in 2017. It is too soon to measure China’s compliance with the latest rounds of sanctions, which, if implemented fully, would significantly constrain the North Korean regime’s ability to fund its nuclear and conventional weapons programs. Given China’s lackluster record of previous sanctions enforcement and continued sanctions violations by Chinese companies exporting dual-use items to North Korea, however, the United States and the international community should keep their expectations low. China’s reluctance to assist with the U.S.-led effort to neutralize the North Korean threat is also driven by Beijing’s belief that Washington’s North Korea policy is designed to strengthen U.S. regional alliances and military posture to contain China.

China-South Korea relations are evidence of this belief. After years of generally positive bilateral relations buoyed by robust trade and cooperative efforts by the countries’ top leaders, the China-South Korea relationship took a negative turn starting in 2016 over the planned deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to South Korea. China indicated its displeasure with this development by mounting a massive economic retaliation campaign against South Korea, causing millions of dollars in losses and forcing one South Korean company to cut back on operations in China. Comparing China’s harsh rhetorical response to THAAD and its lukewarm response to North Korea’s provocations, it appears Beijing finds U.S.-South Korea missile defense cooperation to be a greater threat to Chinese interests than a nuclear-armed North Korea. China has clearly signaled to South Korea that cooperation with the United States will be met with punishment from Beijing. This puts Seoul, which already struggles to balance its relations with Washington and Beijing, in a strategically difficult position, and will necessarily complicate U.S. efforts to enhance cooperation with South Korea going forward.

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In the near term, Chinese aggression toward Japan and economic coercion against South Korea seem to be driving both countries toward closer security cooperation with the United States. Prospects for enhanced South Korea-Japan security cooperation are less certain, however, and longstanding tensions between the two countries complicate U.S. efforts to evolve Northeast Asia’s security architecture from a “hub and spokes” model to a more integrated trilateral cooperative structure.

China and Taiwan

Cross-Strait relations entered a period of increased tension after President Tsai Ing-wen was elected in January 2016, as Beijing steadily increased pressure on Taiwan. Despite President Tsai’s cross-Strait policy of “maintaining the status quo,” Beijing has been displeased with her unwillingness to endorse the “one China” framework for cross-Strait relations (a 1992 framework Taipei and Beijing endorsed during the previous administration in Taiwan that acknowledges there is “one China,” but that allows each side to maintain its own interpretation of the meaning of “one China”). The measures Beijing is employing to pressure Taiwan include suspending official and semiofficial cross-Strait communication and meetings; establishing diplomatic relations with three of Taiwan’s former diplomatic partners (The Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Panama); reducing the number of Chinese group tours to Taiwan and Chinese students who can attend Taiwan universities; refusing to facilitate repatriation to Taiwan of citizens accused of telecommunications fraud in countries with which Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations; and blocking Taiwan’s participation in certain international fora, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN World Health Assembly. A complicating factor in cross-Strait relations is Taiwan’s dependence on China-bound exports. China remains Taiwan’s largest trading partner, biggest export market, and top source of imports, giving Beijing significant economic leverage over Taipei. President Tsai has sought to reduce Taiwan’s reliance on China by diversifying Taiwan’s economic ties. Central to this effort is President Tsai’s New Southbound Policy, which seeks to strengthen trade, investment, people-to-people, and other links with countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. The policy already has led to increased tourism to Taiwan, with the number of visitors from New Southbound Policy target countries increasing 28.6 percent in the first six months after the policy was enacted.

China’s military modernization program remains focused on deterring Taiwan from moving toward formal independence and preparing the Chinese military for a cross-Strait conflict. Faced with a growing threat from China’s military modernization, Taiwan has sought to enhance its own military capabilities in part by indigenously developing combat ships, aircraft, and weapons systems. Advanced antiship cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and fast attack and stealthy catamaran-style patrol ships are among the newest platforms and weapons systems Taiwan has produced. In 2017, Taiwan launched programs to build submarines and advanced jet trainers. Taiwan also seeks to enhance its military capabilities through the procurement of military equipment from the United States. In June 2017, the U.S. Department of State announced its approval of seven foreign military sales and one direct commercial sale to Taiwan valued at $1.4 billion, including AGM-154C joint stand-off weapon air-to-ground missiles and AGM-88B high-speed antiradiation missiles, among other items.

President Tsai has emphasized enhancing Taiwan’s economic relations with the United States as a top priority for her administration. Although there remain obstacles for U.S.-Taiwan trade (particularly the decade-long dispute over Taiwan’s ban on U.S. pork products), both Washington and Taipei remain committed to furthering their economic relationship. Beyond commercial and security ties, U.S.-Taiwan cooperation spans many other areas, including environmental protection, cybersecurity, education, public health, and science and technology. Taiwan’s robust democracy, civil society, and technology sector, and its vast expertise and experience in areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, make it a strong partner for the United States.

China and Hong Kong

In 2017, 20 years after Hong Kong’s handover from the United Kingdom to China, Beijing continued to erode the spirit of the “one country, two systems” policy that has guided its relationship with Hong Kong since 1997. (This policy grants Hong Kong and Macau the right to self-govern their economy and political system to a certain extent, excluding foreign affairs and defense.) The Chinese government increased its interference in the territory’s political affairs, becoming more pervasive in Hong Kong’s government and civil society. Several notable examples include Beijing’s use of legal measures to vacate the seats of six democratically-elected legislators for altering their oaths of office before taking office; its reported involvement in the apparent extralegal abduction of a Chinese billionaire from Hong Kong; and its active efforts to ensure Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor was selected as the territory’s new chief executive. Hong Kong’s rule of law, widely viewed as central to its unique status and a key distinguishing characteristic from the Mainland, is being challenged on many fronts. Freedom of expression in the territory—as guaranteed by China’s handover agreement with the UK and the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini constitution— also faces mounting challenges; these range from a crackdown on prodemocracy activists to pressure on the media, universities, and others to self-censor and conform to Beijing’s views.

As it has done in other aspects of Hong Kong’s politics and society, Beijing has become more active in asserting its presence in Hong Kong’s economy. For example, in 2017, Hong Kong-listed Chinese state-owned enterprises were ordered to include a formal role for the CCP in their articles of association, raising concerns among investors who feel the Chinese government is interfering in business operations. Integration of the mainland and Hong Kong economies continues to deepen, with the launch of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect and the China-Hong Kong Bond Connect serving as the latest in a series of measures aimed at attracting global investors to China’s domestic markets. Hong Kong’s strong rule of law and economic openness have long made it an important destination for international trade and investment. However, some observers are beginning to question Hong Kong’s ability to maintain its status as Asia’s premier financial center if companies and individuals lose confidence in the territory’s rule of law, political autonomy, and other freedoms as they are eroded by Beijing.

Mainland China’s increasing encroachment on Hong Kong’s promised “high degree of autonomy” poses obstacles for the United States in carrying out its policy objectives in the territory. Hong Kong is a major destination and partner for U.S. trade and investment and plays a valuable role as a participant in important international economic organizations. In light of China’s recent intrusions into Hong Kong’s democratic institutions, some observers argue the territory is losing its unique characteristics that make it a close U.S. partner in the Asia Pacific. U.S. allies and partners in the region, particularly Taiwan, also are closely watching these developments with unease. The Mainland’s adherence to its commitments regarding Hong Kong is necessary to ensure continued strong ties between the United States and the territory.

The Report Concludes Tomorrow.

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Quick Analysis

China and the U.S.: Military and Economic Rivalry Analyzed, Part 2

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2017 “Report to Congress.” The Commission’s analysis reveals that Beijing’s meteoric economic rise in recent years is beginning to show some strain and  increasing debt. Of particular concern to Americans is the vast deficit the U.S. has in its trade relations, some of which has been generated by China’s unfair trade practices.  Perhaps the most worrisome aspect is Beijing’s continued massive growth in military power, and the aggressive nature of Chinese relations with nations within its region.  We have excerpted the key findings of the Report, and present them in four parts without comment. 

U.S.-China Security Relations

China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea and in South Asia flared in 2017. China continued to rely primarily on nonmilitary and semiofficial actors (such as the China Coast Guard and maritime militia) to advance its interests in the disputed South China Sea, straining already-unsettled relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. The 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which overwhelmingly sided against China’s position, has not deterred Beijing. China’s territorial assertiveness was also on display when Chinese armed forces attempted to consolidate control over territory disputed by Bhutan and India. Ultimately, India was more successful than the Philippines and Vietnam in countering Chinese coercion.

China’s One Belt, One Road initiative continued to expand in 2017. Although China claims the mega-project is primarily economic in nature, strategic imperatives are at the heart of the initiative. China aims to use One Belt, One Road projects to expand its access to strategically important places, particularly in the Indian Ocean; to enhance its energy security; and to increase its leverage and influence over other countries.

The People’s Liberation Army continues to extend its presence outside of China’s immediate periphery by opening its first overseas military base in Djibouti, increasing its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, and conducting more bilateral and multilateral exercises. China’s arms exports continued to grow in volume and sophistication in 2017, although they remain limited to low- and middle-income countries and are dwarfed by U.S. and Russian sales in value. The People’s Liberation Army’s expanded exercise portfolio includes new partners, such as Burma and Nepal, as well as long-time partners Pakistan and Russia. China’s defense ties with Russia continued an upward trend in 2017.

U.S.-China security relations saw new dialogue formats emerge following the U.S. presidential transition, but were marked by growing tension due to disagreements over issues such as North Korean denuclearization and China’s continued coercive actions in regional territorial disputes.

CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN 2017

China’s military modernization program seeks to advance Beijing’s security interests, prevent other countries from challenging those interests, and defend China’s sovereignty claims to disputed areas along its border and maritime periphery. The weapons and systems under development and those that are being fielded by China’s military—such as intermediate-range ballistic missiles, bombers with long-range precision strike capabilities, and guided missile nuclear attack submarines—are intended to provide China the capability to strike targets further from shore, such as Guam, and potentially complicate U.S. responses to crises involving China in the Indo-Pacific.

China will continue to modernize strategic air and sea lift capabilities, which will enable China’s military to conduct expeditionary operations. The continued production of the Chinese navy’s amphibious lift ships and the air force’s heavy lift transport aircraft will increase China’s ability to deliver troops abroad and to conduct expeditionary operations beyond the first island chain, humanitarian assistance operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

China’s increasingly accurate and advanced missile forces are intended to erode the ability of the United States to operate freely in the region in the event of a conflict and are capable of holding U.S. forces in the region at risk.

China’s continued focus on developing counterspace capabilities indicates Beijing seeks to hold U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites at risk in the event of conflict.

The consolidation of space, cyber, electronic warfare, signals, and potentially human intelligence capabilities under the Strategic Support Force provides China a centralized all-source intelligence apparatus to support national-level decision makers. Furthermore, this development could strengthen the Chinese military’s ability to conduct integrated joint operations by providing a wide range of collection capabilities including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to commanders responsible for operational forces under the military’s five theater commands.

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PLA GROUND FORCES • 850,000 Troops • 13 Group Armies • 78 Combined Arms Brigades • 2 Infantry Brigades • 4 Infantry Divisions • 1 Mechanized Infantry Brigade • 15 Air Defense Brigades • 14 Army Aviation Brigades • 15 Artillery Brigades • 1 Airborne Corps • 15 Special Operations Brigades • 7,000 Tanks • 8,000 Artillery Pieces PLA AIR FORCE AND NAVAL AVIATION • 1,700 Fighter Aircraft • 400 Bombers/Attack Aircraft • 475 Transport Aircraft • 115 Special Mission Aircraft PLA NAVY • 1 Aircraft Carrier • 26 Destroyers • 55 Frigates • 34 Corvettes • 86 Coastal Patrol (Missile) Boats • 27 Tank Landing Ships • 4 Amphibious Transport Docks • 21 Medium Landing Ships • 57 Diesel Attack Submarines • 5 Nuclear Attack Submarines • 4 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines PLA ROCKET FORCE • 75-100 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles • 200-300 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles • 1,200 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles • 200-300 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles • 200-300 Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

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CHINA’S PURSUIT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS

China is pursuing a wide range of military technologies at the global frontier—weapons just now being developed or not yet developed by any country. Advanced systems such as maneuverable reentry vehicles, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counterspace weapons, and unmanned and AI-equipped weapons contribute to China’s longstanding goal of military modernization and its efforts to compete militarily with the United States. They also go hand in hand with Beijing’s desire for the country to become a leading high technology power across commercial and dual-use areas. China’s government has taken a comprehensive approach to the development of key dual-use technologies, leveraging state funding, licit and illicit technological exchange, foreign investment, and talent recruitment opportunities to build national champions and advance its military capabilities.

Although information regarding China’s advanced weapons programs is not always publicly available, numerous open source writings, government statements, and testing and deployment activities indicate Beijing has undertaken vigorous efforts in these areas. China revealed two antiship ballistic missile systems with reported maneuverable reentry vehicle capabilities in 2010 and 2015, respectively, and has taken steps toward developing the reconnaissance-strike complex necessary to successfully strike a moving target at sea, still unproven. China’s hypersonic weapons program appears to be in developmental stages but progressing rapidly, featuring seven likely hypersonic glide vehicle tests since 2014 and a reported scramjet engine flight test in 2015. Following a deep history of research into directed energy weapons, China’s progress includes reported advancements in developing a highpower microwave antimissile system in 2017, at least one chemical high energy laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites as of 2006 (with likely further developments), and recent marketing of low-power solid state laser weapons. China has reportedly built experimental electromagnetic railguns, and numerous research institutes in China are studying aspects of electromagnetic launch technology. China’s technology tests applicable to counterspace weapons include direct-ascent antisatellite missiles, ground-based directed energy weapons, and rendezvous and proximity operations; and its writings and capabilities indicate the potential for directed energy weapons based on co-orbital platforms. Finally, in addition to developing and marketing a wide range of unmanned systems, China has conducted research into autonomous systems such as AIequipped cruise missiles, autonomous vehicles, and drone swarms, alongside its rapid rise in the global commercial AI sector.

While the United States appears to retain a lead in developing most of these systems according to public reports, China likely possesses the key factors (scientific knowledge, critical components, and skills and techniques) necessary to successfully develop advanced weapons. China is able to access scientific knowledge through publicly available information, academic exchanges, and strong efforts to cultivate human talent. Its advances in computing and robotics provide critical components for next frontier weapons: semiconductors are key to intelligent weapons systems; supercomputing is crucial for weapons design and testing; industrial robotics enhances the quality and efficiency of manufacturing; and national champions in the commercial robotics and AI sectors are well positioned to provide next frontier military applications. Finally, while China currently trails the United States in developing relevant skills and techniques, the only fundamental barriers to achieving these will be effort: time, will, and financial support. China appears to have the long-term plans, consistent funding, and human talent in place to eventually overcome these barriers. China may in fact be moving toward a phase of higher-end innovation, given cutting-edge advances in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, and quantum information science. Should the United States falter in its own efforts, China is well prepared to close the gap further than it already has.

China’s advanced weapons programs present both direct implications for U.S. security interests and broader implications for long-term U.S.-China defense technological competition. Breakthroughs in any of the aforementioned advanced weapons categories would contribute to China’s antiaccess/area denial capabilities and directly challenge U.S. advantages. Notable examples include the potential for antiship ballistic missiles to hold U.S. surface ships at risk; for hypersonic weapons to defeat kinetic missile defenses, if capable of sufficient speed and maneuverability; for directed energy weapons and railguns to undermine future U.S. military concepts such as using distributed low-cost platforms to assure access to contested environments; for counterspace weapons to deny key space-based systems to the U.S. military in a contingency; and for unmanned and AI-equipped weapons in large numbers to saturate U.S. air defenses, particularly by using swarm technology. China is poised to challenge U.S. technological leadership in an environment in which dual-use commercial technology increasingly contributes to military technological strength. As the United States seeks to ensure it is prepared to deter aggression and defend key interests in the Asia Pacific, such as the security of allies and partners, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and freedom of navigation, recognizing these critical challenges will be crucial.

HOTSPOTS ALONG CHINA’S MARITIME PERIPHERY

U.S. presence and alliance commitments have helped maintain regional stability in Asia. China’s aggressive actions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait threaten principles such as freedom of navigation, the use of international law to settle disputes, and free trade. If Beijing continues to increase its control over the East and South China seas, the United States could receive requests for additional assistance by allies, friends, and partners to improve their capabilities to defend themselves, along with calls for the United States to remain engaged in the region to maintain security and stability.

With China actively preparing contingency plans for operations against U.S. allies, friends, and partners along China’s maritime periphery, the United States and China could quickly become involved in a conflict if Beijing escalates. This risk becomes greater depending on the level of tensions associated with any of the following flashpoints: the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cross-Strait relations.

Chinese leaders are cautious about letting a crisis escalate into conflict, and Chinese military thinkers study “war control” as a method for limiting the scope of a conflict to minimize negative consequences and achieve a victory at minimal cost. However, if Beijing believes the risk of a response to Chinese action is low, China may be tempted to risk brinksmanship to achieve its national objectives. Furthermore, if Beijing is unable to avoid escalation, any crises involving the use of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) create opportunities to widen a crisis into a conflict that results in the use of force.

China has emphasized building a military capable of responding to situations in multiple regions and has developed theater commands capable of planning and executing missions in their respective areas of responsibility. A key element of success in achieving operational objectives, however, will be managing resources across multiple theaters should China find itself challenged in multiple directions simultaneously. This could create an opportunity to dissuade Chinese aggression or potentially result in Beijing escalating or accelerating a conflict.

The PLA presently lacks the amphibious lift to directly assault Taiwan, and would instead have to successfully seize ports and airfields for the flow of follow-on forces to conduct onisland operations. Likewise, sustaining a prolonged air and maritime blockade against Taiwan is likely to strain PLA logistical capabilities, potentially disrupt trade routes through East Asia, and inhibit freedom of navigation in the region. These are high risk operations for China, and may be conducted only after other coercive options are exhausted.

Military facilities currently under construction in the Spratly Islands are intended to improve the PLA’s operational reach by strengthening logistical support, extending operational reach, and bolstering the military’s capability to monitor potential adversaries. Once these outposts are completed, they will improve the PLA’s ability to take action against Vietnamese or Filipino forces on adjacent features if so ordered. China’s militarization of these features is therefore inherently destabilizing for its neighbors who have overlapping sovereignty claims.

There are several U.S. alliances and other commitments that could be activated by a maritime hotspot conflict with Japan, the Philippines, or Taiwan. Depending on the scenario, the United States could be expected to become involved in a conflict, although China will seek to discourage this by many means, possibly to include ensuring conflict remains in the “grey zone” where U.S. defense commitments are uncertain and the onus of escalation is shifted to China’s adversary.

The forward presence of U.S. forces in East Asia, coupled with the treaty alliances and partnerships of the United States in the region, constitute the most important factor in deterring Chinese adventurism. Nevertheless, they also increase the likelihood, should deterrence fail, that the United States becomes involved in armed conflict. The Commission has documented in previous reports how the balance of military power in the region has shifted in China’s direction. Should that shift continue without a change in U.S. policy, there is a danger that Chinese leaders will consider the United States an obstacle to their ambitions that must be removed. In that event, Beijing may decide to escalate a crisis when the circumstances seem favorable to the achievement of China’s larger ambitions.

The Report Continues Tomorrow.

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Quick Analysis

China and the U.S.: Military and Economic Rivalry Analyzed

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2017 “Report to Congress.” The Commission’s analysis reveals that Beijing’s meteoric economic rise in recent years is beginning to show some strain and  increasing debt. Of particular concern to Americans is the vast deficit the U.S. has in its trade relations, some of which has been generated by China’s unfair trade practices.  Perhaps the most worrisome aspect is Beijing’s continued massive growth in military power, and the aggressive nature of Chinese relations with nations within its region.  We have excerpted the key findings of the Report, and present them in four parts without comment.

ECONOMICS AND TRADE

In 2016 and the first half of 2017, the Chinese government has reported it met or exceeded the targets it set for gross domestic product (GDP) growth—an important deliverable in advance of the political leadership transitions at the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress scheduled for October 2017. The Chinese government has achieved this high growth through reliance on old drivers: credit and real estate. However, the government’s unwillingness to allow the market to play a bigger role has resulted in deteriorating investment efficiency, meaning higher levels of debt are necessary to generate growth. Household consumption—an essential element of China’s economic rebalancing—is growing but at a sluggish pace due to the slow rate of reform.

China’s high and rising debt levels pose a growing threat to the country’s financial stability. China’s total debt reached $27.5 trillion, or 257 percent of GDP, at the end of 2016. The dramatic rise in China’s debt burden can be attributed to the relentless expansion of credit the government has relied on to generate growth since the global financial crisis.

The U.S. trade deficit in goods with China totaled $347 billion in 2016, the second-highest deficit on record. In the first eight months of 2017, the goods deficit increased 6.2 percent year-on-year to $239.1 billion, with U.S. exports to China reaching $80.2 billion, an increase of 15 percent year-on-year, while imports from China grew 8.3 percent year-on-year to $319.3 billion. In 2016, the U.S. services trade surplus with China reached a record high of $37 billion, driven almost entirely by an increase in Chinese tourism to the United States.

China’s foreign investment climate continues to deteriorate as government policy contributes to rising protectionism and unfair regulatory restrictions on U.S. companies operating in China. The newly implemented cybersecurity law illustrates this trend. The law contains data localization requirements and a security review process U.S. and foreign firms claim can be used to discriminatorily advantage Chinese businesses or access proprietary information from foreign firms.

U.S. government efforts to tackle China’s trade-distorting practices continue to yield limited results. The inaugural Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, created following a meeting between President Trump and President Xi in April 2017, concluded with no concrete agreements or future agenda.

At the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States continues to challenge China’s non-compliance with key provisions of its accession agreement, including failure to notify subsidies. In the past year, the United States requested WTO consultations over China’s management of tariff rate quotas for rice, wheat, and corn, and subsidies to select producers of primary aluminum.

CHINESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Chinese government policies, coupled with increased investor uncertainty in China, have contributed to increased investment flows to the United States in recent years. In 2017, Chinese investment flows to the United States are expected to decline relative to 2016 as the Chinese government seeks to limit capital outflows and fend off risks from mounting corporate debt.

Sectors of the U.S. economy deemed strategic by the Chinese government are more likely to be targeted by Chinese firms for investment, while Chinese investments in nonstrategic sectors like entertainment, real estate, and hospitality are declining amid Chinese Communist Party efforts to limit capital outflows and reduce corporate debt.

Some Chinese firms seek to obscure their dealings in the United States through U.S.-based shell companies or attempt to drive down the value of U.S. assets through sophisticated cyber espionage campaigns. These firms are becoming more sophisticated in their attempts to circumvent Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews and other U.S. investment regulations.

Greenfield investments in the United States are not subject to the CFIUS review process, which may raise national security risks. Although the number of Chinese greenfield investments in the United States remains limited compared to acquisitions of U.S. assets, federal laws and screening mechanisms do not sufficiently require federal authorities to evaluate whether a greenfield investment may pose a national security threat.

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The opaque nature of China’s financial system makes it impossible to verify the accuracy of Chinese companies’ financial disclosures and auditing reports. Chinese businesses continue to list on U.S. stock exchanges to raise capital, despite operating outside the laws and regulations governing U.S. firms.

U.S. regulators have struggled to deter Chinese fraud schemes on U.S. exchanges, with Chinese issuers stealing billions of dollars from U.S. investors. Efforts to prosecute the issuers of the fraudulent securities have been unsuccessful, with Chinese regulators choosing not to pursue firms or individuals for crimes committed by Chinese companies listed overseas.

Some Chinese companies operate with little oversight under China’s opaque financial system, leaving U.S. investors exposed to exploitative and fraudulent schemes perpetrated by China-based issuers. Negotiations between the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and its counterparts in China have resulted in little progress toward securing increased cross-border transparency and accountability.

U.S. ACCESS TO CHINA’S CONSUMER MARKET

China’s rebalancing to a more consumption-driven growth model should present opportunities for U.S. companies in the e-commerce, logistics, and financial services sectors. However, U.S. companies operating in China do not have a level playing field and continue to face significant market access challenges, including informal bans on entry, caps on foreign equity, licensing delays, and data localization policies.

China is the largest e-commerce market in the world, with e-commerce sales reaching $787 billion in 2016. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, by 2019 an estimated one out of every three retail dollars in China will be spent online, the highest percentage in the world. Although China has traditionally provided the world with its manufactured goods, its e-commerce boom should offer increased opportunities for U.S. retailers and brands, with more and more Chinese consumers purchasing foreign goods. Demand is strong in areas where the United States excels, such as high-quality foods and supplements, beauty products, and healthcare-related goods.

Although China’s e-commerce market offers opportunities for U.S. retailers and brands, it is not without its challenges and risks. While the Chinese government has made some improvements in enforcing intellectual property rights, intellectual property issues remain a key challenge for U.S. companies operating in China. In particular, the prevalence of counterfeit goods on Chinese e-commerce platforms continues to hurt U.S. retailers and brands.

E-commerce has been a key driver of improvements to China’s $2.2-trillion-dollar logistics sector. Yet, China’s domestic logistics industry remains underdeveloped, due to the country’s historical focus on improving export logistics at the expense of domestic logistics infrastructure. This has caused logistics to become a major bottleneck for China’s e-commerce sector. China’s efforts to develop and modernize its express delivery industry could offer U.S. logistics firms like FedEx and UPS opportunities to expand their China operations.

Financial services have been a major driver of growth within China’s services sector, increasing 11 percent annually from 2012 to 2016. However, Chinese consumers’ access to financial services remains inadequate, and most Chinese consumers lack formal credit histories. Improving their access to financial services will be critical for raising domestic consumption levels. In addition, China has made limited progress in implementing reforms to improve the market orientation and efficiency of its financial sector.

Financial services are a mainstay of the U.S. economy and a major services export to China. While China has taken some steps to expand foreign firms’ access to its financial markets since joining the World Trade Organization, U.S. financial services companies continue to face significant market access barriers in China. These include informal and formal bans on entry, equity caps, licensing restrictions, and data localization requirements. China’s new cybersecurity law poses additional challenges for U.S. financial institutions operating in China. As a result, U.S. firms’ market share in China’s financial sector has been stagnant or declining in recent years.

China has become a global leader in financial technology. China’s Internet giants have emerged as significant players not only in e-commerce and logistics, but also in China’s financial services sector, particularly in payments and lending.

The Report Continues Tomorrow.

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Quick Analysis

New Reports Highlight The Threat From China

The New York Analysis of Policy & Government has examined the latest reports on China’s rapidly growing armed threat to the U.S., and summarizes them in this three-part review.

The danger from China’s dramatically increasing military power has been examined by several recently released governmental and private sources. The New York Analysis of Policy & Government recently examined Beijing’s growing nuclear arsenal. The recently released reports provide insights into its vastly increased conventional power.

We have examined these crucial reviews, and summarize them in this three-part article.

The most significant of the worrisome analyses is the Department of Defenses’ (DOD) 2017 “Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Report of China.” (DoD)

According to the DoD, “Since 1996, the PLA has made tremendous strides, and, despite improvements to the U.S. military, the net change in capabilities is moving in favor of China. Some aspects of Chinese military modernization, such as improvements to PLA ballistic missiles, fighter aircraft, and attack submarines, have come extraordinarily quickly by any reasonable historical standard.

“Over the next five to 15 years, if U.S. and PLA forces remain on roughly current trajectories, Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of U.S. dominance.

“The ability to contest dominance might lead Chinese leaders to believe that they could deter U.S. intervention in a conflict between it and one or more of its neighbors. This, in turn, would undermine U.S. deterrence and could, in a crisis, tip the balance of debate in Beijing as to the advisability of using force.

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“In 2016, China’s leaders advanced an ambitious agenda of military modernization and organizational reforms. China’s military modernization is targeting capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. military-technological advantages.

“To support this modernization, China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including cyber theft, targeted foreign direct investment, and exploitation of the access of private Chinese nationals to such technologies. Several cases emerged in 2016 of China using its intelligence services, and employing other illicit approaches that violate U.S. laws and export controls, to obtain national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials.

“As China’s global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization program has become more focused on supporting missions beyond China’s periphery…

“China’s increasingly assertive efforts to advance its sovereignty and territorial claims, its forceful rhetoric, and lack of transparency about its growing military capabilities and strategic decision-making continue to cause concern among countries in the region and have caused some to enhance their ties to the United States. These concerns are likely to intensify as the PLA continues to modernize, especially in the absence of greater transparency.”

A recent Rand study concurs. “Over the past two decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed itself … into a capable, modern military. ..Annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth in China’s defense spending averaged 11 percent per year between 1996 and 2015…In December 2004, then-premier of China Hu Jintao outlined “new historical missions” for the PLA, which opened the door to a wider range of operations. … China would enjoy enormous situational and geographic advantages in any likely East Asian scenario … This enables the PLA to focus largely on “tooth” (combat forces) as opposed to “tail” (support assets).”

The Report continues tomorrow

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China Matches U.S. in Military Prowess, Part 2

The New York Analysis of Policy and Government continues its review of China’s growing military power. 

Beijing already has a larger number of submarines than the U.S. Navy, and its overall fleet will exceed America’s by 2020. It’s growing naval power has given it the confidence and ability [to do more than] ignore international law. Reuters  has reported that Chinese spy ships have shadowed the U.S. aircraft Carrier USS John C. Stennis. It’s not the first time the U.S. Navy was openly challenged by China.  In 2007, the Daily Mail reported that “American military chiefs have been left dumbstruck by an undetected Chinese submarine popping up at the heart of a recent Pacific exercise and close to the vast U.S.S. Kitty Hawk – a 1,000ft supercarrier with 4,500 personnel on board. By the time it surfaced the 160ft Song Class diesel-electric attack submarine is understood to have sailed within viable range for launching torpedoes or missiles at the carrier.

According to senior NATO officials the incident caused consternation in the U.S. Navy. The Americans had no idea China’s fast-growing submarine fleet had reached such a level of sophistication, or that it posed such a threat. One NATO figure said the effect was “as big a shock as the Russians launching Sputnik” – a reference to the Soviet Union’s first orbiting satellite in 1957 which marked the start of the space age. The incident, which took place in the ocean between southern Japan and Taiwan, is a major embarrassment for the Pentagon.” [The New York Analysis will provide a longer review of China’s naval strength tomorrow.]

A review in the South China Morning Post  (in conjunction with the Associated Press) highlighted ten weapons that Beijing has unveiled over the past several years that underscore its rising military sophistication. They include:

  • the DF-26 missile, intermediate-range ballistic missile dubbed the “Guam killer”, with its 4,000km range putting it within striking distance of the US naval base at Guam;
  • the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile known as a carrier-killer with a maximum range of 1,450km;
  • the DF-5B The liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic, which can carry three or more nuclear warheads with a range of up to 15,000km;
  • the WZ-19 helicopter used to attack tanks and other heavy targets;
  • the Y-9 transport aircraft, a design platform for the air force’s early warning aircraft KJ-200 and KJ-500;
  • the H-6K nuclear strike strategic bomber; the ZTL-09 armored vehicle, with a 105mm gun that can destroyed armored targets over 2km away;
  • the ZTZ-99A main battle tank with a 125mm smoothbore gun and carousel-style autoloader
  • ; the ZBD-04 Infantry fighting vehicle; and
  • the HQ-10/FL-3000N short-range air-defense missile, capable of expanding the navy’s force projection capability. The weapon is mounted on the navy’s most advanced Type 052D  destroyers and Type 056 frigates.

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To take the fullest advantage of its new technology and weaponry, Beijing is modernizing all aspects of its armed forces.

The English language edition of China’s Xinhua news source reports that. “China aims to complete the reform of its 2.3-million-strong army and have the most modern armed forces capable of ‘informationised warfare’ by 2020… China’s armed forces will realise ‘a significant increase of key combat capabilities,’ said the 13th five-year military development plan (2016-2020) issued by the Central Military Commission (CMC), the overall commanding authority of the People’s Liberation Army headed by President Xi Jinping.By 2020, the PLA will have finished mechanisation of all forces and made important progress in incorporating information and computer-technology…More resources will be directed to projects that enhance combat readiness…”

The reforms, notes the Wall Street Journal, “ could enable China not just to challenge U.S. military dominance in Asia, but also to intervene militarily elsewhere … the concern for the U.S. and its allies is that Beijing might use force in ways that conflict with Western interests…The PLA had begun taking tentative steps abroad even before Mr. Xi’s plan. It has sent ships and submarines into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, installed military equipment on reclaimed land in the South China Sea and challenged U.S. naval forces around China’s coast…Mr. Xi has indicated he sees a comparable capability as essential to the “China Dream” he outlined after taking power in 2012, when he ordered the military to prepare to “fight and win wars.” A defense white paper last year gave the PLA a new strategic task to “safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests” on top of its traditional defensive duties.

The Report concludes tomorrow, with a look at China’s naval prowess

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China Matches U.S. in Military Strength

The New York Analysis of Policy & Government begins a multi-part review of the growing military prowess of America’s opponents.  

Americans continue to take false comfort in their erroneous belief that the U.S. leads the world in military technology, and that their armed forces, combined with NATO, constitute the strongest alliance on the planet. The evidence to the contrary is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Moscow commands a larger and more modern nuclear force than Washington, and Beijing’s military is nearing equality in technology while gaining an advantage in numbers.

The evidence for all the above doesn’t only come from western intelligence agencies.  Both Russia and China enthusiastically boast about their prowess, and, as demonstrated by the Kremlin in Ukraine and Beijing in its oceanic exploits (in which it has claimed about 90% of the South China Sea) neither has any reluctance in using force aggressively and illegally.

Thanks to a massive financial investment, (China has increased its military spending by 10% percent annually for a prolonged period, even as the U.S. has cut the Pentagon budget) intense espionage against the west, and the sale of supercomputers by the Clinton administration in the 1990’s, China has closed the gap in technology with the United States.

Roger Cliff, author of a major study on Beijing’s military,   writes “With skyrocketing military budgets and new technology, China’s tanks, aircraft, destroyers, and missile capabilities are becoming comparable to those of the United States.” Peter Dombrowski, writing for the War On The Rocks site, provides contrary evidence to those who maintain that America can rely on superior technology: “..the United States might not be able to sustain a high-technology strategy and, in the long run, China may be better positioned in a long-term race…Numerous accounts document how the Chinese defense industry has increased its capacities, at least in part, by using cyber espionage to steal American and Western technologies and reverse engineering weapons and systems…Unless the U.S. military and intelligence communities can somehow overturn the laws of physics, economics, and geography simultaneously, America remains at a disadvantage relative to China in terms of the fundamentals of military conflict in Asia…China may well out innovate and out invest the United States.”

China has also purchased some of Russia’s most advanced military equipment, while also developing its own naval weapons systems, some of which are unmatched anywhere, including a missile which, launched from land, can disable ships almost 1,000 miles away.

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Examples of Beijing’s rise can be seen clearly in the air, in space, and at sea.

As evidenced at recent air shows, Beijing now has two separate stealth fighters available. The newest is the J-20. According to Russia’s RT news service “China has showcased its new J-20 stealth fighter in southern Guangdong Province’s city of Zhuhai …The J-20 is a long-range radar-evading fighter jet equipped with air-to-air missiles…The J-20, manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Industries Corporation, is an original Chinese project.”

The U.S. Naval Institute  reports: “China is designing weapons to counter advanced Western satellite technology using directed energy weapons and jammers and may have already tested some, according to a [2015] Chinese military assessment to Congress. ‘China continues to develop a variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space- based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict, including the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers,’ read the report.”

The Washington Free Beacon disclosed last November that China had “conducted a flight test of a new missile capable of knocking out U.S. satellites as part of Beijing’s growing space warfare arsenal.The test of a Dong Neng-3 exoatmospheric vehicle was carried out Oct. 30 from China’s Korla Missile Test Complex in western China, said two defense officials familiar with reports of the test. A Chinese press report also provided details of what was said to be a missile defense interceptor flight test carried out Nov. 1 [2015].”  IBI reports that “In 2007 … China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons…Brian Weeden, a security analyst and former Air Force officer who studied and helped publicize the Chinese test. ‘The U.S. came to grips decades ago with the fact that its lower orbit satellites could easily be shot down..”

The Report Continues Tomorrow