On June 23, the Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tx) delivered a major address to the Atlantic Council outlining how the United States should deal with Russia. The following are the key points.
Looking back from the perspective of 70 years, two well-known warnings of 1946 were amazingly perceptive and prescient, and I believe that they can continue to enlighten us today in our struggle with one of the new faces of tyranny that we confront.
George Kennan had clashed with superiors who were not ready to hear the realities driving Soviet Russia. In response to inquiries from the Treasury and State Departments, he sent back a cable discussing what lay underneath Soviet actions and motivations in the famous Long Telegram on February 22, 1946. He wrote, “At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” . . . And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.” Less than two weeks later, on March 5, 1946, a foreign politician then in opposition gave a speech which shook up public opinion about our wartime ally. Winston Churchill told an audience in Fulton, Missouri, which included President Truman, “I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.” “From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.” These insights, among others, helped guide our approach to dealing with the Soviet Union until its collapse…
… But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of us thought and hoped that without the ideology of communism, Russia would enter the community of nations as a responsible, constructive participant. Just as Churchill and Roosevelt were misled by Stalin, we have been disappointed. Perhaps we underestimated something deeper in the Russian psyche, which Kennan pointed out pretty clearly.
Despite the growing warning signs, by the time the Obama Administration took office, it followed a very different approach toward Russia than one guided by the insights of Kennan and Churchill. Within the first month, Vice President Biden said it was “time to press the reset button” with Russia, and shortly Secretary of State Clinton was off to deliver an actual, if mistranslated, button. Later that year, the President canceled the Third Site missile defense plan, surprising our allies, the Poles and Czechs. The next year, the President announced that he had concluded that “the situation in Georgia need no longer be considered an obstacle” to reaching agreements with the Russians. Among other milestones was the famous microphone that picked up the President telling Russian President Medvedev, that “all these issues, but particularly missile defense, can be solved, but it’s important for him [Putin] to give me space. . . . After my election I have more flexibility.”
We saw that flexibility later as the U.S. backed away a second time from missile defense plans that aggravated Moscow.
We also, at that time, began to cut our defense spending. Meanwhile a new government in Ukraine did not want to live under Moscow’s thumb, leading to the invasion and annexation of Crimea, then invasion and occupation of portions of eastern Ukraine. It is in many ways the most significant breach of European borders since the end of World War II. Our response has been primarily economic sanctions and additional training exercises.
But the Administration, along with some of our European allies, has so far refused to provide the weapons the Ukrainians need to defend themselves. Lenin is often quoted as saying, “Probe with bayonets. If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.” It seems that Mr. Putin and those around him do not see economic sanctions as steel.
How stand things today? The Russian defense budget is increasing about 10% despite the economic sanctions with most of the money going to procurement. While the limits on “strategic” launchers and warheads are equal for us under the New Start treaty, Russia is modernizing both, including 2 new land-based ICBM’s, 2 new submarine launched ballistic missiles, a new class of SSBN’s, a new long range cruise missile, with other ICBMs and cruise missiles in development.
All the while, they continue to manufacture new nuclear warheads and maintain roughly 10 times the number of tactical nuclear warheads that we do. The Russian military openly discusses doctrinal changes which have broadened the circumstances under which they would use nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, they are in violation of the INF treaty, as well as other international agreements. Ukraine is not the only place we see aggressive, confrontational behavior as Russian aircraft and ships conduct provocative maneuvers rarely seen even at the height of the Cold War. In no area are they more aggressive than in propaganda, both internally and with neighboring countries.
Visiting Eastern Europe, one hears a lot about the massive, relentless misinformation campaign coming from Moscow. And when it comes to Ukraine, there seems no limit to the lies and extensive efforts to cover up the truth of direct Russian military involvement. Even on the political front media reports evidence that Russia helps finance green protest and anti-fracking movements in Europe, while providing employment for former European officeholders. The dominant topic of the Munich Security Conference this year was hybrid warfare, which refers to a variety of tactics and deceptions to advance a nation’s goals and to complicate any response from the other side. The Russians are not the only adversary using these tactics, but they pose special challenges, especially when some allies are all too willing to look for excuses not to act…
So in summary, the next President will have sitting on his or her desk a situation in which the one country that could pose an existential threat to the United States has growing military capabilities, a growing willingness to use them, a string of provocative actions and outright aggression, along with brazen deception as a matter of government policy without much of an effective response.
And that it just one of the many national security threats and challenges facing the U.S. What should we do? 535 Members of Congress cannot devise or implement national security strategy. What we can do is help clarify thinking, enlighten public opinion, and ensure that the next President will have the tools he or she needs to defend the country and protect our interests.
I suggest 5 elements are key, not only to deal with the growing Russian threat, but also with the other challenges we face:
- Speak the truth. Historic changes after World War II came about because Kennan, Churchill, and others were willing to speak the truth. Domestic political calculations and spin are too often the enemy of the truth. Americans and others need to know the facts of Russian involvement in Ukraine. I think we Americans tend to undervalue the battle of ideas. We took it seriously during the Cold War. But whether it is the struggle against radical Islam or against European aggression, the fight for the truth to be heard and believed is especially important in a networked world. Among other benefits, it lets our allies know that they are not alone. We need the organizations, capability, and political will to fight on that battlefield.
- Strengthen our defense, which starts with how much we spend. Next year’s budget is subject of confusing political maneuvering right now between Capitol Hill and the White House. Both the House and Senate passed Budget Resolutions and now Defense Authorization Bills at the level of defense funding requested by the President. It is the level that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dempsey called the “lower ragged edge” of what it takes to defend the country. Yet the President has threatened to veto either the authorization or appropriations bills or both at his requested level unless Congress agrees to spend more money on domestic agencies, such as the IRS and EPA. Just last Friday, the President repeated his warning to a group of mayors, saying “I will not sign bills that seek to increase defense spending before addressing any of our needs here at home.”
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I note that history has a way of turning irony into tragedy as today Secretary Carter is in Europe working to bolster our NATO allies’ commitment to the alliance, increase their defense budgets, and stiffen spines against Russia. He does that just as the President is holding the defense bills hostage here at home for his own political ends. Nothing would better underscore Secretary Carter’s message than the President’s prompt signature on a bill that funds our military, aids Ukraine, and adds resources to our posture in Eastern Europe. Increasing money to the Overseas Contingency Account is not the ideal way to fund defense, and I agree that we very much need higher, consistent, predictable funding. But holding defense hostage for higher EPA funding will not achieve that goal, and it certainly will not make our nation safer. The fact is that our defense spending has been cut 21% counting the effects of inflation over the last four years, and the world is not 21% safer. As Charles Krauthammer has famously noted, “Decline is a choice.”
We have a choice right now to meet the “lower ragged edge” of what is needed to defend the country or to play politics and end up with significantly less than is required. The choice we make may well prove to be a significant milestone on what the next 70 years will look like. As far as how we spend that money to strengthen our defenses, our nuclear deterrent requires special attention. This week our Committee will have several events on the topic. It is the foundation for all of our defense efforts, yet we have taken it for granted, neglecting the systems, the infrastructure, and the people involved in making sure those complex machines are safe, reliable and effective. The weapons and the delivery systems are all aging out about the same time, and maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent will have to be a major priority for the next administration and Congress. In tight budgets, it is tempting to shave off research and development funding. Tight budgets also cause institutional interests to be more protective of what they have. Neither of those temptations will help us meet the challenge posed by peer competitors. Deputy Secretary Work is leading a push known as the 3 rd Offset to stop the further erosion of American technological advantage. It is a matter of considerable importance and urgency. Few defense systems add uncertainty and complications into an adversary’s planning process as much missile defense. And few defense systems help reassure worried allies as much. An expedited push on both technological development and fielding of existing systems is needed. The new domain of warfare — cyber – poses special challenges for those of us who value the rule of law. But the threat is growing faster than we are able to deal with it. It is not our technical expertise that I worry about; it is our laws and policies that are not keeping up.
- Improve our Agility – We need not only to allocate more resources to defense, we need to make sure these resources are spent more effectively. That is one of the reasons both the House and Senate have put a high priority on defense reform. But an even more important reason to reform the Pentagon is to improve the agility of our system.
To be blunt, if it continues to take us 20 years to field a new airplane, we can never maintain a technological edge over our adversaries. While there are certain trends we can see, such as the increasing importance of the cyber domain, we have to be as ready as we can be to deal with the unexpected in this complex, volatile world. Rigidity is our enemy – whether it is in our bureaucratic organizations, in our military strategy and tactics, in our procurement systems, or in our decision-making. This year, we are focusing on reform of acquisition, reform of our personnel system, and reduction of overhead. Improving efficiency is one objective of these reforms, but to me improved agility is the overriding one.
- Stand strong with allies While the United States must have the capability to defend ourselves and our interests on our own, it is preferable and more likely that we will do so with allies. Whether it is Europe, Asia, or the Middle East, allies must pull their share of the weight. The fact that only four NATO allies are meeting the 2% of GDP target is not only unfair, it is most likely seen by Moscow as further evidence of mush. The U.S. should lead by example, stop the decline in our defense budgets, and demand that others meet the targets. We have to give those willing to defend their country against aggression the means to do so. It is disturbing to me that some here and in Europe see themselves sitting on Mount Olympus, passing judgment on who is qualified to fight an invasion of their country and who is not. It may be that if we provide the Ukrainians with lethal assistance to defend themselves that Putin will up the ante. But they still have the right to defend themselves, and Putin will pay a price for increased causalities – one he is obviously very nervous about paying. We need a concentrated effort to look at what works and what doesn’t when it comes to train and equip efforts. We have had successful and unsuccessful examples over the years, and later this year our Committee will take a look at both.
- Use all instruments of national power In 2007 I served on the Commission on Smart Power, whose recommendations were largely a matter of common sense before they got caught up in politics. We need the full range of capabilities and the judgment to know which tool to use in which circumstance. Secretaries of Defense have become strong advocates for funding of other agencies, yet the day-to-day frustration of antiquated approaches, bureaucratic infighting, stove-piped bureaucracies have led to more and more tasks being assigned the U.S. military. They will do whatever they are asked, but sometimes I worry that we ask too much.
One clear example of a non-defense tool that would make a difference in national security is energy. We need to end the ban on oil exports. The result would be lower fuel prices for our consumers, higher prices for our producers, and a step towards weaning several nations off of Russian energy.
Today we live in an unstable new world with some important parallels to those faced after World War II. The past gives us some positive examples to follow and other examples which provide a warning. Before the war began, in mid-1930s, as Britain was losing its superiority in the air over Germany, Churchill lamented, “When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that it is thoroughly out of hand we apply too late the remedies which then might have effected a cure.” “There is nothing new in the story. . . . Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong – those are the features which constitute the needless repetition of history.” Needless indeed.
We must not allow ourselves to fall into that trap as too many others before us have. On the other hand, we have the opportunity to learn from their mistakes and to benefit from the example of those who did meet their historical moment so that we may craft a security structure that rises to the challenge of our dangerous, volatile world. And so that 70 years from now, future generations will look back with gratitude at what we were able to put in place. We must not let them down.