USA Gov Policy

A U.S. State Department Report

Across much of the Indo-Pacific region, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using military and economic coercion to bully its neighbors, advance unlawful maritime claims, threaten maritime shipping lanes, and destabilize territory along the periphery of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  This predatory conduct increases the risk of miscalculation and conflict. The United States stands with its Southeast Asian allies and partners to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Establishing Overseas Military Bases

As the PRC’s overseas economic and security interests expand under its One Belt One Road initiative (BRI or OBOR), it seeks to expand its overseas military footprint to protect those interests.  Specifically, the PRC seeks to establish global logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to project and sustain military power at greater distances.  It abuses commercial arrangements at host country ports to support military functions and hides the true purpose of its installations overseas.  For example, PRC officials stated for many years that China would never seek overseas bases—up until they officially opened a base in Djibouti in 2017.  The PRC refers to its base in Djibouti as a logistics facility, even though PLA Navy Marines are stationed there equipped with armored vehicles and artillery.

By providing PRC entities with access to and control of ports and other facilities, countries may find they are inadvertently supporting the PRC’s military expansion and thus also Beijing’s revisionist geopolitical goals.  For example, media reports detail secret military agreements between China and Cambodia.  A Chinese military presence in Cambodia could threaten both regional stability and the position of ASEAN.  Further, it could undermine the prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the promotion of maritime safety and security, and the freedom of navigation and overflight.

To date, the impact of PRC militarization is most acutely felt in the South China Sea, where the PRC built several bases despite President Xi’s unambiguous promise in 2015 to not militarize the Spratly Islands.  Beijing now uses those locations to expand its intimidation and coercion of many Southeast Asian coastal states and undermine their efforts to exercise their sovereign rights under international law.

 Stealing Resources in the South China Sea

Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across much of the South China Sea are widely denounced as unlawful.  Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian coastal states in the South China Sea, bully them out of offshore resources, threaten them out of shipping lanes, assert unilateral dominion, and deprive fishermen of access to their livelihoods.  Beijing seeks to replace international law with “might makes right.”  The PRC has no legal grounds to unilaterally impose its will on the region.  Beijing has offered no coherent legal basis for its “Nine-Dashed Line” claim in the South China Sea, since formally announcing it in 2009.  In a unanimous decision on July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention—to which the PRC is a State Party—rejected much of the PRC’s South China Sea maritime claims as having no basis in international law.

Beijing should not be allowed to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire.  The United States stands with its Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.  Further, the United States stands with the international community in defense of freedom of the seas—rejecting any efforts to impose “might makes right” in the South China Sea or the wider region.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met with India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on July 1 to discuss cooperation between the two countries, weapons sales and the upcoming signing of the framework for the new defense partnership.

The meeting took place as the U.S. met with the Foreign Minister of Australia, the External Affairs Minister of India, and the Foreign Minister of Japan to, according to the U.S. State Department., “…reaffirm our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.” The nations emphasized a commitment to “defending the rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. As four leading maritime nations in the Indo-Pacific, we are united in our conviction that peace and stability in the maritime domain underpin the security and prosperity of the region. We are committed to a region where all countries are free from coercion and strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion.”

The statement was clearly aimed at China.

India’s population, military strength, and strategic geographical location render it one of the world’s most important nations.  The implications for the United States, particularly in the dangerous challenges from China, are extraordinary.

According to official Indian sources, “Defence is one of the major spending sectors in the Indian economy. The geographical and topographical diversity, especially the 15,000 km long border which India shares with seven neighbouring countries poses unique challenges…”

India has consistently taken a nonaligned position in global affairs.  However, as China’s aggressiveness has increased dramatically, it has been forced to face the reality that its security lies with western-aligned nations.

While India has recognized the common threat it faces from China with the U.S., it remains “nonaligned” in other international matters.

“Almost right at the beginning of the administration, President [Donald J.] Trump and Prime Minister Shri [Narendra] Modi set a strong foundation for our relationship, which we’re building on here today: productive, pragmatic and realistic,” Hegseth said. “And our nations boast a rich and growing history of cooperation driven by a shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.” 

The secretary said both the U.S. and India are mutually aware of the security concerns in the region, and both nations have the ability to counter that threat together. He also touched on U.S. efforts to provide India with the tools needed to counter threats in the Indo-Pacific region. 

“The United States is very pleased with the successful integration of many U.S. defense items into India’s inventory,” Hegseth said. “And building on this progress, we hope we can complete several major pending U.S. defense sales to India, expand our shared defense industrial cooperation and coproduction efforts, strengthen interoperability … between our forces, and then formally sign a new 10-year Framework for the U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership … which we hope to do very soon.” 

During a meeting in February between Trump and Modi, the two leaders announced plans to pursue new procurements and coproduction arrangements for Javelin antitank guided missiles and Stryker armored vehicles. Also discussed was procurement for six additional P-8I maritime patrol aircraft. 

India has already integrated into its own military American weapons, such as the C‑130J Super Hercules, C‑17 Globemaster III and P‑8I Poseidon aircraft, as well as the CH‑47F Chinook, MH‑60R Sea Hawk and AH‑64E Apache. India also utilizes the Harpoon antiship missiles, M777 howitzers and MQ‑9B Sky Guardians. 

Also in February, the president and prime minister pledged to increase military cooperation with enhanced training, exercises and operations. 

Hegseth and Jaishankar discussed participation in the next India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem Summit, where the two nations will continue to build on U.S.-India defense industrial cooperation and produce new innovations in technology and manufacturing. 

“We’re eager to work alongside you to realize our shared goals,” Hegseth said. “They’re deep and ongoing.” 

Jaishankar said India’s relationship with the U.S. is already strong, but more can be done. 

“We believe that our defense partnership is today truly one of the most consequential pillars of the relationship. It’s not built merely on shared interests, but we believe really deepening convergence and of capabilities, of responsibilities,” Jaishankar said. “And what we do in the Indo-Pacific, we believe, is absolutely crucial to its strategic stability.”

Photo: India successfully conducted release trials of the 1000-kg class Long-Range Glide Bomb (LRGB) ‘Gaurav’ from Su-30 MKI between Apr 8-10, 2025. Achieving 100 km range with pinpoint accuracy, the indigenously developed weapon marks a major boost for the Indian Air Forces’ strike capability. (India Defence Ministry photo)

The Congressional Research Service has released a major new report on North Koreas’ nuclear weapons and missile programs.  We conclude our presentation of that report.

Nuclear Warheads  

North Korean government statements show that the country  is aiming to increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads and  improve their design for a variety of delivery systems.  Some nongovernmental experts estimate that North Korea  has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads but may have assembled approximately 50. Another goal of  a nuclear weapon program is to lower the size and weight  of a nuclear warhead for deployment on missiles, called  “miniaturization.” A July 2017 DIA assessment asserted

North Korea had achieved the level of miniaturization  required to fit a nuclear device on weapons ranging from  short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to intercontinental  ballistic missiles (ICBM). Kim Jong-un in January 2021  said that the country was able to “miniaturize, lighten and  standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical  ones.” 

In his January 1, 2023, speech, Kim said the country would  expand its nuclear arsenal and “mass produce” tactical  nuclear weapons. The 2024 ATA said that Kim ordered a “an increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile and the  expansion of weapon-grade nuclear material production” in  March 2023. The ATA said that “North Korea also unveiled  a purported tactical nuclear warhead and claimed it could  be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including an  unmanned underwater vehicle and cruise missiles.”

Missile Testing 

North Korea has accelerated the pace of its ballistic missile  test launches since 2022. UN Security Council (UNSC)  resolutions prohibit North Korea’s development of the  means of delivering conventional and nuclear payloads, in  addition to the nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC  resolutions specifically ban “all ballistic missile tests” by North Korea. A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a  rocket engine until it reaches the apogee of its trajectory, at  which point it falls back to earth using earth’s gravity.  Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional  payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are  categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range  (intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site  to the target. 

North Korea will likely continue testing and developing a  variety of missiles to increase the reliability, effectiveness,  and survivability of its ballistic missile force. According to  the 2025 ATA, North Korea may be receiving technical  expertise from Moscow in exchange for weapons sales, which “could accelerate North Korea’s testing and  deployment efforts.” In his May 2025 congressional  testimony, U.S. Forces Korea Commander said, “Russia’s  expanded cooperation will enable advancements of DPRK’s  weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program across the  next three to five years.” 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

North Korea has been improving its ability to strike the  continental United States with an ICBM through a series of  tests, first in 2017, then in 2022, four times in 2023, and  most recently in October 2024. The DPRK first  successfully test-launched two liquid-propellant, road mobile ICBMs in 2017: the Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated  KN-20) and Hwasong-15 (U.S. designated KN-22). North  Korea displayed a larger Hwasong-17 ICBM at an October  2020 military parade and began test launching it in 2022. In December 2022, North Korea static (or ground) tested an  ICBM solid-propellant rocket motor, potentially for a land based or submarine-based ICBM. On April 13, July 12, and  December 17, 2023, North Korea flight tested its solid-fuel  ICBM, the Hwasong-18. The October 31, 2024, test was  assessed as a Hwasong-19 solid-propellant ICBM with  multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)  capability. These systems may require further testing to  improve reliability. 

Short- and Medium-Range Missiles 

North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), precision-guided multiple launch rocket systems  (MLRS), and artillery pose the most acute near-term threats to other nations. Advances in these systems demonstrate a shift toward solid propellants and satellite guidance  systems; advances that could carry over to larger, more  potent systems like the Hwasong series ICBMs. These  developments provide the projectiles greater mobility and  survivability prior to launch and greater precision on target. Selected systems are described here. 

In the MRBM category, the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) is a  solid-propellant missile capable of carrying a nuclear or  conventional payload—known as dual capable. The North  Koreans fire the missile from a tracked vehicle, which gives  the system mobility and makes prelaunch targeting of the  system difficult. The KN-23 SRBM can strike any location  on the Korean peninsula with either a conventional or  nuclear payload and uses a solid-propellant. 

North Korea has committed to expanding the performance of its precision guided tactical weapons, which can pose  significant threats to South Korea and U.S. assets on the  peninsula. The KN-24 is a tactical system with a mobile  launcher, solid propellant, and relatively large payload. The  KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile; however,  it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at  significant range. The North Koreans may seek to fire these rockets in salvos to overwhelm missile defense systems. 

The recent advances in North Korea’s ballistic missile  program appear to be directed at developing capabilities to  defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses in  the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),  and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). The  United States and South Korea are developing Integrated  Air and Missile Defense (IAMD).  

North Korea’s progress with submarine-launched ballistic  missiles (SLBM) suggests an effort to counter land-based  THAAD missile defenses by launching attacks from  positions at sea outside the THAAD’s radar field of view,  although local Aegis BMD systems could likely still track  these projectiles. The Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was  successfully tested beginning in late 2019. According to a 2021 DIA report, North Korea has said this SLBM, to be  launched from a ballistic missile submarine, will be cold launched, solid-fueled and “will carry a nuclear warhead.”  North Korea has since then revealed development of  longer-range SLBMs, the Pukguksong-4, -5, and -6. Unveiled in 2022, the Pukguksong-6 is a longer-range  SLBN that some analysts assess is solid-fueled, MIRVed, and under development with a new ballistic missile  submarine (SSBN). 

North Korean missile tests have demonstrated growing  success and, coupled with increased operational training  exercises, suggest a pattern designed to strengthen the  credibility of North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent  strategy. 

Photo: Pixabay

The Congressional Research Service has released a major new report on North Koreas’ nuclear weapons and missile programs.  We present that report for you in two parts.

 Overview 

North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and  missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions  and high-level diplomatic efforts. The country’s ballistic  missile testing, military parades, and policy statements  suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear  warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic  missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a  deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more  credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises  questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may wish to examine U.S. policy toward North  Korea. 

U.S. policy as well as UN resolutions call on North Korea  to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs. In  recent years, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has  repeatedly rejected “denuclearization” talks. According to  the U.S. intelligence community’s 2025 annual threat  assessment (ATA), Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as  a “guarantor of regime security.”  

In response, the United States and South Korea have  conducted joint military drills and exercises, and  established bilateral consultative mechanisms focused on  strengthening extended deterrence such as the Nuclear  Consultative Group to “discuss nuclear and strategic  planning, and manage the threat the DPRK poses to the  global nonproliferation regime.” The Biden  Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review said, “Any  nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or  its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the  end of that regime.” It maintains that U.S. nuclear weapons  will continue to play a role in deterring “rapid strategic  attacks” by North Korea in East Asia. 

Nuclear Doctrine and Plans 

Kim Jong Un said at the 2016 Workers’ Party Congress that  “nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final  order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s  Army [Kim Jong Un] to repel invasion or attack from a  hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.” 

At the 8^th North Korean Workers Party Congress in January  2021, Kim announced a Five-Year Defense Plan that said  the country would field a new nuclear-capable submarine,  develop its tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple  warheads on a single missile, and improve its ICBMs’ accuracy, among other goals. The plan includes  development of an ICBM with a range of 15,000 km for  “preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike,” and ground based and sea-based solid-fueled ICBMs. Some analysts predict an increase in missile testing this year in order to  meet these goals by 2026. 

The Korea People’s Assembly adopted a new law in  September 2022 that reportedly expands the conditions  

under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to  include possible first use in situations that threaten the  regime’s survival. In September 2023, Kim promised to  boost nuclear weapons production “exponentially” and  diversify nuclear strike options. 

Nuclear Testing 

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times  since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts  progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield. North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3,  2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a  hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that  it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic  missile. In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had  achieved its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It  dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018.  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say  North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022. A  recent U.S. Department of Defense report said that “North  Korea has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured  to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.” 

Nuclear Material Production 

North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile  material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for  weapons. Fissile material production in large part  determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a  country is able to build. 

North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities  after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is also operating centrifuge uranium enrichment plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at Kangson. In March 2025, the IAEA reported construction and operations  at the Yongbyon uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, “undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and  Yongbyon,” and activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory  plant and Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor site. Spent fuel from that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory to extract plutonium for  weapons. The IAEA also reported ongoing uranium mining,  milling, and concentration activities at Pyongsan. 

The report concludes tomorrow

Illustration: Pixabay

The same media, and the same politicians, that hid Biden’s incapacity and ignored evidence of his corruption are now seeking to portray any inquest into those crimes as nothing more than revenge. It is part of a pattern of Democratic Party hyper-partisanship and cover-ups that has, for decades, harmed America.

Much of the media and academia casts the Democratic Party and its leaders in a soft glow of praise and nostalgia. But the facts have become too vast to ignore. The organization’s history of endorsing slavery, segregation, (did you know that a higher percentage of Republicans voted in favor of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 than Democrats?) socialism, open borders, and now, antisemitism (In 2023, a significant number of Democrat representatives refused to vote for a House resolution condemning antisemitism voting “present” instead of supporting it.) has been swept under the rug.

While individual politicians on both sides have committed electoral misdeeds, it is the Democrats who have institutionalized it and made it a key part of their campaign strategies. The use of Covid as an excuse to ignore ballot safeguards was the latest iteration, but it follows in the footsteps of Democrat foul play involving ballot harvesting, fighting against voter ID, preserving inaccurate registration rolls, and casting ballots for the dead. The expulsion of reporters and poll watchers from key precincts in the 2020 election followed by the “discovery” of boxes of ballots in the dark of night (supporting Biden) in that election was a violation the media refused to cover, and ridiculing those that discussed it.  It is similar to the aspersions cast on the few sources, led by the New York Post, that reported on the Hunter Biden laptop story.  

Unsavory tactics have been a hallmark of the party. Democratic leadership has condoned or ignored the aggressive tactics of pro-Hamas demonstrators, in much the same way they did with Antifa and Black Lives Matter. Having failed to forcefully condemn the use of violence as a political tool, and having welcomed hard-core socialists into their ranks, they have encouraged the growth of unlawful tactics and the rise to power of those who use them. Democrat leadership has engaged in verbal threats against free speech (Senator Schumer has stated that “I believe there ought to be limits because the First Amendment is not absolute. …We have libel laws. We have anti-pornography laws. All of those are limits on the First Amendment. Well, what could be more important than the wellspring of our democracy? And certain limits on First Amendment rights that if left unfettered, destroy the equality — any semblance of equality in our democracy — of course would be allowed by the Constitution. And the new theorists on the Supreme Court who don’t believe that, I am not sure where their motivation comes from, but they are just so wrong. They are just so wrong.”

Notably, that same Senator Schumer issued verbal threats against Supreme Court Justices who considering voting against his position on a legal issue. As noted in Scotusblog, “Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., turned and gestured toward the court building. He said, “I want to tell you, Gorsuch; I want to tell you, Kavanaugh. You have released the whirlwind. And you will pay the price.”

Concerns regarding the ethics of the Biden White House, and Biden himself, significantly predate the latest revelations about his medical concerns. The Biden family’s financial relationship with China goes back as far as his vice-presidency, and included significant financial gain in return for no discernable service (other than influence peddling.) It is remarkable to realize that one of the Trump impeachment trials was based, during his first term in office, on his attempt to research Biden corruption in Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether the latest revelations about Biden, and Democratic Party, corruption will lead to reforms.

Illustration: Pixabay

Iran’s nuclear weapons program has met face-to-face with Israel’s Operation rising Lion as well as America’s B2 bombers.

In an aerial bombardment campaign, not seen since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Israel took over command of the skies above Iran in just under two days and left the country weaker. It was a well-planned operation that earned Israel air superiority with Iran exhibiting military underperformance. Zohar Palti, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy says that the strike’s success presented a “profound shock to the [Iranian] regime and its public.”

Members of the intelligence community in Washington say it is understandable that Israel could no longer tolerate Iran’s growing stockpile of fissile material. With Iran’s April 2024 attack, Palti says “Iran crossed a major threshold by directly attacking Israel. That strike shattered a psychological barrier, intensified Israeli fears, and ultimately led Jerusalem to conclude that it had to take action against Iran’s nuclear progress.”

Tehran’s stockpile serves as the basis for a dangerous and large nuclear weapons arsenal that could rapidly add to the regime’s growing missile stocks. “Israel’s main goal is to inflict maximum damage on the Iranian nuclear and missile programs and the military-industrial infrastructure supporting them,” says Michael Eisenstadt, author of “Attacking Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Action.” Israel’s Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi recently pointed out that the Israeli leadership  recognizes that historical data suggest an air campaign alone cannot dismantle a dispersed, hardened and buried nuclear weapons program. It suggests his country’s intent may be, in part, to impose sufficient costs on Iran to induce a return to negotiations under more favorable terms. Tehran, Eisenstadt says, will be in even greater need of post-conflict sanctions relief to preserve regime stability and carry out reconstruction. 

One unanswered question is what will occur next – did the recent strike trigger an escalation or will Iran decide it has no choice but to sit down for talks with Israel. If Iran won’t negotiate, Israel’s “mowing the grass” efforts alone may not prove sufficient to stabilize the threat should Iran decide to rebuild its nuclear program. “Three distinct scenarios are possible: a tenuous ceasefire, likely followed by renewed Iranian efforts to rebuild its nuclear and missile programs, with Israel taking steps to disrupt these efforts; renewed nuclear negotiations as a result of Iranian military exhaustion, fear of domestic unrest, and/or fear of U.S. military intervention; or regime collapse,” says Eisenstadt. Although regime collapse is unlikely, events are unfolding among Iran’s citizenry that suggest the populace is not fully supportive of regime policies.

Military experts in Washington point out that Israel’s latest air campaign appears to have severely damaged Iran’s nuclear weapons program, with missile salvos aimed precisely at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command centers, missile systems, nuclear facilities, and state broadcasting facilities, among other critical infrastructure. “Either Tehran accepts a ceasefire in the next couple days, or Israel will put all military options on the table, including energy infrastructure, political leadership, and military bases,” says Palti. Israel is prepared to conduct strikes on oil and natural gas sites, regime focal points in the provinces, and senior leadership, he adds, in an attempt to change Iran’s behavior across the region. One military analyst suggests that the Trump Administration, in an attempt to draw the conflict to a close, is considering backing a strike on Iran’s most fortified nuclear site, the Fordow enrichment plant. 

In recent days Iran has quietly approached its Arab neighbors suggesting it may be preparing to halt hostilities and is willing to negotiate if Israel agrees to cease aggressive action toward Iran. Officials in Tehran appear to be concluding that if it refuses to negotiate, Washington will be drawn into the conflict – a war it is not prepared to fight right now. Regime survival is at the center of a decision by Iran’s leadership. Since last spring, Israeli military leaders have expressed increased confidence that it could face off with Iran’s network of terrorist and nonstate actors, defend against future ballistic missile strikes and effectively attack inside Iran. Time is growing short for the regime to decide on a course of action that will guarantee regime survival. With domestic pressure rising inside the country it is a rare diplomatic opening that, hopefully, Iran will accept. Washington also needs to convince Israel that an immediate truce followed by negotiations could compel Iran to shutter its nuclear program, halt missile production, disassemble its proxy network. US priorities in the region this week are centered on protecting American personnel and preventing the expansion of the conflict. According to one analyst, “It is time to assess whether US red lines have already been crossed.” The US Embassy branch in Tel Aviv was damaged by an Iranian ballistic missile, and Iran sent drones on suicide missions in attempts to destroy the US Consulate in Erbil, Iraq and kill US service members at al-Asad Air Base. One more misstep by any party involved in the conflict could lead to widespread disaster. The options are narrowing for Iran.

Photo: Pixabay