Moscow has dramatically increased its military budget, and has asserted itself boldly on the world stage. It does so despite any threat, and that should trouble western policy makers.
Entering into the 21st century, Russia found itself in a generally favorable position. Its former Cold War opponent, the United States, could no longer be counted as an enemy. Indeed, following the rise of Islamic terrorism and the continuance of aggressive Arab regimes, Washington sought the Kremlin’s alliance. NATO, which had substantially slashed spending, was clearly not a problem to be contended with. Indeed, Russian representatives roamed the halls of the alliance’s headquarters and cooperation (on the part of NATO) was the order of the day. In many ways, the global interests of Washington and Moscow appeared to coincide.
During the Obama presidency, American defense spending was sharply reduced, and the New START arms treaty gave, for the first time, a strategic nuclear advantage to Russia, which also held a ten to one advantage in conventional nuclear arms. Mr. Obama essentially conceded to Moscow’s wishes on key issues such as anti-ballistic missile deployment.
Moscow’s major disputes with China were but a memory, and as the new century moved on, the two giant nations grew closer, eventually engaging in joint war games (rather pointedly aimed at the U.S.,) the sharing of military technology, and important economic ties.
Moscow’s economy didn’t depend on or require foreign adventures or territory. With extensive energy resources and a developing economy, friendly, rather than adversarial, relations with other countries were and are far more advantageous.
Despite the lack of enemies or a need for foreign adventures, Russia, under the Putin regime, has essentially returned to the cold war, aggressive, and militaristic policies of the Soviet Union, an entity who’s passing the former KGB official clearly regrets.
Therein lays the only logical explanation for the Kremlin’s budget-busting military buildup. Unlike a standard democracy, where the financial well-being of the voters is paramount, Putin, through both Soviet-style intimidations of his domestic political opponents and an appeal to nostalgia for the days when the Kremlin’s armed might made the world tremble, can and has ignored that standard concern of even pseudo-representative governments. He is free to pursue his goal of restoring the U.S.S.R., despite the costs and lack of benefit to his people.
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The burden on Russia’s economy is increasingly clear. As noted by Stratfor, “Russia is entering its second recession in six years. The economy began slowing in 2013, but the combination of sanctions from the West, soured investment sentiment toward Russia and low oil prices has hastened its decline. In January, the Kremlin slashed the 2015 [civilian] budget by 10 percent across the board — except for defense — but even with that cut Russia still faces a $54 billion deficit this year…missing from the discussions and leaks is any mention of cutting defense spending. In fact, the original 2015 budget expanded defense spending by 20 percent, then revised it to just a 10 percent expansion from 2014 levels… Currently Russia spends 4.8 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, up from 3.5 percent in 2014. This is more than double what NATO guidelines say members should spend on defense… Russian economists and financial analysts openly criticizing the Kremlin’s decision on defense spending are pressured or silenced.”
During the same time that the U.S. defense budget was sharply reduced, and without the existence of any credible threat, Russia’s defense budget was hiked by over 30%. The spending spree is expected to continue as the Kremlin looks to fulfill President Putin’s massive additional $722 billion additional investments in armaments.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies contrasts Moscow’s buildup with Europe’s continuing decline in military strength: “Military modernisation in Russia is continuing, with investment in new ships, combat aircraft and guided weapons. Russia continues to test the Sukhoi T-50 fifth generation fighter aircraft, and may be finalising designs of a new long-range bomber. Russia has nuclear weapons very much at the centre of its military strategy, and there is increased emphasis on its rapid-reaction forces, while its air and maritime capabilities are often being deployed provocatively. Overall, Europe is facing a more belligerent Russia that appears intent on testing the resolve of the West….European defence spending continued the decline seen since the 2008 financial crisis, and was in 2014 cumulatively 8% lower, in real terms, than in 2010. There were signs that the more challenging strategic environment was shifting budgetary priorities, particularly in Northern and Eastern Europe, and amid unease about possible gaps in NATO’s capacity to counter Russia’s use of hybrid warfare techniques. However, defence allocations in Europe’s leading military players maintained their downward slide.
“Military equipment across the continent also continued to reduce, with policymakers focusing instead on the advanced capabilities of future kit. Numbers have declined substantially since the Cold War. Between 1995 and 2015, main battle tank numbers in Europe dropped from around 25,000 to just under 8,000, while fighters and ground attack aircraft decreased from 5,400 to 2,400.”
The Council on Foreign Relations comparison of Russian and European military strength illuminates the contrast. “the Russian armed forces are in the midst of a historic overhaul with significant consequences for Eurasian politics and security. Russian officials say the reforms are necessary to bring a Cold War-era military into the twenty-first century, but many Western analysts fear they will enable Moscow to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, often relying on force to coerce its weaker neighbors… Both in terms of troops and weapons, Russian conventional forces dwarf those of its Eastern European and Central Asian neighbors…, many of which are relatively weak ex-Soviet republics closely allied with Moscow. Russia has a military pact with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, formed in 1992. Moscow also stations troops in the region: Armenia (3,300), Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (7,000), Moldova’s separatist Transnistria region (1,500), Kyrgyzstan (500), Tajikistan (5,000), and Crimea (20,000)… Moscow is intent on remilitarizing its Arctic territory and is restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports to help protect important hydrocarbon resources and shipping lanes. (Russia has the world’s largest fleet of icebreakers, which are regularly required to navigate these waters.) In late 2013, Putin ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian Arctic.”
Policy makers in the United States and Europe continue to construct their defense and diplomatic strategies regarding Russia not as reality would suggest, but as they wish the facts were. That further strengthens Putin’s hand and encourages further militarization and adventurism on his part.